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Kulisek, Jonathan A.

Publications and source records attributed to Kulisek, Jonathan A..

Applied radiation tags for warhead dismantlement transparency

Here, this study explores the feasibility of applying radiation tags as a Chain of Custody tool to confirm the dismantlement of individual warheads by investigating time dependent emissions from special nuclear material. Precedents of photon and neutron sources that have been used to irradiate warhead components are presented. Measurements of irradiated Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) are used to benchmark simulations with the CINDER90 library for MCNP. Delayed gamma emissions are simulated as a function of time since irradiation of moderated HEU and Weapons Grade Plutonium with photon and neutron sources. Models of commercial 9 MV and 15 MV linacs were found to induce ~10 9 fissions/g and ~10 11 fissions/g, respectively, creating 3 to 4 orders of magnitude more delayed gammas than neutron sources, modeled at 10 10 n/s. However, a DT neutron source was found to induce sufficient fissions, ~10 7 fissions/g, to create quantifiable signatures relative to intrinsic emissions. Applied radiation tagging is determined to be technically feasible, but its operational context and practical implementation requires significant development.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Neutron resonance transmission analysis prototype system for thorium fuel cycle safeguards

Emerging thorium-based reactor designs and fuel cycles present challenges to traditional non-destructive assay techniques used in international safeguards. Specifically, assaying the masses of 233 U and 235 U when they are present together in samples with high gamma ray backgrounds is difficult because of similar passive neutron signatures and relatively weak gamma-ray emissions of 233 U. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) are developing a compact neutron resonance transmission analysis (NRTA) system as one potential solution to these challenges. The NRTA technique provides isotopic information for a sample via neutron time-of-flight (TOF) measurements that exploit a sample’s epithermal neutron resonance cross-sections. A recently developed portable NRTA system uses a commercially available, pulsed deuterium-tritium neutron generator with a ~2 m flight path and a GS20 lithium glass scintillator detector. Finally, this paper describes the prototype NRTA system design, a refined radiation transport model of the system, preliminary measurements with thorium and uranium sources, and demonstration of a quantitative isotopic estimation algorithm.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

New NDA Methods for Thorium Fuel Cycle Safeguards (Mid-Project Report)

This project is developing new Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) safeguards techniques for emergent thorium fuel cycles based on Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA), which can assay 233 U and 235 U when they are present together in a sample with potentially high gamma-ray backgrounds from fission products and 232 U. Existing passive techniques face large challenges for this task so new active interrogation methods are needed. This effort is also exploring how gamma-ray signatures can complement NRTA for enhanced assayed performance. This project leverages an NRTA system being developed at PNNL in collaboration with MIT, which uses a commercially available deuterium-tritium neutron generator at short standoff (~2 m). We aim to assess the feasibility and performance of these new NDA techniques for the range of relevant samples in thorium fuel cycles. Key advancements described in this mid-project report include NRTA system design for thorium safeguards measurements, characterization of 233 U oxide powder at PNNL, a survey of detector technologies suitable for NRTA in high gamma background environments, successful preliminary demonstration of a quantitative isotopic estimation algorithm, and first NRTA measurements of a thorium sample.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Viability of an Unattended Verification Station for UF6 Cylinders: Phase I Findings

In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pursued innovative techniques and an integrated suite of safeguards measures to address the verification challenges posed by the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Among the unattended instruments currently being explored by the IAEA is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS), which could provide automated, independent verification of the declared relative enrichment, 235U mass, total uranium mass, and identification for all declared uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders in a facility (e.g., uranium enrichment plants and fuel fabrication plants). Under the auspices of the United States and European Commission Support Programs to the IAEA, a project was undertaken to assess the technical and practical viability of the UCVS concept. Phase I of the UCVS viability study was centered on a long-term field trial of a prototype UCVS system at the Westinghouse Fuel Fabrication Facility in South Carolina, USA. A key outcome of the study was a quantitative performance evaluation of two nondestructive assay (NDA) methods being considered for inclusion in a UCVS: Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA), and Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM). This paper will provide context for the UCVS and potential implementation concepts, a description of the UCVS prototype design, and an overview of the long-term field trial at a fuel fabrication facility. Selected field-trial results and interpretation are presented, including the performance of PNEM and HEVA for the verification of declared enrichment and 235U mass in over 200 “typical” Type 30B cylinders. Example results from a modeling study provide a preliminary assessment of sensitivity to material-substitution scenarios, for the as-fielded NDA methods.

Smith, Leon E.↗

Analysis of an Indirect Neutron Signature for Enhanced UF6 Cylinder Verification

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) currently uses handheld gamma-ray spectrometers combined with ultrasonic wall-thickness gauges to verify the declared enrichment of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders. The current method provides relatively low accuracy for the assay of 235U enrichment, especially for natural and depleted UF6. Furthermore, the current method provides no capability to assay the absolute mass of 235U in the cylinder due to the localized instrument geometry and limited penetration of the 186-keV gamma-ray signature from 235U. Also, the current verification process is a time-consuming component of on-site inspections at uranium enrichment plants. Toward the goal of a more-capable cylinder assay method, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has developed the hybrid enrichment verification array (HEVA). HEVA measures both the traditional 186-keV direct signature and a non-traditional, high-energy neutron-induced signature (HEVANT). HEVANT enables full-volume assay of UF6 cylinders by exploiting the relatively larger mean free paths of the neutrons emitted from the UF6. In this work, Monte Carlo modeling is used as the basis for characterizing HEVANT in terms of the individual contributions to HEVANT from nuclides and hardware components. Monte Carlo modeling is also used to quantify the intrinsic efficiency of HEVA for neutron detection in a cylinder-assay geometry. Modeling predictions are validated against neutron-induced gamma-ray spectra from laboratory measurements and a relatively large population of Type 30B cylinders spanning a range of enrichments. Implications of the analysis and findings on the viability of HEVA for cylinder verification are discussed, such as the resistance of the HEVANT signature to manipulation by the nearby placement of neutron-conversion materials.

Monte Carlo↗

Viability Study for an Unattended UF 6 Cylinder Verification Station: Phase I Final Report

In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pursued innovative techniques and an integrated suite of safeguards measures to address the verification challenges posed by the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Among the unattended instruments currently being explored by the IAEA is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS) that could provide automated, independent verification of the declared relative enrichment, 235 U mass, total uranium mass and identification for all declared UF 6 cylinders in a facility (e.g., uranium enrichment plants and fuel fabrication plants). Under the auspices of the United States and European Commission Support Programs to the IAEA, a project was undertaken to assess the technical and practical viability of the UCVS concept. The US Support Program team consisted of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL, lead), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Savanah River National Laboratory (SRNL). At the core of the viability study is a long-term field trial of a prototype UCVS system at a Westinghouse fuel fabrication facility. A key outcome of the study is a quantitative performance evaluation of two nondestructive assay (NDA) methods being considered for inclusion in a UCVS: Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA), and Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM). This report provides context for the UCVS concept and the field trial: potential UCVS implementation concepts at an enrichment facility; an overview of UCVS prototype design; field trial objectives and activities. Field trial results and interpretation are presented, with a focus on the performance of PNEM and HEVA for the assay of over 200 “typical” Type 30B cylinders, and the viability of an “NDA Fingerprint” concept as a high-fidelity means to periodically verify that the contents of a given cylinder are consistent with previous scans. A modeling study, combined with field-measured instrument uncertainties, provides an assessment of the partial-defect sensitivity of HEVA and PNEM for both one-time assay and (repeated) NDA Fingerprint verification scenarios. The findings presented in this report represent a significant step forward in the community’s understanding of the strengths and limitations of the PNEM and HEVA NDA methods, and the viability of the UCVS concept in front-end fuel cycle facilities. This experience will inform Phase II of the UCVS viability study, should the IAEA pursue it.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array: Module Characterization Studies

The work presented in this report is focused on the characterization and refinement of the Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA) approach, which combines the traditional 186-keV 235 U signature with high-energy prompt gamma rays from neutron capture in the detector and surrounding collimator material, to determine the relative enrichment and 235 U mass of the cylinder. The design of the HEVA modules (hardware and software) deployed in the current field trial builds on over seven years of study and evolution by PNNL, and consists of a ø3''×3'' NaI(Tl) scintillator coupled to an Osprey digital multi-channel analyzer tube base from Canberra. The core of the HEVA methodology, the high-energy prompt gamma-ray signature, serves as an indirect method for the measurement of total neutron emission from the cylinder. A method for measuring the intrinsic efficiency of this “non-traditional” neutron signature and the results from a benchmark experiment are presented. Also discussed are potential perturbing effects on the non-traditional signature, including short-lived activation of materials in the HEVA module. Modeling and empirical results are presented to demonstrate that such effects are expected to be negligible for the envisioned implementation scenario. In comparison to previous versions, the new design boosts the high-energy prompt gamma-ray signature, provides more flexible and effective collimation, and improves count-rate management via commercially available pulse-processing electronics with a special modification prompted by PNNL.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗