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Korsah, Kofi

Publications and source records attributed to Korsah, Kofi.

14 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

Assessment of Sensor Technologies for Advanced Reactors

This paper provides an assessment of sensor technologies and a determination of measurement needs for advanced reactors (AdvRx). It is a summary of a study performed to provide the technical basis for identifying and prioritizing research targets within the instrumentation and control (I&C) Technology Area under the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Advanced Reactor Technology (ART) program. The study covered two broad reactor technology categories: High Temperature Reactors and Fast Reactors. The scope of “High temperature reactors” included Gen IV reactors whose coolant exit temperatures exceed ≈650 °C and are moderated (as opposed to fast reactors). To bound the scope for fast reactors, this report reviewed relevant operating experience from US-operated Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) and relevant test experience from the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF). For high temperature reactors the study showed that in many cases instrumentation have performed reasonably well in research and demonstration reactors. However, even in cases where the technology is “mature” (such as thermocouples), HTGRs can benefit from improved technologies. Current HTGR instrumentation is generally based on decades-old technology and adapting newer technologies could provide significant advantages. For sodium fast reactors, the study found that several key research needs arise around (1) radiation-tolerant sensor design for in-vessel or in-core applications, where possible non-invasive sensing approaches for key parameters that minimize the need to deploy sensors in-vessel, (2) approaches to exfiltrating data from in-vessel sensors while minimizing penetrations, (3) calibration of sensors in-situ, and (4) optimizing sensor placements to maximize the information content while minimizing the number of sensors needed.

Korsah, Kofi↗
DOE OSTI2017

A qualitative assessment of current CCF guidance based on a review of safety system digital implementation changes with evolving technology - 148

This paper is a summary of a study performed in support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate current policy on software common-cause failure (CCF). The study reported in this paper is one of several that contributed to the technical basis to inform NRC staff. The study first reviewed policies and assessment guidance as discussed in the Staff Requirements Memorandum to the Secretary of the Commission, Office of the NRC (SECY) 93-087, Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19, Guidance on Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth and Diversity in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems, as well as Chapter 7, 'Instrumentation and Controls', in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. The study then examined instrumentation and controls (I and C) technology implementations in nuclear power plants in the light of current CCF guidance. The intent was to assess whether the current position on CCF remains appropriate given the evolutions in digital safety system implementations and, if gaps in the guidance were found, to provide recommendations as to how these gaps could be closed. The methodology adopted was to review the vendors' technology and software implementation processes for digital safety systems as technology evolved. The following three representative safety systems were selected to provide illustrative examples: - Eagle 21 was selected to represent vintage microprocessor-based technology used from the 1980's to mid-1990's, - TELEPERM XS (TXS) was selected to represent second generation microprocessor-based technology used from the mid-1990's to the 2000's, and - The advanced logic system (ALS) was selected to represent the latest trend of using technology based on field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Technology implementations were reviewed in light of the basic premise of the NRC in BTP 7-19 (Revision 6), that software-based or software-logic-based digital system development errors are a credible source of CCF and therefore are susceptible to CCF because identical copies of the software-based logic and architecture are present in redundant divisions of safety-related systems. BTP 7-19 categorizes firmware and logic developed from software-based development systems all under software. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Assessment of sensor technologies for advanced reactors - 250

This paper provides an assessment of sensor technologies and a determination of measurement needs for advanced reactors (AdvRx). It is a summary of a study performed to provide the technical basis for identifying and prioritizing research targets within the instrumentation and control (I and C) Technology Area under the Department of Energy's (DoE's) Advanced Reactor Technology (ART) program. The study covered two broad reactor technology categories: High Temperature Reactors and Fast Reactors. The scope of 'High temperature reactors' included Gen IV reactors whose coolant exit temperatures exceed about {approx}650 deg. C and are moderated (as opposed to fast reactors). To bound the scope for fast reactors, this report reviewed relevant operating experience from US-operated Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) and relevant test experience from the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF). For high temperature reactors the study showed that in many cases instrumentation have performed reasonably well in research and demonstration reactors. However, even in cases where the technology is 'mature' (such as thermocouples), HTGRs can benefit from improved technologies. Current HTGR instrumentation is generally based on decades-old technology and adapting newer technologies could provide significant advantages. For sodium fast reactors, the study found that several key research needs arise around (1) radiation-tolerant sensor design for in-vessel or in-core applications, where possible non-invasive sensing approaches for key parameters that minimize the need to deploy sensors in-vessel, (2) approaches to exfiltrating data from in-vessel sensors while minimizing penetrations, (3) calibration of sensors in-situ, and (4) optimizing sensor placements to maximize the information content while minimizing the number of sensors needed. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Assessment of Sensor Technologies for Advanced Reactors

Sensors and measurement technologies provide information on processes, support operations and provide indications of component health. They are therefore crucial to plant operations and to commercialization of advanced reactors (AdvRx). This report, developed by a three-laboratory team consisting of Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), provides an assessment of sensor technologies and a determination of measurement needs for AdvRx. It provides the technical basis for identifying and prioritizing research targets within the instrumentation and control (I&C) Technology Area under the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Advanced Reactor Technology (ART) program and contributes to the design and implementation of AdvRx concepts.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2016

Assessment of Sensor Technologies for Advanced Reactors

Sensors and measurement technologies provide information on processes, support operations and provide indications of component health. They are therefore crucial to plant operations and to commercialization of advanced reactors (AdvRx). This report, developed by a three-laboratory team consisting of Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), provides an assessment of sensor technologies and a determination of measurement needs for AdvRx. It provides the technical basis for identifying and prioritizing research targets within the instrumentation and control (I&C) Technology Area under the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Advanced Reactor Technology (ART) program and contributes to the design and implementation of AdvRx concepts. The report is organized under two broad categories: High Temperature Reactors and Fast Reactors. For the purposes of this report, the scope of “High temperature reactors” includes Gen IV reactors whose coolant exit temperatures exceed ~650 °C and are moderated (as opposed to fast reactors). We included in this category gas-cooled reactors that have been built and operated throughout the world to date-including those that use carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) or Helium (He) as coolant-and the molten salt reactor. However, for the sake of conciseness this report uses the high temperature gas reactor (HTGR) as an example in many cases. With regard to fast reactors, there are several reactor years of experience with several technology variants (including sodium fast reactors and other fast reactors such as the LBFR). In particular, several experimental, prototype and demonstration units have been designed and operated in several countries, including France, India, Japan, USSR/Russia, UK, and the United States. To bound the scope, this report reviewed relevant operating experience from US-operated Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) and relevant test experience from the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2016

A Qualitative Assessment of Current CCF Guidance Based on a Review of Safety System Digital Implementation Changes with Evolving Technology

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is initiating a new rulemaking project to develop a digital system common-cause failure (CCF) rule. This rulemaking will review and modify or affirm the NRC's current digital system CCF policy as discussed in the Staff Requirements Memorandum to the Secretary of the Commission, Office of the NRC (SECY) 93-087, Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19, Guidance on Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth and Diversity in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems, as well as Chapter 7, Instrumentation and Controls, in NRC Regulatory Guide (NUREG)-0800, Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (ML033580677). The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is providing technical support to the NRC staff on the CCF rulemaking, and this report is one of several providing the technical basis to inform NRC staff members. For the task described in this report, ORNL examined instrumentation and controls (I&C) technology implementations in nuclear power plants in the light of current CCF guidance. The intent was to assess whether the current position on CCF is adequate given the evolutions in digital safety system implementations and, if gaps in the guidance were found, to provide recommendations as to how these gaps could be closed.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Technical Basis for Electromagnetic Compatibility Regulatory Guidance Update

The objective of this report is to serve as the technical basis document for the next, planned revision of this RG that highlights and provides the rationale for the recommended changes. The structure of this document follows and summarizes the several assessment activities undertaken during the course of this project to evaluate new and updated electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) standards, testing methods and limits, and relevant technology developments being incorporated into plant activities that may have EMI/RFI implications, as well as other specific issues, including impacts of electrostatic discharge (ESD) on safety equipment and impacts on increased usage of wireless devices in nuclear power plants.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Taxonomy for Common-Cause Failure Vulnerability and Mitigation

Applying current guidance and practices for common-cause failure (CCF) mitigation to digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems has proven problematic, and the regulatory environment has been unpredictable. The potential for CCF vulnerability inhibits I&C modernization, thereby challenging the long-term sustainability of existing plants. For new plants and advanced reactor concepts, concern about CCF vulnerability in highly integrated digital I&C systems imposes a design burden that results in higher costs and increased complexity. The regulatory uncertainty in determining which mitigation strategies will be acceptable (e.g., what diversity is needed and how much is sufficient) drives designers to adopt complicated, costly solutions devised for existing plants. To address the conditions that constrain the transition to digital I&C technology by the US nuclear industry, crosscutting research is needed to resolve uncertainty, demonstrate necessary characteristics, and establish an objective basis for qualification of digital technology for nuclear power plant (NPP) I&C applications. To fulfill this research need, Oak Ridge National Laboratory is investigating mitigation of CCF vulnerability for nuclear-qualified applications. The outcome of this research is expected to contribute to a fundamentally sound, comprehensive basis to qualify digital technology for nuclear power applications. This report documents the development of a CCF taxonomy. The basis for the CCF taxonomy was generated by determining consistent terminology and establishing a classification approach. The terminology is based on definitions from standards, guides, and relevant nuclear power industry technical reports. The classification approach is derived from identified classification schemes focused on I&C systems and key characteristics, including failure modes. The CCF taxonomy provides the basis for a systematic organization of key systems aspects relevant to analyzing the potential for CCF vulnerability and the suitability of mitigation techniques. Development of an effective CCF taxonomy will help to provide a framework for establishing the objective analysis and assessment capabilities desired to facilitate rigorous identification of fault types and triggers that are the fundamental elements of CCF.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Identification of Modeling Approaches To Support Common-Cause Failure Analysis

Experience with applying current guidance and practices for common-cause failure (CCF) mitigation to digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems has proven problematic, and the regulatory environment has been unpredictable. The impact of CCF vulnerability is to inhibit I&C modernization and, thereby, challenge the long-term sustainability of existing plants. For new plants and advanced reactor concepts, the issue of CCF vulnerability for highly integrated digital I&C systems imposes a design burden resulting in higher costs and increased complexity. The regulatory uncertainty regarding which mitigation strategies are acceptable (e.g., what diversity is needed and how much is sufficient) drives designers to adopt complicated, costly solutions devised for existing plants. The conditions that constrain the transition to digital I&C technology by the U.S. nuclear industry require crosscutting research to resolve uncertainty, demonstrate necessary characteristics, and establish an objective basis for qualification of digital technology for usage in Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) I&C applications. To fulfill this research need, Oak Ridge National Laboratory is conducting an investigation into mitigation of CCF vulnerability for nuclear-qualified applications. The outcome of this research is expected to contribute to a fundamentally sound, comprehensive technical basis for establishing the qualification of digital technology for nuclear power applications. This report documents the investigation of modeling approaches for representing failure of I&C systems. Failure models are used when there is a need to analyze how the probability of success (or failure) of a system depends on the success (or failure) of individual elements. If these failure models are extensible to represent CCF, then they can be employed to support analysis of CCF vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies. Specifically, the research findings documented in this report identify modeling approaches that can be adapted to contribute to the basis for developing systematic methods, quantifiable measures, and objective criteria for evaluating CCF vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2015

PROGRESS IN DESIGN OF THE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL OF THE TOKAMAK COOLING WATER SYSTEM

This paper discusses progress in the design of the control, interlock and safety systems of the Tokamak Cooling Water System (TCWS) for the ITER fusion reactor. The TCWS instrumentation and control (I&C) is one of approximately 200 separate plant I&C systems (e.g., vacuum system I&C, magnets system I&C) that interface to a common central I&C system through standardized networks. Several aspects of the I&C are similar to the I&C of fission-based power plants. However, some of the unique features of the ITER fusion reactor and the TCWS (e.g., high quasi-static magnetic field, need for baking and drying as well as cooling operations), also demand some unique safety and qualification considerations. The paper compares the design strategy/guidelines of the TCWS I&C and the I&C of conventional nuclear power plants. Issues such as safety classifications, independence between control and safety systems, sensor sharing, redundancy, voting schemes, and qualification methodologies are discussed. It is concluded that independence and separation requirements are similar in both designs. However, the voting schemes for safety systems in nuclear power plants typically use 2oo4 (i.e., 4 divisions of safety I&C, any 2 of which is sufficient to trigger a safety action), while 2oo3 voting logic - within each of 2 independent trains - is used in the TCWS I&C. It is also noted that 2oo3 voting is also acceptable in nuclear power plants if adequate risk assessment and reliability is demonstrated. Finally, while qualification requirements provide similar guidance [e.g., both IEC 60780 (invoked in ITER-space), and IEEE 323 (invoked in fission power plant space) provide similar guidance], an important qualification consideration is the susceptibility of I&C to the magnetic fields of ITER. Also, the radiation environments are different. In the case of magnetic fields the paper discusses some options that are being considered.

Korsah, Kofi↗
DOE OSTI2014

Update on Common-Cause Failure Experience and Mitigation Practices

Experience in other industries has shown that digital technology can provide substantial benefits in terms of performance and reliability. However, the U.S. nuclear power industry has been slow to adopt the technology extensively in its instrumentation and control (I&C) applications because of inhibiting factors such as regulatory uncertainty, insufficient technological experience base, implementation complexity, limited availability of nuclear-qualified products and vendors, and inadequate definition of modernization cost recapture. Although there have been examples of digital technology usage in the nuclear power industry, challenges to the qualification of digital technology for high-integrity nuclear power plant (NPP) applications have severely constrained more widespread progress in achieving the benefits that are possible through the transition to digital. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) established the Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation (ASI) technology area under the Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies (NEET) Program to coordinate the instrumentation and controls (I&C) research across DOE NE and to identify and lead efforts to address common needs. As part of the NEET ASI research program, the Digital Technology Qualification project was established. Under this project, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is leading the investigation into mitigation of digital common-cause failure (CCF) vulnerabilities for nuclear-qualified applications. This technical report documents updated and expanded findings from research activities by ORNL. Specifically, the report describes CCF experience in the nuclear and nonnuclear industries, identifies the state of the practice for CCF mitigation through key examples, and presents conclusions from the determination of knowledge gaps.

Wood, Richard Thomas↗
DOE OSTI2012

Common-Cause Failure Mitigation Practices and Knowledge Gaps

This technical report documents the findings from first phase of research activities by ORNL. Specifically, the report describes the results of the investigation of CCF mitigation practices and determination of knowledge gaps.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗