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NASA NTRS2015

An Assessment of the Efficacy of Launch Collision Avoidance Analysis in Providing Risk Reduction for NASA

The objective of this document is to assess the value of collision on launch assessment (COLA, often referred to as “launch COLA”) practices and provide recommendations regarding its implementation for NASA robotic missions. The scope of this effort is limited to launch COLA screens against catalog objects that are either spacecraft or debris. No modifications to manned safety launch COLA practices are considered in this effort. An assessment of the value of launch COLA can be broken down into two fundamental questions: 1) Does collision during launch represent a significant risk to either the payload being launched or the space environment? 2) Can launch collision mitigation be performed in a manner that provides meaningful risk reduction at an acceptable level of operational impact? While it has been possible to piece together partial answers to these questions for some time, the first attempt to comprehensively address them is documented in reference (a), Launch COLA Operations: an Examination of Data Products, Procedures, and Thresholds, Revision A. This report is the product of an extensive study that addressed fundamental technical questions surrounding launch collision avoidance analysis and practice. The results provided in reference (a) will be cited throughout this document as these two questions are addressed. The premise of this assessment is that in order to conclude that launch COLA is a value-added activity, the answer to both of these questions must be affirmative. A “no” answer to either of these questions points toward the conclusion that launch COLA provides little or no risk mitigation benefit. The remainder of this assessment will focus on addressing these two questions.

launch COLA↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Setting the Bar for the Replacement of the Probability of Collision Metric

To date, satellite conjunction assessment (CA) risk analysis has largely embraced the probability of collision (Pc) as the omnibus metric to evaluate collision likelihood, and its use in such assessments has mostly been straightforward: at the point at which a conjunction mitigation decision is required, the calculated Pc is compared to a threshold; and if the calculated Pc exceeds that threshold, then a mitigation action is warranted. With only minor variation, this approach is employed by major CA risk assessment centers (e.g., NASA, EUSST, CNES, JAXA) and is advanced as the preferred method in the published CA best practices handbooks. Despite this near unanimity of operational practice, there is a major strain of secondary literature critical of the Pc and willing to propose alternatives. Alfano (2005) pointed out the ability of the Pc to underrepresent the risk in certain situations and counselled a maximum Pc construct. Carpenter (2017, 2019) reiterated this criticism and proposed using instead a confidence interval on the miss distance. Balch et al. (2019) identified what they argued was a defect in the entire Bayesian Pc construct and believed that the use of a more conservative methodology based on covariance ellipsoid overlap was necessary. Delande (2022) introduced the framework of collision “plausibility” to the risk assessment process and sketched out how this might be used operationally. Elkantassi (2022) published a full development of the miss distance confidence interval approach and applied it to several worked examples. While these different approaches to collision risk assessment do differ in their details, they all converge on two central points: first, the Pc’s failure to give an adequate expression of the risk in dilution region situations is a fatal flaw; and second, a conjunction should be presumed risky and in need of mitigation until the evidence of the situation can establish otherwise. These criticisms, if correct, would counsel a number of modifications to current CA operational practice; as such, they force a re-examination of fundamental aspects of the CA problem, including the following: 1. Is the CA risk assessment a probability problem, a statistics problem, or something else? 2. If it is a statistics problem, does it lend itself naturally to a hypothesis test construction? 3. If it can be construed as a hypothesis test, what form should the null hypothesis take, to wit: what constraints exist on the choice of the null hypothesis, what selections are in best alignment with all of the attendant parameters of the problem, and what is implied philosophically by different choices? 4. What are the implications of using the different proposed risk assessment parameters for CA? This question should be answered both in determining how frequently the dilution region situation cited by the critics of the Pc actually appears in an operationally significant manner and the missed detection and false alarm rates of all of the proposed risk assessment metrics, compared both to the Pc and to each other. This paper explores and offers preliminary answers to the above questions, presenting a researched treatment of the philosophical nature of the CA problem and the null hypothesis choice that achieves the greatest consistency with all of the different aspects of operational CA conduct. It then profiles all of the different proposed risk assessment metrics enumerated in the earlier paragraph against an extremely large database of conjunction events at both the 550km and 700km altitudes. The combination of the philosophical exploration of the CA problem and the results of the profiling activity articulates what a risk assessment metric will need to demonstrate, in terms of both innate construction and performance, in order to be a true competitor to the Pc.

conjunction assessment↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Setting the Bar for the Replacement of the Probability of Collision Metric

Recent research in satellite conjunction risk assessment has levelled a number of criticisms at the probability of collision (Pc) parameter as a durable statement of satellite collision likelihood, and a number of different alternatives to this calculation have been proposed. Many of these proposals, however, stop at the outlining of the theory and do not discuss the additional philosophical and practical issues that must be confronted in evaluating such proposals for adoption. The present work seeks to outline some of these philosophical and practical considerations, and therefore the kinds of analyses and profiling that will be needed before the Pc, which is at present nearly universally adopted in the conjunction risk mitigation community, can be replaced with a new (and superior) paradigm and associated metric.

conjunction assessment↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automating Maneuvers: Considerations for Collision Avoidance

As more space operators implement large constellations of spacecraft, automating orbit maintenance maneuvers becomes a key feature of their operations concept to ensure that the workload is manageable. However, the practice of performing a maneuver without sharing the plan with other nearby spacecraft causes a risk that two spacecraft will collide, not only destroying the spacecraft involved, but creating debris that will affect all other spacecraft using that orbit regime. In order to share the maneuver plan, a predicted ephemeris file containing the maneuver must be sent to a central authority to screen against predicted trajectories of all other on-orbit objects to determine where and when close approaches will occur that may need to be mitigated. Currently the screening authority used by US operators is the 19th Space Defense Squadron; screenings are performed once every 8 hours, meaning that spacecraft using automated maneuvering need to allow 16 hours to share their maneuver plan via the screening process in advance of maneuver execution in case one screening is missed and the next needs to be used. In an effort to speed up the screening process to benefit spacecraft using automated maneuvering, a prototype system for performing near-real-time screenings has been developed in support of the NASA Starling mission, a constellation of four cubesats that fly at the same altitude as the SpaceX Starlink constellation. Both of these constellations perform automated maneuvering, so without screening the planned maneuvers before execution, the two constellations would risk a collision. This paper describes the traditional conjunction assessment (CA) process, the prototype real-time CA screening capability, plans for the experiment to test the prototype, and next steps.

conjunction assessment↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automating Maneuvers: Considerations for Collision Avoidance

As more space operators implement large constellations of spacecraft, automating orbit maintenance maneuvers becomes a key feature of their operations concept to ensure that the workload is manageable. However, the practice of performing a maneuver without sharing the plan with other nearby spacecraft causes a risk that two spacecraft will collide, not only destroying the spacecraft involved, but creating debris that will affect all other spacecraft using that orbit regime. In order to share the maneuver plan, a predicted ephemeris file containing the maneuver must be sent to a central authority to screen against predicted trajectories of all other on-orbit objects to determine where and when close approaches will occur that may need to be mitigated. Currently the screening authority used by US operators is the 19th Space Defense Squadron; screenings are performed once every 8 hours, meaning that spacecraft using automated maneuvering need to allow 16 hours to share their maneuver plan via the screening process in advance of maneuver execution in case one screening is missed and the next needs to be used. In an effort to speed up the screening process to benefit spacecraft using automated maneuvering, a prototype system for performing near-real-time screenings has been developed in support of the NASA Starling mission, a constellation of four cubesats that fly at the same altitude as the SpaceX Starlink constellation. Both of these constellations perform automated maneuvering, so without screening the planned maneuvers before execution, the two constellations would risk a collision. This paper describes the traditional conjunction assessment (CA) process, the prototype real-time CA screening capability, plans for the experiment to test the prototype, and next steps.

conjunction assessment↗