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Kerby, Leslie

Publications and source records attributed to Kerby, Leslie.

A Survey of Proposed Standards and Regulations for Artificial Intelligence

Over the last decade, the interest in machine learning and artificial intelligence (A.I) has grown exponentially. Researchers across several industries have explored and proposed uses of machine learning that have the potential to exponentially improve automation, efficiency, etc. The nuclear industry is no exception, with several studies exploring applications in almost every aspect of the field. However, these developments have brought forth a number of concerns. Government officials, industry leaders and many others have called for new regulations to govern the development and implementation of A.I systems. In order for machine learning and A.I to be viable for nuclear applications, there will need to be great regulatory oversight. The purpose of this study is to examine current and proposed regulations that relate to machine learning and provide recommendations for future regulations, specifically for nuclear applications.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Complete Evaluation on Advanced Reactor Machine Learning Subversion Attacks (Final)

Navigating through the world of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in nuclear reactors and their Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems demands a careful, deliberate journey. AI’s capability to manage massive datasets and streamline control systems has indeed carved out a significant role in various sectors, including nuclear energy. However, while AI, and particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), bring a lot to the table in terms of operational efficiency and anomaly detection, they also expose the sector to a new breed of cybersecurity threats, like Inference Attacks, Adversarial Attacks, and Trojan Attacks. This guide is designed to be a straightforward manual, diving deep into the intertwining worlds of AI and cybersecurity within nuclear reactors, and tailoring insights for three crucial audiences: I&C Vendors/Developers, Nuclear Regulators, and Nuclear Reactor Operators and Cyber Defense Teams. (1) Section 2, directed at I&C Vendors/Developers, will provide a clear and focused look at several cybersecurity attacks, offering practical recommendations and detailed scenarios related to AI cybersecurity. This section isn’t just about identifying problems but also about giving solid, usable solutions. (2) Section 3, meant for Nuclear Regulators, gets straight to the point about regulations, policy suggestions, and guidelines that are needed to lay down a robust, secure, and ethical foundation for the application of AI in nuclear operations. The focus is on making sure that everything adheres to international standards and laws while being practicable and clear-cut. (3) Section 4, aimed at Nuclear Reactor Operators and Cyber Defense Teams, offers an exhaustive exploration and technical reports, with clear recommendations and scenario analyses vital to protect operational environments and guarantee the secure application of AI in nuclear reactor operations. The goal is simple: as we step into an era where AI becomes a fundamental element of our technological and energy infrastructures, this guide is here to act as a clear, direct handbook, ensuring that AI is implemented within the nuclear sector in a manner that is secure, responsible, and practical. It’s about striking a balance – optimizing the undeniable benefits offered by AI while securing and shielding against potential cyber threats as we move through this new and complex landscape.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Expanded analysis of machine learning models for nuclear transient identification using TPOT

Industries around the world are becoming more and more data driven. The nuclear field is no exception with several different applications being proposed. One popular area of research is the use of machine learning in transient detection. This paper seeks to build upon a previous study which made use of the AutoML package TPOT to train traditional machine learning models to classify transient events occurring with a reactor. Synthetic data was once again collected using a GPWR reactor simulator. Data on 12 different events was collected using 15 different initial conditions. Here, a dataset consisting of over 100,000 data points was compiled and used to train 7 different machine learning models using a pre-defined TPOT dictionary with 12 different preprocessing techniques. Three of the trained models were able to produce validation results in the 90s with the expanded dataset. Once the models were trained, it was possible to look into where during the simulation, misclassifications occurred. Using these three models, analysis was done to determine if TPOT could be used to train models that were effective if important features were missing. The results from this were positive with the newly trained models scoring close to the original models. Finally, to conclude this study, the three high performing models were retrained using different random states to see if there was any major variation when different states were used.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Generalized Spallation Model

The Generalized Spallation Model (GSM) event generator is an advanced, robust, and scalable Fortran code developed from an extended and improved version of the earlier event generator codes CEM03.03 and LAQGSM03.03. The GSM implements its algorithms within the context of cascade exciton, particle equilibration, particle evaporation, and particle disintegration models sampled via Monte-Carlo techniques. Coalescence of particles is also considered. The GSM assumes the incident particles has sufficient energy to satisfy the assumptions utilized in the GSM. The GSM calculates reactions induced by hadrons and nuclei incident on nuclear targets at incident energies ranging from ~20 MeV up to several TeV per nucleon. Usage of GSM is recommended however for particles with incident energies exceeding ~100 MeV to ensure model-assumptions are satisfied. The GSM additionally provides its clients with sub-model libraries to allow them to model desired physics within their own physical models.

Juneau, Chase↗

Advancement of Functional Expansion Tallies Capabilities in Serpent 2

The need for accident tolerant fuels (ATFs) became self-evident after the series of unfortunate nuclear events at Fukushima Daiichi in 2011. Restarting the Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT) at INL is one component in this concerted effort to establish the ATF development and testing program under the United States Department of Energy. Prior to the closure of TREAT in 1994, each experiment required multiple low-power calibration tests before and after each run. Since then, computing advancements have set computer-based modeling and simulation (M and S) as the preferred calibration method. The anticipated savings are both temporal and monetary. MAMMOTH, a collection of M and S tools built from the finite element-based MOOSE Framework, has been established to support the designed experiments intended for TREAT. This collection of tools includes: 1) Rattlesnake, a striking diffusion-based neutronics code, 2) BISON, an advanced materials and fuels performance code, and 3) RELAP-7, a powerful thermal-hydraulics solver. Each is capable of independently performing its function accurately and effectively; unified, they create a powerful multiphysics reactor core M and S application. One unfortunate weakness in this configuration lies in the unique geometry and design of TREAT's core. Although simple to model, this poses a challenge to the diffusion solver in Rattlesnake. One alternative is to replace Rattlesnake with Serpent, a fully-fledged Monte Carlo (MC) neutronics code. Coincidentally, Rattlesnake calculations are frequently validated against Serpent simulations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Integration of OpenMC methods into MAMMOTH and Serpent

OpenMC, a Monte Carlo particle transport simulation code focused on neutron criticality calculations, contains several methods we wish to emulate in MAMMOTH and Serpent. First, research coupling OpenMC and the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE) has shown promising results. Second, the utilization of Functional Expansion Tallies (FETs) allows for a more efficient passing of multiphysics data between OpenMC and MOOSE. Both of these capabilities have been preliminarily implemented into Serpent. Results are discussed and future work recommended.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗