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Kristina Rojdev

Publications and source records attributed to Kristina Rojdev.

6 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2020

Simulated Galactic Cosmic Ray and Solar Particle Event Radiation Effects on Inflatable Habitat, Composite Habitat, Space Suit and Space Hatch Cover Materials

The effect of particle radiation representative of galactic cosmic ray (GCR) and solar particle event (SPE) radiation on polymeric materials used in deep space mission environments is largely unknown. For NASA, this uncertainty represents an unquantified mission risk. To better quantify this risk, selected polymeric materials used in inflatable habitats, composite habitats, space suits and space hatch covers are irradiated at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, after which changes in relevant end-use properties are measured. The irradiated materials are lightweight candidates having critical functions such as ripstops, permeation barriers, micrometeoroids and orbital debris (MMOD) shield layers and restraint layers.The effect of several types of particle radiation are evaluated. To evaluate GCR effects, high-energy (1 GeV) protons and iron nucleons are used. To evaluate SPE effects, intermediate energy (ca. 20 to 40 MeV) protons are used. In addition, two mission scenarios are evaluated: a Mars mission cycle (space suit materials) and a worst-case 50 year deep space mission cycle (all materials). Lastly, a common polymer (high density polyethylene (HDPE)) is subjected to accelerated aging and radiation exposure to determine if a combined physical aging/radiation effect exists.The level of radiation induced property change observed in this study after exposure of polymers to kGy levels of intermediate and high energy ions is often significant and is quantitatively comparable to the level of change reported for similar materials exposed to MGy levels of low energy protons, electrons and gamma-radiation. This suggests that intermediate and high energy ions encountered in space may cause more damage than low energy forms of radiation due to displacement and linear energy transfer (LET) effects. For these reasons, it is recommended that final approval for mission use be made by the appropriate NASA material and structural review boards to ensure radiation induced changes in candidate materials do not interfere with their engineering function in the intended mission application. Since the materials tested in this report received doses exceeding actual mission doses, the results are considered conservative as a first approximation. However, caution must be exercised when evaluating radiation effects in the absence of other secondary factors know to contribute to degradation. In the addition to radiation type and energy, the results presented in this study show that molecular composition, orientation, stress and physical aging can also contribute to or influence degradation. Other factors such as polymer formulation, secondary radiation effects, stress, exposure to elevated temperature, thermal cycling and exposure to ozone were not investigated here, but must be considered when performing a comprehensive evaluation of a polymeric materials suitability for service in a space radiation environment. Only when the total sum of these factors operating in concert with radiation are accounted for, can accurate assessments of a material's suitability be made.

Jess M. Waller↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Major Design Choices and Challenges that Enabled the Success of the Ejectable Data Recorder System

The Ejectable Data Recorder (EDR) subsystem was added to the Crew Module (CM) of the Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight due to a risk that the communications architecture would be insufficient to downlink all the data to the ground during the test flight. Since the EDR subsystem was a secondary system for data collection, AA-2 management enabled the team to take a different approach to hardware development that was more agile-like. This paper discusses key design decisions, technical challenges, and lessons learned that enabled the success of the EDR system during its flight on July 2, 2019.

Jeff Hagen↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Agile-Like Approach to Hardware Development: The Ejectable Data Recorder (EDR) for Orion's Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) Test Flight

On July 2, 2019, the Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) Flight Test Vehicle was launched from Cape Canaveral, with the goal of demonstrating the performance of Orion’s Launch Abort System (LAS) and collecting data from hundreds of sensors throughout the vehicle. The data collected during this test flight is of paramount importance, as it will be used to certify the Orion vehicle for human spaceflight. Originally, the data was to be downlinked via a single string network of antennas on the LAS, with the associated risk of potential data dropouts, as well as loss of data once the LAS was jettisoned. Thus, additional antennas were added onto the crew module (CM) to support data downlink post-LAS jettison, a buffer rebroadcast capability was added to fill in any gaps in data downlink transmissions, and an ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem was added to the CM as a redundant measure to collect all the instrumentation data. The EDR subsystem was added to the project about one year after the project commenced, which significantly reduced the available development time when compared with the other subsystems of the AA-2 Test Flight. The project was further accelerated by six months, around the critical design review gate. Due to the schedule compression challenge and the fact that the EDR subsystem was a backup system and not flight critical, the EDR subsystem was further challenged to find a new and more efficient way to develop hardware. Thus, the EDR subsystem experimented with different management and systems engineering processes, team sizes, communication methods, and tools. Some examples are novel uses of SharePoint as a Data-centric Project Management & Systems Engineering environment, a continuous testing approach through the lifecycle, and a Skunkworks approach to managing the team. The EDR subsystem blended Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) hardware with in-house developed hardware and software to create a novel data retrieval capability. The capability evolved rapidly through a hardware in the loop simulation environment that enabled incremental component updates for not only the EDR subsystem but across the entire Crew Module. This paper will present an overview of how the EDR subsystem was managed and compare it to an Agile approach to managing projects. The paper will further provide a recommended approach to future Agile-like hardware development that incorporates lessons learned from the EDR experience.

Agile↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Ejectable Data Recorder: A Lean, Risk-Informed Approach for Hardware Development

NASA is developing the Orion spacecraft to transport crew from the Earth to the Moon as part of the Artemis series of missions. To provide a crew escape capability from pre-launch through ascent, the Orion vehicle is equipped with a Launch Abort System (LAS), built by Lockheed Martin, which pulls the capsule away from the launch vehicle in the event of an abort scenario. The Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight occurred on July 2, 2019,and tested a production version of the LAS to ensure that it can operate as intended, and to collect a large data set from hundreds of sensors on the vehicle to support Orion flight certification. In the original AA-2 architecture, a single-string set of communications antennas on the LAS would downlink all of the in-flight test data to ground stations. However, that communications architecture was predicted to have data dropouts during abort and jettison of the LAS, and would not support data transmission at all after LAS jettison. As a result, a comprehensive trade study was completed, yielding the addition of antennas on the crew module (CM), a buffer/rebroadcast capability for key portions of the flight, and an ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem. This EDR subsystem would serve as a backup to the radio frequency (RF) communications system, and would be non-flight critical, providing a unique capability that enabled management to take a different approach with the hardware and software development. The Crew Module and Separation Ring were developed as “Class 1”Flight Hardware, albeit with some tailoring approaches to enable efficiencies. The Class 1 designation requires full rigor for flight hardware and software, documenting everything that happens to a piece of hardware from procurement through disposal, requiring a full spectrum of acceptance tests, and the highest rigor of quality assurance processes. At the other end of the spectrum, Class 3hardware is controlled, but not intended for flight, and leaves the level of rigor up to the project manager. This classification is often used for research and development projects. Similarly,Class-1E has been recently defined at NASA for ISS payloads and technology development projects that are not flight critical and do not need the full rigor of Class 1 to be successful. The EDR subsystem was challenged at commencement to adopt a skunkworks and agile-like approach to hardware development, allowing for a different risk posture than the rest of the AA-2 hardware. After initially pursuing Class 1 processes, the EDR subsystem design evolved to incorporating numerous commercial components, leading to re-designation as a Class-1E subsystem. The resulting EDR subsystem was fully successful in meeting all flight system requirements, and achieved 100% retrieval of flight test data. This paper will discuss the risk posture of the EDR subsystem and the subsequent tailoring that was enacted as part of its Class-1E status.

EDR↗