Search NASA⌕ Search

Engineering topics

Lear, Dana

Publications and source records attributed to Lear, Dana.

13 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2018

Hypervelocity Impact Testing and MMOD Risk Reduction

Purpose: (1) Provide data to develop, update, and/or verify ballistic limit equations used in the MMOD risk assessment. (2) Provide data used to compare two or more shielding options to reduce MMOD risk. (3) Determine failure modes and failure criteria for hardware: (a) Failure modes: how hardware fails (pressure vessels, pressurized lines, electronic hardware, power cables). (b) Failure criteria: quantify damage level that results in hardware failure (for example: depth of penetration into pressure vessel that results in leak or burst).

Lear, Dana↗
NASA NTRS2012

Risk Assessment Update: Russian Segment

BUMPER-II version 1.95j source code was provided to RSC-E- and Khrunichev at January 2012 MMOD TIM in Moscow. MEMCxP and ORDEM 3.0 environments implemented as external data files. NASA provided a sample ORDEM 3.0 g."key" & "daf" environment file set for demonstration and benchmarking BUMPER -II v1.95j installation at the Jan-12 TIM. ORDEM 3.0 has been completed and is currently in beta testing. NASA will provide a preliminary set of ORDEM 3.0 ".key" & ".daf" environment files for the years 2012 through 2028. Bumper output files produced using the new ORDEM 3.0 data files are intended for internal use only, not for requirements verification. Output files will contain these words ORDEM FILE DESCRIPTION = PRELIMINARY VERSION: not for production. The projectile density term in many BUMPER-II ballistic limit equations will need to be updated. Cube demo scripts and output files delivered at the Jan-12 TIM have been updated for the new ORDEM 3.0 data files. Risk assessment results based on ORDEM 3.0 and MEM will be presented for the Russian Segment (RS) of ISS.

Christiansen, Eric↗
NASA NTRS2009

Handbook for Designing MMOD Protection

Spacecraft are subject to micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impact damage which have the potential to degrade performance, shorten the mission, or result in catastrophic loss of the vehicle. Specific MMOD protection requirements are established by NASA for each spacecraft early in the program/project life, to ensure the spacecraft meets desired safety and mission success goals. Both the design and operations influences spacecraft survivability in the MMOD environment, and NASA considers both in meeting MMOD protection requirements. The purpose of this handbook is to provide spacecraft designers and operations personnel with knowledge gained by NASA in implementing effective MMOD protection for the International Space Station, Space Shuttle, and various science spacecraft. It has been drawn from a number of previous publications [10-14], as well as new work. This handbook documents design and operational methods to reduce MMOD risk. In addition, this handbook describes tools and equations needed to design proper MMOD protection. It is a living report, in that it will be updated and re-released periodically in future with additional information. Providing effective and efficient MMOD protection is essential for ensuring safe and successful operations of spacecraft and satellites. A variety of shields protect crew modules, external pressurized vessels and critical equipment from MMOD on the International Space Station (ISS). Certain Space Shuttle Orbiter vehicle systems are hardened from MMOD impact, and operational rules are established to reduce the risk from MMOD (i.e., flight attitudes are selected and late inspection of sensitive thermal protection surfaces are conducted to reduce MMOD impacts). Science spacecraft include specific provisions to meet MMOD protection requirements in their design (for example, Stardust & GLAST). Commercial satellites such as Iridium and Bigelow Aerospace Genesis spacecraft incorporate MMOD protection. The development of low-weight, effective MMOD protection has enabled these spacecraft missions to be performed successfully. This handbook describes these shielding techniques. For future exploration activities to the Moon and Mars, implementing high-performance MMOD shielding will be necessary to meet protection requirements with minimum mass penalty. A current area of technology development in MMOD shielding is the incorporation of sensors to detect and locate MMOD impact damage. Depending on the type of sensor the signals from the sensor can be processed to infer the location of the impact and the extent of damage. The objective of the sensors is to locate critical damage that would endanger the spacecraft or crew immediately or during reentry (such as an air leak from crew module or critical damage to thermal protection system of reentry vehicles). The information from the sensors can then be used with repair kits, patch kits, hatch closure or other appropriate remedial techniques to reduce MMOD risk.

Arnold, Jim↗
NASA NTRS2009

Hypervelocity Impact Performance of Open Cell Foam Core Sandwich Panel Structures

Metallic foams are a relatively new class of materials with low density and novel physical, mechanical, thermal, electrical and acoustic properties. Although incompletely characterized, they offer comparable mechanical performance to traditional spacecraft structural materials (i.e. honeycomb sandwich panels) without detrimental through-thickness channeling cells. There are two competing types of metallic foams: open cell and closed cell. Open cell foams are considered the more promising technology due to their lower weight and higher degree of homogeneity. Leading micrometeoroid and orbital debris shields (MMOD) incorporate thin plates separated by a void space (i.e. Whipple shield). Inclusion of intermediate fabric layers, or multiple bumper plates have led to significant performance enhancements, yet these shields require additional non-ballistic mass for installation (fasteners, supports, etc.) that can consume up to 35% of the total shield weight [1]. Structural panels, such as open cell foam core sandwich panels, that are also capable of providing sufficient MMOD protection, represent a significant potential for increased efficiency in hypervelocity impact shielding from a systems perspective through a reduction in required non-ballistic mass. In this paper, the results of an extensive impact test program on aluminum foam core sandwich panels are reported. The effect of pore density, and core thickness on shielding performance have been evaluated over impact velocities ranging from 2.2 - 9.3 km/s at various angles. A number of additional tests on alternate sandwich panel configurations of comparable-weight have also been performed, including aluminum honeycomb sandwich panels (see Figure 1), Nomex honeycomb core sandwich panels, and 3D aluminum honeycomb sandwich panels. A total of 70 hypervelocity impact tests are reported, from which an empirical ballistic limit equation (BLE) has been derived. The BLE is in the standard form suitable for implementation in risk analysis software, and includes the effect of panel thickness, core density, and facesheet material properties. A comparison between the shielding performance of foam core sandwich panel structures and common MMOD shielding configurations is made for both conservative (additional 35% non-ballistic mass) and optimistic (additional mass equal to 30% of bumper mass) considerations. Suggestions to improve the shielding performance of foam core sandwich panels are made, including the use of outer mesh layers, intermediate fabric/composite layers, and varying pore density.

Ryan, Shannon↗
NASA NTRS2009

Projectile Density Effects on Shield Performance

In the past, the orbital debris environment was modeled as consisting entirely of aluminum particles. As a consequence, most of the impact test database on spacecraft micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shields, and the resulting ballistic limit equations used to predict shielding performance, has been based on using aluminum projectiles. Recently, data has been collected from returned spacecraft materials and other sources that indicate higher and lower density components of orbital debris also exist. New orbital debris environment models such as ORDEM2008 provide predictions of the fraction of orbital debris in various density bins (high = 7.9 g/cu cm, medium = 2.8 g/cu cm, and low = 0.9-1.1 g/cu cm). This paper describes impact tests to assess the effects of projectile density on the performance capabilities of typical MMOD shields. Updates to shield ballistic limit equations are provided based on results of tests and analysis.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Code Assesses Risks Posed by Meteoroids and Orbital Debris

BUMPER II version 1.92e is a computer code for assessing the risk of damage from impacts of micrometeoroids and orbital debris on the International Space Station (ISS), including those parts of the ISS covered by shielding that affords partial protection against such impacts. (Other versions of BUMPER II have been written for other spacecraft.) Bumper II quantifies the probability of penetration of shielding and the damage to spacecraft equipment as functions of the size, shape, and orientation of the spacecraft; the parameters of its orbit; failure criteria that quantify impact damage at the threshold of failure for each spacecraft surface; and the impact-damage resistance of each spacecraft surface as defined by "ballistic limit equations" that return the size of a failure-causing particle as a function of target parameters (including materials, configurations, thicknesses, and gap distances) and impact conditions (impact velocity and the density and shape of the impactor). BUMPER II version 1.92e contains several dozen ballistic limit equations that are based on results from thousands of hypervelocity impact tests conducted by NASA on ISS shielding and other hardware, and on results from numerical simulations of impacts.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗