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Khargonekar, Pramod

Publications and source records attributed to Khargonekar, Pramod.

On the marginal value of electricity storage

We investigate the problem of characterizing the economic value of energy storage capacity to a wind power producer (WPP) that sells its energy in a conventional two-settlement electricity market. The WPP can offer a forward contract to supply power in the day-ahead market, subject to financial penalties for imbalances between the contracted power and the power that is delivered in real-time. We consider the setting in which the WPP has access to a co-located energy storage system, and can thus reshape its wind power production subject to its storage capacity constraints. Modeling wind power as a random process, we show that the problem of determining optimal forward contract offerings—given recourse with storage—is convex. We further establish that the maximum expected profit is concave and non-decreasing in the energy storage capacity, which reveals that the greatest marginal benefit from energy storage is derived from initial investment in small storage capacity. We provide a characterization of the marginal value of small energy storage capacity to the WPP. The formulae we derive shed light on the relationship between the value of storage and certain statistical measures of variability in the underlying wind power process.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Smart Grid Integrity Attacks: Characterizations and Countermeasures

Real power injections at loads and generators, and real power flows on selected lines in a transmission network are monitored, transmitted over a SCADA network to the system operator, and used in state estimation algorithms to make dispatch, re-balance and other energy management system [EMS] decisions. Coordinated cyber attacks of power meter readings can be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm. These unobservable attacks present a serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks [under standard DC load flow approximations] involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of power meters on lines is presented. This requires O(n2m) flops for a power system with n buses and m line meters. If all lines are metered, there exist canonical forms that characterize all 3, 4, and 5-sparse unobservable attacks. These can be quickly detected in power systems using standard graph algorithms. Known secure phase measurement units [PMUs] can be used as countermeasures against an arbitrary collection of cyber attacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NP-hard. It is shown that p + 1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize a collection of p cyber attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗