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Jordan, J

Publications and source records attributed to Jordan, J.

CONTAINMENT OF LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AT THE DOE SALTSTONE DISPOSAL FACILITY

As facilities look for permanent storage of toxic materials, they are forced to address the long-term impacts to the environment as well as any individuals living in affected area. As these materials are stored underground, modeling of the contaminant transport through the ground is an essential part of the evaluation. The contaminant transport model must address the long-term degradation of the containment system as well as any movement of the contaminant through the soil and into the groundwater. In order for disposal facilities to meet their performance objectives, engineered and natural barriers are relied upon. Engineered barriers include things like the design of the disposal unit, while natural barriers include things like the depth of soil between the disposal unit and the water table. The Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina is an example of a waste disposal unit that must be evaluated over a timeframe of thousands of years. The engineered and natural barriers for the SDF allow it to meet its performance objective over the long time frame. Some waste disposal facilities are required to meet certain standards to ensure public safety. These type of facilities require an engineered containment system to ensure that these requirements are met. The Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is an example of this type of facility. The facility is evaluated based on a groundwater pathway analysis which considers long-term changes to material properties due to physical and chemical degradation processes. The facility is able to meet these performance objectives due to the multiple engineered and natural barriers to contaminant migration.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

THERMAL MODELING ANALYSIS OF SRS 70 TON CASK

The primary objective of this work was to perform the thermal calculations to evaluate the Material Test Reactor (MTR) fuel assembly temperatures inside the SRS 70-Ton Cask loaded with various bundle powers. MTR fuel consists of HFBR, MURR, MIT, and NIST. The MURR fuel was used to develop a bounding case since it is the fuel with the highest heat load. The results will be provided for technical input for the SRS 70 Ton Cask Onsite Safety Assessment. The calculation results show that for the SRS 70 ton dry cask with 2750 watts total heat source with a maximum bundle heat of 670 watts and 9 bundles of MURR bounding fuel, the highest fuel assembly temperatures are below about 263 C. Maximum top surface temperature of the plastic cover is about 112 C, much lower than its melting temperature 260 C. For 12 bundles of MURR bounding fuel with 2750 watts total heat and a maximum fuel bundle of 482 watts, the highest fuel assembly temperatures are bounded by the 9 bundle case. The component temperatures of the cask were calculated by a three-dimensional computational fluid dynamics approach. The modeling calculations were performed by considering daily-averaged solar heat flux.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS OF BULK TRITIUM SHIPPING PACKAGE

The Bulk Tritium Shipping Package was designed by Savannah River National Laboratory. This package will be used to transport tritium. As part of the requirements for certification, the package must be shown to meet the scenarios of the Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) defined in Code of Federal Regulations Title 10 Part 71 (10CFR71). The conditions include a sequential 30-foot drop event, 30-foot dynamic crush event, and a 40-inch puncture event. Finite Element analyses were performed to support and expand upon prototype testing. Cases similar to the tests were evaluated. Additional temperatures and orientations were also examined to determine their impact on the results. The peak stress on the package was shown to be acceptable. In addition, the strain on the outer drum as well as the inner containment boundary was shown to be acceptable. In conjunction with the prototype tests, the package was shown to meet its confinement requirements.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Packaging and Transportation of Additional Neptunium Oxide

The Savannah River Site's HB-Line Facility completed a second neptunium oxide production campaign in which nine (9) additional cans of neptunium oxide were produced and shipped to the Idaho National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the 9975 shipping container. These additional cans were from a different feed solution than the first fifty (50) cans of neptunium oxide that were previously produced and shipped via a Letter of Amendment to the 9975 Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) content table. This paper will address the challenges associated with demonstrating the neptunium oxide produced from the additional feed solution was equivalent to the original neptunium oxide and within the content description of the Letter of Amendment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NEPTUNIUM OXIDE PROCESSING

The Savannah River Site's HB-Line Facility completed a campaign in which fifty nine cans of neptunium oxide were produced and shipped to the Idaho National Laboratory in the 9975 shipping container. The neptunium campaign was divided into two parts: Part 1 which consisted of oxide made from H-Canyon neptunium solution which did not require any processing prior to conversion into an oxide, and Part 2 which consisted of oxide made from additional H-Canyon neptunium solutions which required processing to purify the solution prior to conversion into an oxide. The neptunium was received as a nitrate solution and converted to oxide through ion-exchange column extraction, precipitation, and calcination. Numerous processing challenges were encountered in order make a final neptunium oxide product that could be shipped in a 9975 shipping container. Among the challenges overcome was the issue of scale: translating lab scale production into full facility production. The balance between processing efficiency and product quality assurance was addressed during this campaign. Lessons learned from these challenges are applicable to other processing projects.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗