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Kramer, Stephen L.

Publications and source records attributed to Kramer, Stephen L..

Local Radiation Shielding Design Methodology

The NSLS-II accelerators are housed within a radiation enclosure of normal concrete (and in some places high density concrete) that has been designed to reduce the radiation generated from an assumed operational beam loss or bulk shielding current (BCS) from each accelerator. The beam loss model used to estimate the thickness of this bulk shielding, assumed a beam energy at the expected operating energy and a current loss based on reasonable assumptions for the fraction of the expected operating current. The thickness of the shield was determined to be the amount required to reduce the radiation outside the shield to a maximum dose rate of <0.5mrem/hr. for occupied areas for these normal operational losses. These assumed beam losses and the bulk shielding thicknesses required are given in reference [1]. Abnormal operating conditions generating higher than normal beam losses must also be considered, and additional engineering controls will be required depending on the magnitude of the radiation levels generated during the abnormal condition. Additional local shielding subject to configuration control may be utilized to reduce radiation levels associated with these abnormal loss conditions. Interlocked area radiation monitors are another means to prevent continued operation with higher than an acceptable level. The NSLS-II Shielding Policy requires that an engineered system be utilized to mitigate an abnormal condition producing radiation levels greater than 100 mR/h, and that two systems are required if the projected radiation levels during a fault condition are > 2000 mR/h. It is intended that shielding limits the dose rate to < 0.5 mR/h in occupied areas for normal operational losses, and the combination of administrative and engineered controls for abnormal losses will maintain radiation exposure to trained personnel working at the NSLS-II facility to as low as reasonably achievable. It is anticipated that all individual exposures will be well within the planned administrative control level of 100mrem/year. This technical note presents the method used to identify these potential high beam loss locations, evaluate the potential radiation risk these losses create outside the enclosure shield and the design process that specifies the required local radiation shielding needed to reduce this risk below the maximum dose rate of the bulk shield design, listed above. If shielding can’t be adequately provided or if other fault initiated losses could occur, then the necessary engineering controls will be indicated that will limit the energy, current or duration of the beam transport that constitute this high beam loss risk.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Injection Beam Loss Monitor for NSLS-II Radiation Protection

The NSLS-II with its high stored beam energy operation and top-off injection, make the radiation protection a critical issue. The radiation shield wall of the tunnel is being designed to be adequate for a 10% loss of the injection current (l.4nC/min) at any one location. The injection region is shielded for 100% injection losses (14nC/min). This thinner shielding around the ring is a concern should the beam develop high current instabilities, that would cause the beam to dump or develop a very short lifetime. In order to overcome these instabilities, studies and operations in the high current conditions that might drive these instabilities would be required. If the radiation shielding would not allow operation at these currents, then the ability to study and correct these instabilities may not be allowed or at least not without greatly restriction the users access to the experimental floor. We propose a detector that could be used to quantify the amount of charge (DC current) lost around the ring, verifying that beam losses didn't exceed the design levels. This would then allow the beam to be refilled for operations and/or studies without regard to the experimental floor occupancy. In a earlier Tech Note we proposed a method to control the location of the beam dumped during intentional (interlock trips) and unintentional beam losses, this Tech Note will deal mostly with accounting for beam lost during injection.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Three Pole Wigglers with Minimal Impact on Natural Emittance

The use of damping wigglers or three pole wigglers (TPW) in straight sections with dispersion has been show to either reduce the damping of the emittance or increase the emittance (TPW's). This is the result of an increase in the quantum excitation of the radiation and hence the equilibrium emittance. This is the unavoidable result of the dispersion in the ID. However, it was originally shown by Robinson that for uniform dipole guide field that the damping rate for horizontal betatron oscillations would be half that of the energy oscillations, but this ratio could be controlled by introducing gradient dipole fields in the lattice. A. Hofmann extended this to Robinson wigglers that increase the horizontal partition factor, J x at the expense of reduced energy partition factor.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Dose rates near the Service Buildings for Al, Cu, Fe and Pb targets

Fluka simulations were performed to model fault conditions that result in the electron beam hitting different materials found in the storage ring (SR), namely aluminum in beam pipes, copper in magnet coils, iron in magnet yokes and lead in local shields. The primary goal of the simulations was to determine dose distributions outside the bulk shielding due to beam losses for different fault conditions. These predicted doses can be used to provide guidance regarding the need for additional shielding or administrative safeguards. A secondary goal was to compare the simulated dose at three different locations with the dose obtained from analytical calculations using the thick target approximation. The analytical calculations are quick and easy and do not require detailed modeling of the geometry. If these calculations can indeed provide reasonably accurate estimates of the dose then they can be used instead of the detailed FLUKA simulations which require more time, effort and computational resources. However the assumptions embedded in the analytical methods result in the maximum possible yield of secondary particles and will therefore overestimate the radiation dose and the radiation shielding required.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

FLUKA Analysis of Linac Fault Study Dose Rates

The planned Linac Fault Study was conducted on December 5 and 6, 2013 according to the Fault Study Procedure. Beam energy out the end of the Linac was typically 200 MeV, except for the LB-B1 Fault study that used 100 MeV beam out of the 4 th accelerator cavity (ACC4, also called and labeled as 4 th accelerating structure, AS4). The Linac fault study where beam was steered into the 4 th accelerator cavity (upstream) had beam energy of 150 MeV, since the last cavity was not traversed. Table I describes the list of the Beam Loss Fault Studies generated for verification of the Linac tunnel bulk and Linac supplemental shield effectiveness. The beam charge for the loss locations was typically measured at the LB-IT1 integrating current monitor after the ACC4 cavity, between LB-Q1 and LB-Q2. If beam was transported to the dumps a Faraday cup (LB-DU1 or LBDU2) monitor will yield the transported current to the dump, with the difference between LB-IT1 and LB-DU1 yielding the charge lost ahead of the dump. For beam miss-steered or intercepted ahead of the dumps the transport efficiency is zero. For the ACC4 beam loss fault the assumed current was the LB-ITI value before the miss-steering. For most of the faults the LB-ITI current was reading ~13.4 nC and the pulse rate was 1Hz, for 13.4 nC/s beam current.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗