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Lear, Dana M.

Publications and source records attributed to Lear, Dana M..

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Comparison of Risk from Orbital Debris and Meteoroid Environment Models on the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure from an impact from a meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. An extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuit” impact during a US extravehicular activity (EVA) is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. A risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) by the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA. Need to understand the effect of updated meteoroid and orbital debris environment models to EMU risk.

Hoffman, Kevin↗
NASA NTRS2019

Observations of MMOD Impact Damage to the ISS

This paper describes meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage observations on the International Space Station (ISS). Several hundred MMOD damage sites on ISS have been documented using imagery taken from ISS windows. MMOD damage sites visible from ISS windows are typically larger – approximately 5mm diameter and greater – due to the larger viewer-to-surface distance. Closer inspection of these surfaces by astronauts during spacewalks reveals many smaller features that are typically less distinct. Characterization of these features as MMOD or non- MMOD is difficult, but can be partially accomplished by matching physical characteristics of the damage against typical MMOD impact damage observed on ground-based impact tests. Numerous pieces of space-exposed ISS hardware were returned during space shuttle missions. Subsequent ground inspection of this hardware has also contributed to the database of ISS MMOD impact damage. A handful of orbital replacement units (ORUs) from the ISS active thermal control and electrical power subsystems were swapped out and returned during the Space Shuttle program. In addition, a reusable logistics module was deployed on ISS for a total 59.4 days on 11 shuttle missions between 2001 and 2011 and then brought back in the shuttle payload bay. All of this returned hardware was subjected to detailed post-flight inspections for MMOD damage, and a database with over 1,400 impact records has been collected. A description of the largest observed damage features is provided in the paper. In addition, a discussion of significant MMOD impact sites with operational or design aspects is presented. MMOD impact damage to the following ISS modules/subsystems is described: (1) Solar Arrays, (2) US and Russian windows, (3) Extravehicular Activity (EVA) handrails, (4) Radiators, and (5) Russian Functional Cargo Block (FGB) module.

Hyde, James L.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Consequences of MMOD Penetrations on the International Space Station

Risk from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts on space vehicles is often quantified in terms of the probability of no penetration (PNP). However, for large spacecraft, especially those with multiple compartments, a penetration may have a number of possible outcomes. The extent of the damage (diameter of hole, crack length or penetration depth), the location of the damage relative to critical equipment or crew, crew response, and even the time of day of the penetration are among the many factors that can affect the outcome. For the International Space Station (ISS), a Monte-Carlo style software code called Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability (MSCSurv) is used to predict the probability of several outcomes of an MMOD penetration—broadly classified as loss of crew (LOC), crew evacuation (Evac), loss of escape vehicle (LEV), and nominal end of mission (NEOM). By generating large numbers of MMOD impacts (typically in the billions) and tracking the consequences, MSCSurv allows for the inclusion of a large number of parameters and models as well as enabling the consideration of uncertainties in the models and parameters. MSCSurv builds upon the results from NASA’s Bumper software (which provides the probability of penetration and critical input data to MSCSurv) to allow analysts to estimate the probability of LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM. This paper provides an overview of the methodology used by NASA to quantify LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM with particular emphasis on describing in broad terms how MSCSurv works and its capabilities and most significant models.

Evans, Hilary J.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Status of the Post Flight MMOD Inspection Campaign for the SpaceX Cargo Dragon

The SpaceX Cargo Dragon has been flying supply missions for NASA to the International Space Station (ISS) since 2012. At the time of this writing, SpaceX has completed 14 missions to ISS with each returning to Earth via water landing. After each mission, a team from the NASA Johnson Space Center performs an inspection of the exterior surfaces of the Cargo Dragon spacecraft for hypervelocity impact damage features. Data from these inspections are collected into a database that includes impact feature dimensions as well as the location on the vehicle. Additional details on the type and size of particle that produced the damage site are pro-vided when sampling data and definitive spectroscopic analysis results are available. Observation data can be compared with impact estimates from risk assessment codes as a check on the micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment predictions.

Hyde, James L.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk Assessment Methodology

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of vehicle failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. Among the vehicles of importance to NASA is the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuit” used while performing a US extravehicular activity (EVA). An EMU impact is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching the airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. For this reason, a risk assessment is provided to the EVA office at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) prior to certification of readiness for each US EVA.

Hoffman, Kevin D.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Bumper: A Tool for Analyzing Spacecraft Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

“Bumper” is NASA’s computer program for analyzing spacecraft micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk. Bumper was developed in the late-1980s and has been continuously used and maintained since. The user base has grown from a few government entities to now include numerous commercial entities as well. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team is responsible for all aspects of the Bumper software. Bumper has been used to characterize MMOD risk on hundreds of spacecraft. All of the International Space Station (ISS) modules, visiting vehicles and numerous external components and systems have been analyzed. Bumper was used to analyze each of the Space Shuttle missions since STS-50. The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) MMOD shielding is being developed using Bumper as well. Bumper has also been used on numerous telescopes (Hubble, James Webb, and Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescopes), scientific probes (Stardust, New Horizons, Parker Solar Probe), and Earth observation satellites (Landsat, Joint Polar Satellite System). Bumper is also being used to analyze the micrometeoroid risk and support design of the Deep Space Gateway (DSG) and Mars Sample Return (MSR) missions. The HVIT Bumper Configuration Control Board (CCB) ensures that all changes to the code are approved, reviewed, and documented. Most of the changes are made to add new MMOD damage “ballistic limit equations” (BLEs). BLEs are typically added in response to completion of a hypervelocity impact (HVI) test series and development of an associated BLE. Other less frequent changes include updates of the debris or meteoroid environment models, feature enhancements, and feature retirement. Some BLEs are commercially sensitive and/or proprietary, so the CCB also manages code user-version control and software distribution. The current version – “Bumper 3” – is a FORTRAN executable that utilizes a 64-bit architecture. Bumper 3 has numerous features that make it a powerful tool for analyzing spacecraft MMOD risk. Bumper uses the latest orbital debris and micrometeoroid environment models. Bumper also easily processes large spacecraft geometry models, recognizes hidden surfaces, permits BLE assignment by name or number, and conducts quality checks of the spacecraft geometry model. Bumper 3 can also be used to estimate the effects of particle penetration through thin, high-standoff distance hardware components such as solar arrays and radiators. This is done using a special HVIT-developed technique know as the “3-Part Analysis.” The paper introduces the Bumper 3 MMOD risk analysis code and provides an example MMOD risk assessment showing Bumper’s role in the overall MMOD protection design process.

Lear, Dana M.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Cumulative Distribution of Ballistic Impact Failures of Common Twisted-Pair Data Cables at Orbital Speeds

Data wire cable runs are a significant presence on the exterior of the International Space Station (ISS), and continued ISS mission support requires detailed assessment of cables due to micrometeoroid and orbit debris (MMOD) impact. These data wire cables are twisted-pair cables consisting of two 22AWG stranded conductors and fillers inside a tight fitting braided copper shield. The copper shield and its contents are covered with a jacket that has a nominal outer diameter of 3.76 mm and beta-cloth tape. The ISS engineering community has identified two loss-of-function mechanisms for these cables: open circuits due to severed conductors within the cable, and short circuits due to contact between conductors or grounded components. As these data cables are low power systems, short circuits are not expected to burn away the contact, so both open and short circuits are considered permanent loss-of-function for the cable. A total of ninety-seven impact experiments have been performed into these cables to develop a statistical model for the failure of these cables to be used in reliability studies. The experimental work has yielded cumulative distribution functions for these cables for steel and aluminum components of the orbital debris environment at representative speeds and impact obliquities.

Miller, Joshua E.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Effects of High-Density Impacts on Shielding Capability

Spacecraft are shielded from micrometeoroids and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts to meet requirements for crew safety and/or mission success. In the past, orbital debris particles have been considered to be composed entirely of aluminum (medium-density material) for the purposes of MMOD shielding design and verification. Meteoroids have been considered to be low-density porous materials, with an average density of 1 g/cu cm. Recently, NASA released a new orbital debris environment model, referred to as ORDEM 3.0, that indicates orbital debris contains a substantial fraction of high-density material for which steel is used in MMOD risk assessments [Ref.1]. Similarly, an update to the meteoroid environment model is also under consideration to include a high-density component of that environment. This paper provides results of hypervelocity impact tests and hydrocode simulations on typical spacecraft MMOD shields using steel projectiles. It was found that previous ballistic limit equations (BLEs) that define the protection capability of the MMOD shields did not predict the results from the steel impact tests and hydrocode simulations (typically, the predictions from these equations were too optimistic). The ballistic limit equations required updates to more accurately represent shield protection capability from the range of densities in the orbital debris environment. Ballistic limit equations were derived from the results of the work and are provided in the paper.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Toughened Thermal Blanket for MMOD Protection

Thermal blankets are used extensively on spacecraft to provide passive thermal control of spacecraft hardware from thermal extremes encountered in space. Toughened thermal blankets have been developed that greatly improve protection from hypervelocity micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts. These blankets can be outfitted if so desired with a reliable means to determine the location, depth and extent of MMOD impact damage by incorporating an impact sensitive piezoelectric film. Improved MMOD protection of thermal blankets was obtained by adding selective materials at various locations within the thermal blanket. As given in Figure 1, three types of materials were added to the thermal blanket to enhance its MMOD performance: (1) disrupter layers, near the outside of the blanket to improve breakup of the projectile, (2) standoff layers, in the middle of the blanket to provide an area or gap that the broken-up projectile can expand, and (3) stopper layers, near the back of the blanket where the projectile debris is captured and stopped. The best suited materials for these different layers vary. Density and thickness is important for the disrupter layer (higher densities generally result in better projectile breakup), whereas a highstrength to weight ratio is useful for the stopper layer, to improve the slowing and capture of debris particles.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2014

MMOD Impact Damage to ISS

Paper will describe micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage that has been observed on the International Space Station (ISS). Several hundred documented MMOD damage sites on ISS have been identified through imagery from the windows of ISS modules or docked vehicles. Sites that are observable from ISS or shuttle windows exhibiting distinct features of hypervelocity impact damage are usually greater than 5mm in diameter. Many smaller features are revealed in on-orbit imagery are typically less distinct and difficult to characterize but could be MMOD damage. Additional images of on-orbit damage features have been collected by astronauts during extra vehicular activities. Ground inspection of returned ISS hardware has also contributed to the database of ISS MMOD impact damage. A handful of orbital replacement units (ORU) from the ISS active thermal control and electrical power subsystems were swapped out and returned during the Space Shuttle program. In addition, a reusable logistics module was deployed on ISS for a total 59.4 days on 11 shuttle missions between 2001 and 2011 and then brought back in the shuttle payload bay. All of this returned hardware was subjected to detailed post-flight inspections for MMOD damage, and a database with nearly 1000 impact records has been collected. A description of the largest observed damages will be provided in the paper. In addition, a discussion of significant MMOD impact sites with operational or design aspects will be presented. Some of the ISS modules/subsystems damaged by MMOD to be included in the discussion are (1) Solar Arrays, (2) US and Russian windows, (3) EVA handrails, (4) Radiators, and (5) Russian FGB module.

Hyde, James L.↗
NASA NTRS2013

International Space Station (ISS) Soyuz Vehicle Descent Module Evaluation of Thermal Protection System (TPS) Penetration Characteristics

The descent module (DM) of the ISS Soyuz vehicle is covered by thermal protection system (TPS) materials that provide protection from heating conditions experienced during reentry. Damage and penetration of these materials by micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts could result in loss of vehicle during return phases of the mission. The descent module heat shield has relatively thick TPS and is protected by the instrument-service module. The TPS materials on the conical sides of the descent module (referred to as backshell in this test plan) are exposed to more MMOD impacts and are relatively thin compared to the heat shield. This test program provides hypervelocity impact (HVI) data on materials similar in composition and density to the Soyuz TPS on the backshell of the vehicle. Data from this test program was used to update ballistic limit equations used in Soyuz TPS penetration risk assessments. The impact testing was coordinated by the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group [1] in Houston, Texas. The HVI testing was conducted at the NASA-JSC White Sands Hypervelocity Impact Test Facility (WSTF) at Las Cruces, New Mexico. Figure

Davis, Bruce A.↗
NASA NTRS2012

As-Flown Shuttle Micro-Meteoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD) Assessment History

The final flight of the Space Shuttle program was completed on July 21st of 2011. The reusable nature of the Orbiter vehicles has provided NASA with a unique opportunity to inspect and sample spacecraft surfaces exposed to the MMOD environment in low Earth orbit. This paper will provide details of MMOD damages found on Orbiter surfaces after recent flights, as well as putting these damages in context by providing historical comparisons of recent damage to previous flights. The Bumper threat assessment computer code is used by NASA to determine spacecraft MMOD penetration risk. The tool was used before each mission to estimate pre-flight MMOD risk for the Shuttle Program Office using planned vehicles attitudes and exposure times. This paper summarizes the efforts of the authors to assess the expected number MMOD impacts of selected particles sizes of 52 shuttle missions ranging from STS-50 (1992) through STS-133 (2011) using as-flown attitude data. The missions encompass the Shuttle/Mir precursors to the International Space Station (ISS) as well as the ISS assembly flights. The paper includes a comparison of observed MMOD impact damage to the predicted number of impacts from Bumper code assessments. This data can be used to validate engineering models of the orbital debris and micrometeoroid environment, such NASA s ORDEM debris model and MEM meteoroid model.

Hyde, James L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Shuttle Hypervelocity Impact Database

With three missions outstanding, the Shuttle Hypervelocity Impact Database has nearly 3000 entries. The data is divided into tables for crew module windows, payload bay door radiators and thermal protection system regions, with window impacts compromising just over half the records. In general, the database provides dimensions of hypervelocity impact damage, a component level location (i.e., window number or radiator panel number) and the orbiter mission when the impact occurred. Additional detail on the type of particle that produced the damage site is provided when sampling data and definitive analysis results are available. Details and insights on the contents of the database including examples of descriptive statistics will be provided. Post flight impact damage inspection and sampling techniques that were employed during the different observation campaigns will also be discussed. Potential enhancements to the database structure and availability of the data for other researchers will be addressed in the Future Work section. A related database of returned surfaces from the International Space Station will also be introduced.

Hyde, James L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Threat Assessment: Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle

This report provides results of a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) risk assessment of the Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle (MSR EEV). The assessment was performed using standard risk assessment methodology illustrated in Figure 1-1. Central to the process is the Bumper risk assessment code (Figure 1-2), which calculates the critical penetration risk based on geometry, shielding configurations and flight parameters. The assessment process begins by building a finite element model (FEM) of the spacecraft, which defines the size and shape of the spacecraft as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations. This model is built using the NX I-deas software package from Siemens PLM Software. The FEM is constructed using triangular and quadrilateral elements that define the outer shell of the spacecraft. Bumper-II uses the model file to determine the geometry of the spacecraft for the analysis. The next step of the process is to identify the ballistic limit characteristics for the various shield types. These ballistic limits define the critical size particle that will penetrate a shield at a given impact angle and impact velocity. When the finite element model is built, each individual element is assigned a property identifier (PID) to act as an index for its shielding properties. Using the ballistic limit equations (BLEs) built into the Bumper-II code, the shield characteristics are defined for each and every PID in the model. The final stage of the analysis is to determine the probability of no penetration (PNP) on the spacecraft. This is done using the micrometeoroid and orbital debris environment definitions that are built into the Bumper-II code. These engineering models take into account orbit inclination, altitude, attitude and analysis date in order to predict an impacting particle flux on the spacecraft. Using the geometry and shielding characteristics previously defined for the spacecraft and combining that information with the environment model calculations, the Bumper-II code calculates a probability of no penetration for the spacecraft.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Shuttle Hypervelocity Impact Database

With three flights remaining on the manifest, the shuttle impact hypervelocity database has over 2800 entries. The data is currently divided into tables for crew module windows, payload bay door radiators and thermal protection system regions, with window impacts compromising just over half the records. In general, the database provides dimensions of hypervelocity impact damage, a component level location (i.e., window number or radiator panel number) and the orbiter mission when the impact occurred. Additional detail on the type of particle that produced the damage site is provided when sampling data and definitive analysis results are available. The paper will provide details and insights on the contents of the database including examples of descriptive statistics using the impact data. A discussion of post flight impact damage inspection and sampling techniques that were employed during the different observation campaigns will be presented. Future work to be discussed will be possible enhancements to the database structure and availability of the data for other researchers. A related database of ISS returned surfaces that are under development will also be introduced.

Hyde, James I.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Recent Shuttle Post Flight MMOD Inspection Highlights

Four significant micro-meteoroid orbital debris (MMOD) impact events on the shuttle are documented: two perforations of the payload bay door radiator sandwich panel along with craters in a crew module window and a wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon panel. Results from Scanning Electron Microscope/Energy-Dispersive x-ray Spectroscopy (SEM/EDS) analysis of impact residue are provided in an attempt to identify the source of each impact. Particle sizes that could produce the observed damage are discussed, along with hypervelocity impact testing on representative samples conducted to simulate the impact event.

Hyde, James L.↗