A Logical Account of Diagnosis with Multiple Theories
Model-based diagnosis is a powerful, first-principles approach to diagnosis. The primary drawback with model-based diagnosis is that it is based on a system model, and this model might be inappropriate. The inappropriateness of models usually stems from the fundamental tradeoff between completeness and efficiency. Recently, Struss has developed an elegant proposal for diagnosis with multiple models. Struss characterizes models as relations and develops a precise notion of abstraction. He defines relations between models and analyzes the effect of a model switch on the space of possible diagnoses. In this paper we extend Struss's proposal in three ways. First, our account of diagnosis with multiple models is based on representing models as more expressive first-order theories, rather than as relations. A key technical contribution is the use of a general notion of abstraction based on interpretations between theories. Second, Struss conflates component modes with models, requiring him to define models relations such as choices which result in non-relational models. We avoid this problem by differentiating component modes from models. Third, we present a more general account of simplifications that correctly handles situations where the simplification contradicts the base theory.