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Lopez, Carlos

Publications and source records attributed to Lopez, Carlos.

At least 37 records · Page 2

Can Cell to Cell Thermal Runaway Propagation be Prevented in a Li-ion Battery Module?

Increasing cell spacing decreased adjacent cell damage center dotElectrically connected adjacent cells drained more than physically adjacent cells center dotRadiant barrier prevents propagation when fully installed between BP cells center dotBP cells vent rapidly and expel contents at 100% SOC -Slower vent with flame/smoke at 50% -Thermal runaway event typically occurs at 160 degC center dotLG cells vent but do not expel contents -Thermal runaway event typically occurs at 200 degC center dotSKC LFP modules did not propagate; fuses on negative terminal of cell may provide a benefit in reducing cell to cell damage propagation. New requirement in NASA-Battery Safety Requirements document: JSC 20793 Rev C 5.1.5.1 Requirements - Thermal Runaway Propagation a. For battery designs greater than a 80-Wh energy employing high specific energy cells (greater than 80 watt-hours/kg, for example, lithium-ion chemistries) with catastrophic failure modes, the battery shall be evaluated to ascertain the severity of a worst-case single-cell thermal runaway event and the propensity of the design to demonstrate cell-to-cell propagation in the intended application and environment. NASA has traditionally addressed the threat of thermal runaway incidents in its battery deployments through comprehensive prevention protocols. This prevention-centered approach has included extensive screening for manufacturing defects, as well as robust battery management controls that prevent abuse-induced runaway even in the face of multiple system failures. This focused strategy has made the likelihood of occurrence of such an event highly improbable. b. The evaluation shall include all necessary analysis and test to quantify the severity (consequence) of the event in the intended application and environment as well as to identify design modifications to the battery or the system that could appreciably reduce that severity. In addition to prevention protocols, programs developing battery designs with catastrophic failure modes should take the steps necessary to assess the severity of a possible thermal runaway event. Programs should assess whether there are reasonable design changes that could appreciably affect the severity of the outcome. Evaluation should include environmental effects to surrounding hardware (i.e., temperature, pressure, shock), contamination effects due to any expelled contaminates, and venting propulsive effects when venting overboard.

Jeevarajan, Judith↗

Cost Estimate for a Proposed GDF Suez LNG Testing Program

At the request of GDF Suez, a Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) cost estimate was prepared for the design, construction, testing, and data analysis for an experimental series of large-scale (Liquefied Natural Gas) LNG spills on land and water that would result in the largest pool fires and vapor dispersion events ever conducted. Due to the expected cost of this large, multi-year program, the authors utilized Sandia's structured cost estimating methodology. This methodology insures that the efforts identified can be performed for the cost proposed at a plus or minus 30 percent confidence. The scale of the LNG spill, fire, and vapor dispersion tests proposed by GDF could produce hazard distances and testing safety issues that need to be fully explored. Based on our evaluations, Sandia can utilize much of our existing fire testing infrastructure for the large fire tests and some small dispersion tests (with some modifications) in Albuquerque, but we propose to develop a new dispersion testing site at our remote test area in Nevada because of the large hazard distances. While this might impact some testing logistics, the safety aspects warrant this approach. In addition, we have included a proposal to study cryogenic liquid spills on water and subsequent vaporization in the presence of waves. Sandia is working with DOE on applications that provide infrastructure pertinent to wave production. We present an approach to conduct repeatable wave/spill interaction testing that could utilize such infrastructure.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Evaluation of Select Heat and Pressure Measurement Gauges for Potential Use in the NRC/OECD High Energy Arc Fault (HEAF) Test Program

In an effort to improve the current state of the art in fire probabilistic risk assessment methodology, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Regulatory Research, contracted Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to conduct a series of scoping tests to identify thermal and mechanical probes that could be used to characterize the zone of influence (ZOI) during high energy arc fault (HEAF) testing. For the thermal evaluation, passive and active probes were exposed to HEAF-like heat fluxes for a period of 2 seconds at the SNL's National Solar Thermal Test Facility to determine their ability to survive and measure such an extreme environment. Thermal probes tested included temperature lacquers (passive), NANMAC thermocouples, directional flame thermometers, modified plate thermometers, infrared temperature sensors, and a Gardon heat flux gauge. Similarly, passive and active pressure probes were evaluated by exposing them to pressures resulting from various high-explosive detonations at the Sandia Terminal Ballistic Facility. Pressure probes included bikini pressure gauges (passive) and pressure transducers. Results from these tests provided good insight to determine which probes should be considered for use during future HEAF testing.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Thermo-mechanical study of bare 48Y UF6 containers exposed to the regulatory fire environment.

Most of the regulatory agencies world-wide require that containers used for the transportation of natural UF6 and depleted UF6 must survive a fully-engulfing fire environment for 30 minutes as described in 10CFR71 and in TS-R-1. The primary objective of this project is to examine the thermo-mechanical performance of 48Y transportation cylinders when exposed to the regulatory hypothetical fire environment without the thermal protection that is currently used for shipments in those countries where required. Several studies have been performed in which UF6 cylinders have been analyzed to determine if the thermal protection currently used on UF6 cylinders of type 48Y is necessary for transport. However, none of them could clearly confirm neither the survival nor the failure of the 48Y cylinder when exposed to the regulatory fire environment without the additional thermal protection. A consortium of five companies that move UF6 is interested in determining if 48Y cylinders can be shipped without the thermal protection that is currently used. Sandia National Laboratories has outlined a comprehensive testing and analysis project to determine if these shipping cylinders are capable of withstanding the regulatory thermal environment without additional thermal protection. Sandia-developed coupled physics codes will be used for the analyses that are planned. A series of destructive and non-destructive tests will be performed to acquire the necessary material and behavior information to benchmark the models and to answer the question about the ability of these containers to survive the fire environment. Both the testing and the analysis phases of this project will consider the state of UF6 under thermal and pressure loads as well as the weakening of the steel container due to the thermal load. Experiments with UF6 are also planned to collect temperature- and pressure-dependent thermophysical properties of this material.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Regulatory fire test requirements for plutonium air transport packages : JP-4 or JP-5 vs. JP-8 aviation fuel.

For certification, packages used for the transportation of plutonium by air must survive the hypothetical thermal environment specified in 10CFR71.74(a)(5). This regulation specifies that 'the package must be exposed to luminous flames from a pool fire of JP-4 or JP-5 aviation fuel for a period of at least 60 minutes.' This regulation was developed when jet propellant (JP) 4 and 5 were the standard jet fuels. However, JP-4 and JP-5 currently are of limited availability in the United States of America. JP-4 is very hard to obtain as it is not used much anymore. JP-5 may be easier to get than JP-4, but only through a military supplier. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that readily-available JP-8 fuel is a possible substitute for the aforementioned certification test. Comparisons between the properties of the three fuels are given. Results from computer simulations that compared large JP-4 to JP-8 pool fires using Sandia's VULCAN fire model are shown and discussed. Additionally, the Container Analysis Fire (CAFE) code was used to compare the thermal response of a large calorimeter exposed to engulfing fires fueled by these three jet propellants. The paper then recommends JP-8 as an alternate fuel that complies with the thermal environment implied in 10CFR71.74.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Fire tests and analyses of a rail cask-sized calorimeter.

Three large open pool fire experiments involving a calorimeter the size of a spent fuel rail cask were conducted at Sandia National Laboratories Lurance Canyon Burn Site. These experiments were performed to study the heat transfer between a very large fire and a large cask-like object. In all of the tests, the calorimeter was located at the center of a 7.93-meter diameter fuel pan, elevated 1 meter above the fuel pool. The relative pool size and positioning of the calorimeter conformed to the required positioning of a package undergoing certification fire testing. Approximately 2000 gallons of JP-8 aviation fuel were used in each test. The first two tests had relatively light winds and lasted 40 minutes, while the third had stronger winds and consumed the fuel in 25 minutes. Wind speed and direction, calorimeter temperature, fire envelop temperature, vertical gas plume speed, and radiant heat flux near the calorimeter were measured at several locations in all tests. Fuel regression rate data was also acquired. The experimental setup and certain fire characteristics that were observed during the test are described in this paper. Results from three-dimensional fire simulations performed with the Cask Analysis Fire Environment (CAFE) fire code are also presented. Comparisons of the thermal response of the calorimeter as measured in each test to the results obtained from the CAFE simulations are presented and discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗