Engineering topics
Letchford, Joshua
Publications and source records attributed to Letchford, Joshua.
Experimental Wargaming with SIGNAL
Wargames are a common tool for investigating complex conflict scenarios and have a long history of informing military and strategic study. Historically, these games have often been one-offs, may not rigorously collect data, and have been built primarily for exploration rather than developing data-driven analytical conclusions. Experimental wargaming, a new wargaming approach that employs the basic principles of experimental design to facilitate an objective basis for exploring fundamental research questions around human behavior (such as understanding conflict escalation), is a potential tool that can be used in combination with existing wargaming approaches. The Project on Nuclear Gaming, a consortium involving the University of California, Berkeley, Sandia National Laboratories, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, developed an experimental wargame, SIGNAL, to explore questions surrounding conflict escalation and strategic stability in the nuclear context. To date, the SIGNAL experimental wargame has been played hundreds of times by thousands of players from around the world, creating the largest database of wargame data for academic purposes known to the authors. Here, this paper discusses the design of SIGNAL, focusing on how the principles of experimental design influenced this design.
Wargaming when War is not the Answer: Multipurpose collective conflict resolution games.
Abstract not provided.
SIGNAL Game Manual
SIGNAL is a first of its kind experimental wargame developed as part of the Project on Nuclear Gaming (PoNG). In this document we describe the rules and game mechanics associated with the online version of SIGNAL created by team members from the University of California, Berkeley, Sandia National Laboratories, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The game was developed as part of a larger research project to develop the experimental wargaming methodology and explore its use on a model scenario: the impact of various military capabilities on conflict escalation dynamics. We discuss the results of this research in a forthcoming paper that will include this manual as an appendix. It is our hope that this manual will both contribute to our players' understanding of the game prior to play and that it will allow for replication of the SIGNAL game environment for future research purposes. The manual begins by introducing the terminology used throughout the document. It then outlines the technical requirements required to run SIGNAL. The following section provides a description of the map, resources, infrastructure, tokens, and action cards used in the game environment. The manual then describes the user interface including the chat functions, trade mechanism, currency and population counts necessary for players to plan their actions. It then turns to the sequence of player actions in the game describing the signaling, action, and upkeep phases that comprise each round of play. It then outlines the use of diplomacy including alliances with minor states and trade between players. The manual also describes the process for scoring the game and determining the winner. The manual concludes with tips for players to remember as they embark upon playing the game.
EXPERIMENTAL WARGAMES TO ADDRESS THE COMPLEXITY?SCARCITY GAP.
Abstract not provided.
An Active Learning Method for the Comparison of Agent-based Models.
Abstract not provided.
Experimental Gaming: Introducing the Project on Nuclear Gaming?s SIGNAL Framework.
Abstract not provided.
Project on Nuclear Gaming: Investigating the Impact of Nuclear Weapons Capabilities on Deterrence: May 2-3, 2018 Workshop Summary
In the future, it may be possible for states to construct nuclear weapons with alternative effects that are optimized for specific military purposes. These nuclear weapon concepts might employ features such as enhanced radiation outputs (ER), electromagnetic pulse (EMP), or other approaches such as high-precision, low-yield systems (HPLY) that reduce collateral damage, but improve lethality to targets. Some have speculated that such weapons could have the effect of lowering the threshold of use for nuclear weapons by reducing the negative incentives to their use or by providing new military applications for nuclear weapons. A nuclear arsenal that includes weapons with alternate effect regimes may also have an impact on the calculus of escalation in a conflict scenario. This project of the University of California, Berkeley (UCB), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) investigates the potential impacts of alternate nuclear weapons effects regimes on deterrence and strategic stability using experimental gaming methods. The purpose of this document is to capture the research questions, assumptions, scenario characteristics, and other details that provide the framework used to address this challenge presented during the first workshop discussion hosted by the Center for Global Security Research at LLNL with subject matter experts from government, academia, and the private sector. The report also summarizes feedback from participants. Topics discussed during the workshop included alternative effects of nuclear weapons, existing approaches for modeling and measuring conflict, and the state of the art in experimental game design.
Modeling Economic Interdependence in Deterrence Using a Serious Game
In order to understand the effect of economic interdependence on conflict and on deterrents to conflict, and to assess the viability of online games as experiments to perform research, an online serious game was used to gather data on economic, political, and military factors in the game setting. These data were operationalized in forms analogous to variables from the real-world Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset. A set of economic predictor variables was analyzed using linear mixed effects regression models in an attempt to discover relationships between the predictor variables and conflict outcomes. Differences between the online game results and results from the real world are discussed.
Toward a Quantitative Approach to Data Gathering and Analysis for Nuclear Deterrence Policy.
Abstract not provided.
Macro Supply Chain Lifecycle Decision Analytics
This report summarizes a two-year LDRD project that investigated the problem of representing complex supply chains, identifying the worst risks and evaluating mitigation options. Our team developed a framework that includes a representation for business processes, risk assessment questions, risk indicators and methods for analyzing and summarizing the data. In our approach, the Process Matrix represents an overall supply chain for an end product in a high-level, tabular form. It connects the various touch-points of a business process including people, external vendors, tools, storage locations and transportation services while capturing the flow of both physical and intellectual artifacts. We believe these direct connections are exactly the things that a process owner can typically control. These material flows (both physical and intellectual) are also represented in a graph. This enables us to use graph-oriented analysis such as fault tree analysis and attack graph generation. Our approach is top-down, which helps users to get a more holistic understanding for a given amount of resources. Understanding the provenance of materials is difficult and it is easy to exhaust the analysts' resources. Rather than a tool to do vendor analysis or product comparison, our framework enables an enterprise-level analysis. The risk assessment questionnaires have a varying levels of detail and cover various aspects of the supply chain such as process steps, artifacts, suppliers, etc. and connections between these aspects such as artifact-storage, artifact-supplier, etc. Each question is further associated with one of seven risk indicators which can be used to summarize the risk. These risk indicators can also be weighted to reflect a user's concerns. We have successfully applied our framework to several use cases in various stages of its development and provided valuable insights to our partners, but it can also be applied to other complex systems outside of the supply chain security problem.
Game Theory for Proactive Dynamic Defense and Attack Mitigation in Cyber-Physical Systems
While there has been a great deal of security research focused on preventing attacks, there has been less work on how one should balance security and resilience investments. In this work we developed and evaluated models that captured both explicit defenses and other mitigations that reduce the impact of attacks. We examined these issues both in more broadly applicable general Stackelberg models and in more specific network and power grid settings. Finally, we compared these solutions to existing work in terms of both solution quality and computational overhead.