Engineering topics
LaChance, Jeffrey L
Publications and source records attributed to LaChance, Jeffrey L.
The Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Accident Chronology.
Abstract Not Provided
Development and Application of a Dynamic Level 1 and 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment Tool.
Abstract Not Provided
The development of a realistic source term for sodium-cooled fast reactors : assessment of current status and future needs.
Sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs) continue to be proposed and designed throughout the United States and the world. Although the number of SFRs actually operating has declined substantially since the 1980s, a significant interest in advancing these types of reactor systems remains. Of the many issues associated with the development and deployment of SFRs, one of high regulatory importance is the source term to be used in the siting of the reactor. A substantial amount of modeling and experimental work has been performed over the past four decades on accident analysis, sodium coolant behavior, and radionuclide release for SFRs. The objective of this report is to aid in determining the gaps and issues related to the development of a realistic, mechanistically derived source term for SFRs. This report will allow the reader to become familiar with the severe accident source term concept and gain a broad understanding of the current status of the models and experimental work. Further, this report will allow insight into future work, in terms of both model development and experimental validation, which is necessary in order to develop a realistic source term for SFRs.
Assessment of methodologies for analysis of the dungeness B accidental aircraft crash risk.
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has requested Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to review the aircraft crash methodology for nuclear facilities that are being used in the United Kingdom (UK). The scope of the work included a review of one method utilized in the UK for assessing the potential for accidental airplane crashes into nuclear facilities (Task 1) and a comparison of the UK methodology against similar International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United States (US) Department of Energy (DOE), and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) methods (Task 2). Based on the conclusions from Tasks 1 and 2, an additional Task 3 would provide an assessment of a site-specific crash frequency for the Dungeness B facility using one of the other methodologies. This report documents the results of Task 2. The comparison of the different methods was performed for the three primary contributors to aircraft crash risk at the Dungeness B site: airfield related crashes, crashes below airways, and background crashes. The methods and data specified in each methodology were compared for each of these risk contributors, differences in the methodologies were identified, and the importance of these differences was qualitatively and quantitatively assessed. The bases for each of the methods and the data used were considered in this assessment process. A comparison of the treatment of the consequences of the aircraft crashes was not included in this assessment because the frequency of crashes into critical structures is currently low based on the existing Dungeness B assessment. Although the comparison found substantial differences between the UK and the three alternative methodologies (IAEA, NRC, and DOE) this assessment concludes that use of any of these alternative methodologies would not change the conclusions reached for the Dungeness B site. Performance of Task 3 is thus not recommended.
Risk-informed separation distances for hydrogen gas storage facilities.
The use of risk information in establishing code and standard requirements enables: (1) An adequate and appropriate level of safety; and (2) Deployment of hydrogen facilities are as safe as gasoline facilities. This effort provides a template for clear and defensible regulations, codes, and standards that can enable international market transformation.
Risk associated with the use of barriers in hydrogen refueling stations.
Abstract Not Provided
Risk associated with the use of barriers in hydrogen refueling stations.
Abstract Not Provided
Hydrogen release behavior.
The summary of this presentation is: (1) Barrier walls are used to reduce setbacks by factor of 2; (2) We found no ignition-timing vs. over-pressure sensitivities for jet flow obstructed by barrier walls; (3) Cryogenic vapor cloud model indicates hazard length scales exceed the room-temperature release; validation experiments are required to confirm; (4) Light-up maps developed for lean limit ignition; flammability factor model provides good indication of ignition probability; and (5) Auto-ignition is enhanced by blunt-body obstructions - increases gas temperature and promotes fuel/air mixing.
Risk associated with the use of barriers in hydrogen refueling stations.
Separation distances are used in hydrogen refueling stations to protect people, structures, and equipment from the consequences of accidental hydrogen releases. Specifically, hydrogen jet flames resulting from ignition of unintended releases can be extensive in length and pose significant radiation and impingement hazards. Depending on the leak diameter and source pressure, the resulting separation distances can be unacceptably large. One possible mitigation strategy to reduce exposure to hydrogen flames is to incorporate barriers around hydrogen storage, process piping, and delivery equipment. The effectiveness of barrier walls to reduce hazards at hydrogen facilities has been previously evaluated using experimental and modeling information developed at Sandia National Laboratories. The effect of barriers on the risk from different types of hazards including direct flame contact, radiation heat fluxes, and overpressures associated with delayed hydrogen ignition has subsequently been evaluated and used to identify potential reductions in separation distances in hydrogen facilities. Both the frequency and consequences used in this risk assessment and the risk results are described. The results of the barrier risk analysis can also be used to help establish risk-informed barrier design requirements for use in hydrogen codes and standards.
Analyses to support development of risk-informed separation distances for hydrogen codes and standards.
The development of a set of safety codes and standards for hydrogen facilities is necessary to ensure they are designed and operated safely. To help ensure that a hydrogen facility meets an acceptable level of risk, code and standard development organizations are tilizing risk-informed concepts in developing hydrogen codes and standards.