Search NASA⌕ Search

Engineering topics

Lopez Jr, Juan

Publications and source records attributed to Lopez Jr, Juan.

Beyond Binary: Automated PLC Memory Forensics through RGB Image Analysis and Deep Learning

The introduction of Industry 4.0 and the evolution of industrial control systems (ICS) to adopt Internet-based technologies enhanced productivity, but have inadvertently increased their vulnerability to cyber-based malicious attacks. When an ICS system is compromised, security analysts need to identify the root cause quickly to start the recovery process and develop mitigation strategies to safeguard against future instances. Memory forensics is critical in the analysis process to ascertain what occurred. To date, approaches to analyze the persistent memory in ICS devices are limited, and almost nonexistent for volatile memory. This paper proposes an automated methodology, COMA, for PLC memory dump analysis using computer vision and deep learning techniques. Specifically, COMA converts the sequences of bytes in a PLC memory dump to RGB pixels and creates a deep learning model that learns the underlying patterns and features of pre-labeled forensic artifacts in images and segments them into distinct regions. COMA then uses the trained model to automatically segment new memory images and extract forensic artifacts. We evaluate COMA on a Schneider Electric Modicon M221 PLC involving two cyber-based attack scenarios: (i) code injection and (ii) code modification. The empirical results show that COMA can successfully detect attack artifacts in memory dumps in both scenarios.

Asmar Awad, Rima↗

CYVET: A Cyber-Physical Assurance Framework Based on a Semi-Supervised Vetting Approach

The project is designed to directly address the needs described in the Topic Area 4 (“Cybersecurity Verification and Validation”) of the CEDS’19 Research Call. The proposed CYVET system directly addresses the need to elevate the current industry capabilities to verify and validate OT cybersecurity and associated control system infrastructure. Currently, there is a significant gap in the energy sector’s capability in that regard during infrastructure improvement, equipment procurement, and compliance certification. CYVET provides that needed capability. CYVET is device and architecture agnostic and thus broadly applicable across the energy sector. The goal of this project is to develop and deliver a cybersecurity verification and validation framework testing capability to verify and validate OT equipment, software, and the underlying control system architecture. The primary project objectives are (i) Verification: the synthesis and reconciliation of standards and vendor supplied features, (ii) Validation: the generation, execution, and presentation of testing scripts of verified security features, and (3) Demonstration: apply the developed technology capabilities for verification and validation at a relevant end-user facility in the energy sector.

Lopez Jr, Juan↗

Memory forensic analysis of a programmable logic controller in industrial control systems

In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are used to automate physical processes such as nuclear plants and power grid stations, and are often subject to cyber attacks. As in conventional IT domain, the memory analysis of the PLCs can help answer important forensic questions about the attack, such as the presence of malicious firmware, injection of modified control logic (the program running on the PLC), and manipulation of I/O devices (e.g., sensors and actuators). Unlike conventional IT domain, PLCs have heterogeneous hardware architecture, proprietary firmware and control software, making it challenging to employ a unified framework for their memory forensics. For merely extracting artifacts of forensic importance, reverse-engineering the firmware is a tedious task, and the effort needs to be repeated for every PLC model. As a community, a step-wise approach to tackle this challenge is to analyze the memory of specific PLCs, and subsequently find a generic framework applicable to all PLCs. Our work is a step forward in this direction. By following a methodology that focuses on the functional layer of PLCs instead of reverse engineering the firmware, we analyze the digital forensic artifacts available in a common PLC, Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61. Before diving into the memory dump, we analyze the PLC control software to create a list of important artifacts that are sure to exist in the PLC memory dump. The approach employs a setup where PLC control software RSLogix-5000 is connected to the PLC, and the memory dump can be obtained as and when needed. We create test cases that sequentially highlight each category of artifacts, followed by an examination of the resultant impact on memory. After attaining the listed artifacts, we employ conventional string and known data searches to extract interesting information present in this PLC's memory. The memory analysis profile, presented as a Python library and shared with the community, can help a forensic investigator to readily extract forensic artifacts from the same model's controller. The adopted approach may help researchers in creating memory profile of other PLCs, and ultimately formulating a generic PLC memory analysis framework.

Rais, Muhammad Haris↗

JTAG-based PLC memory acquisition framework for industrial control systems

In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLC) are the embedded devices that directly control and monitor critical industrial infrastructure processes such as nuclear plants and power grid stations. Cyberattacks often target PLCs to sabotage a physical process. A memory forensic analysis of a suspect PLC can answer questions about an attack, including compromised firmware and manipulation of PLC control logic code and I/O devices. Given physical access to a PLC, collecting forensic information from the PLC memory at the hardware-level is risky and challenging. It may cause the PLC to crash or hang since PLCs have proprietary, legacy hardware with heterogeneous architecture. This paper addresses this research problem and proposes a novel JTAG (Joint Test Action Group)-based framework, Kyros, for reliable PLC memory acquisition. Kyros systematically creates a JTAG profile of a PLC through hardware assessment, JTAG pins identification, memory map creation, and optimizing acquisition parameters. It also facilitates the community of interest (such as ICS owners, operators, and vendors) to develop the JTAG profiles of PLCs. Further, we present a case study of Kyros implementation over Allen-Bradley 1756-A10/B to help understand the framework's application on a real-world PLC used in industry settings. The sample PLC memory dumps are shared with the research community to facilitate further research.

Rais, Muhammad Haris↗

Smart Semi-Supervised Accumulation of Large Repositories for Industrial Control Systems Device Information

Industrial Control Systems device manufacturers frequently add new features to improve their product performance. Oftentimes, these changes are mainly vendor-driven initiatives, and customers may not be aware of the full impact of these new capabilities on their cybersecurity posture. In the energy sector, this can lead to considerable dissonance between vendor-provided cybersecurity claims and a customer’s responsibility for Operation Technology cybersecurity compliance. Thus, the resulting dynamic verification burden is shifted towards the customer and may pose a significant cybersecurity risk to the energy sector landscape. We found that there is very limited research into cybersecurity auditing for Operational Technology. However, a solution is needed for vetting the vendor-supplied feature claims and their adherence to cybersecurity requirements and standards. We are presently engaged in an effort to develop such a system. This paper demonstrates one vital aspect of this effort in proposing an end-to-end framework to accumulate a large repository of ICS device information for this vetting system, curate the dataset, and conduct extensive processing. This framework is designed to use web scraping, data analytics and Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques to identify vendor websites, automate the collection of website-accessible documents and automatically derive metadata from them for identification of product documents relevant to the repository. We have found that this automated approach to vendor identification, document extraction into a product repository, and NLP pre-processing is unique and has not been previously presented in the literature. The preliminary work shows that this is feasible and can produce reliable results with minimum supervision. Future work will be built upon this foundation in order to achieve semi-supervised vetting of device technical information – a vital capability for ensuring that vendor-claimed device cybersecurity capabilities match industry requirements.

Ameri, Kimia↗

A Novel Vetting Approach to Cybersecurity Verification in Energy Grid Systems

The cybersecurity auditing for Operation Technology is critical and has been largely missing from the cybersecurity research, especially in the energy sector. In this paper, we present a novel “cybersecurity vetting” approach (CYVET) to the problem of verification and validation of cybersecurity in complex cyber-physical installations underlying modern energy grid systems.

Perumalla, Kalyan↗

Kensor: Coordinated Intelligence from Co-Located Sensors

Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming more pervasive in many installations, including homes, manufacturing plants, and industrial facilities of all kinds. The data that IoT produces is a reflection of usual behavior such as daily routines and scheduled tasks, but also from unexpected behavior due to unintentional or undesirable abnormalities. Here, we focus on achieving coordinated intelligence about normal and abnormal phenomena from multiple sensors that are geographically colocated in close proximity, monitoring and controlling a set of co-located devices. Given a set of co-located sensors, we seek an intelligent approach that would automatically determine the “normal” patterns of behaviors among the correlated sensors. After normal behavior is extracted, later monitoring should detect any deviant variations over time. An example application is an entry monitoring and alert system for facilities such as nuclear reactors, where badge readers, door locks, lights, weight trackers and other co-located sensors at the entry point are collectively tracked. To address this problem, we identify the possible solution approach that can be used to solve its different variants. The implemented model is developed as a combination of rules and Markov Chain methods.

Kotevska, Olivera↗

Detecting Sensors and Inferring their Relations at Level-0 in Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems

While there exist tools and techniques to discover, identify, map, and analyze cyber physical components at higher levels of the cyber space, there is a lack of capabilities to reach down to the sensors at the bottom-most levels, such as levels 0 and 1 of the Purdue Enterprise Reference Model for cyber-physical systems (CPS). Conventional information technology (IT)-based tools reach as far as the network-side of programmable logic controllers, but are inadequate to access and analyze the physical side of the CPS infrastructure that directly interfaces with the actual physical processes and systems. In this paper, we present our research and development efforts aimed at addressing this gap, by building a system called Deep-cyberia (Deep Cyber-Physical System Interrogation and Analysis) that incorporates algorithms and interfaces aimed at uncovering sensors and computing estimates of correlations among them.

Perumalla, Kalyan↗

Volatile Memory Extraction- Based Approach for Level 0-1 CPS Forensics

Most security analyzers operate on system state that is far removed from end-point components in cyber-physical systems (CPS) identified as level 0-1 in the Purdue Architecture Reference Architecture (PERA) [1]. For example, many operate on system logs and other data dumps to disks. Tremendous value that can be gained in cyber security forensics if low level details such as dynamic changes to volatile memory can be extracted and provided to more sophisticated analysis tools. However, obtaining detailed and dynamic system state at the level of volatile memory is extremely challenging [2]. Here, we attempt to apply IT memory forensic mechanisms to CPS end-point devices and statistically evaluate them. Our focus is to extract volatile and dynamically changing internal information form CPS 0-1 level devices, and design preliminary schemes to exploit that extracted information. This new capability of generating a sequence of volatile memory snapshots for offline, detailed and sophisticated analysis opens a new class of cyber security schemes for CPS forensic analysis. As a case study for our ongoing research, we apply the proposed methodology to Modicon PLC using Modbus protocol. We extract the memory layout and subject the device to read operations at the most critical regions of memory. Similarly, write operations are initiated to carefully determine memory locations (for example, bytes that hold the firmware version number). This capability of generating a sequence of volatile memory snapshots for offline, detailed and sophisticated analysis opens a new class of cyber security schemes for CPS forensic analysis. Also, the ability to dynamically make controlled modifications to specific memory locations opens the potential for new mechanisms such as taint analysis and watermarking.

Asmar Awad, Rima↗

Automated Reconstruction of Control Logic for Programmable Logic Controller Forensics

This paper presents Similo, an automated scalable framework for control logic forensics in industrial control systems. Similo is designed to investigate denial of engineering operations (DEO) attacks, recently demonstrated to hide malicious control logic in a programmable logic controller (PLC) at field sites from an engineering software (at control center). The network traffic (if captured) contains substantial evidence to investigate DEO attacks including manipulation of control logic. Laddis, a state-of-the-art forensic approach for DEO attacks, is a binary-logic decompiler for the Allen-Bradley’s RSLogix engineering software and MicroLogix 1400 PLC. It is developed with extensive manual reverse engineering effort of the underlying proprietary network protocol and the binary control logic. Unfortunately, Laddis is not scalable and requires similar efforts to extend on other engineering software/PLCs. The proposed solution, Similo, is based on the observation that engineering software of different vendors are equipped with decompilers. Similo is a virtual-PLC framework that integrates the decompilers with their respective (previously-captured) ICS network traffic of control logic. It recovers the binary logic into a high-level source code (of the programming languages defined by IEC 61131-3 standard) automatically. Similo can work with both proprietary/open protocols without requiring protocol specifications and the binary formats of control logic. Thus, it is scalable to different ICS vendors. We evaluate Similo on three PLCs of two ICS vendors, i.e. MicroLogix 1400, MicroLogix 1100, and Modicon M221. These PLCs support proprietary protocols and the control logics written in two programming languages: Ladder Logic and Instruction List. The evaluation results show that Similo can accurately reconstruct a control logic from an ICS network traffic and can be used to investigate the DEO attacks effectively.

Ali qasim, Syed↗

Industrial IoT cross-layer forensic investigation

Cross-layer forensic investigation is addressed for Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) device attacks in Critical Infrastructure (CI) applications. The operational motivation for cross-layer investigation is provided by the desire to directly correlate bit-level network anomaly detection with physical layer (PHY) device connectivity and/or status (normal, defective, attacked, etc.) at the time of attack. The technical motivation for developing cross-layer techniques is motivated by (a) having considerable capability in place for Higher-Layer Digital Forensic Information exploitation—real-time network cyberattack and postattack analysis, (b) having considerably less capability in place for Lowest-Layer PHY Forensic Information exploitation—the PHY domain remains largely under exploited, and (c) considering cyber-physical integration as a means to jointly exploit higher-layer digital and lowest-layer PHY forensic information to maximize investigative benefit in IIoT cyber forensics. A delineation of higher-layer digital and lowest-layer PHY elements is provided for the standard network Open Systems Interconnection model and the specific Perdue Enterprise Reference Architecture commonly used in IIoT Industrial Control System/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition applications. Finally, a forensics work summary is provided for each delineated area based on selected representative publications and provides the basis for presenting the envisioned cross-layer forensic investigation.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗