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Maxted, Maxcine

Publications and source records attributed to Maxted, Maxcine.

Data call questions related to potential NEPA/Data gaps

Based on review of the related NEPA documents, and consideration of the potential gaps in NEPA coverage, a number of questions have been generated. These questions are generally higher level (less detailed) questions that should help to establish the applicability of analyses in existing NEPA documents and the ability of these documents to provide NEPA coverage for the Proposed Action. These questions do not request detailed information about SRS facilities/activities and the Proposed Action like typically would be requested when performing impacts analyses for an EIS. We do not believe detail information is needed; if it is needed, it may be an indication that an SA is not the appropriate level of NEPA documentation for the Proposed Action.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Panel Session 67: US Savannah River Operation Office: Nuclear Materials Management

The Savannah River Site (SRS) has a proud 70-year history of nuclear materials management and processing. This panel provided an overview of the history, current status, and a look at potential future missions related to spent nuclear fuel (SNF), nuclear materials, and facilities at SRS. Panelists with presentations: SRS Nuclear Materials Management (Maxcine Maxted, Janice Lawson, Michael Mikolanis)

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Evaluation of H-Canyon Ventilation Exhaust Tunnel Inspection at the Savannah River Site - 20052

The Department of Energy (DOE) H-Canyon Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is operated by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). The Facility Structural Integrity Program [1] provides a process to inspect, evaluate, and document the conditions of passive safety related structural systems and components, their degradation mechanisms and their impact on the safety envelope. The Structural Integrity Program performs periodic visual inspections to confirm the systems and components can perform their safety function and recommend corrective actions before the function is compromised. The H-Canyon Exhaust Tunnel is part of the H-Canyon Ventilation System and is periodically inspected under the Structural Integrity Program. The Tunnel performs a Safety Class passive design feature function that is available 100% of the time. The underground reinforced concrete Tunnel directs Canyon process air from the Canyon to the Sand Filter System. The radiological and chemical airborne activity coupled with the physical configuration of the tunnel precludes a manned entry into the tunnel to perform the inspection. Unlike active systems that can be subjected to physical testing to confirm capability, qualification calculations, including modeling, is performed to assess passive design feature capabilities relative to operational, accident and natural phenomena hazards events. Input for these calculations come from knowledge of field conditions, design drawings and conservative assumptions. The knowledge of field conditions comes from concrete and soil testing activities as well as inspection data. The use of cameras on crawlers to obtain inspection data and how that data is used in qualification calculations is the focus of this discussion. Remote Tunnel inspections have been performed using cameras on a stick, referred to as pole cameras, prior to Calendar Year 2003 (CY2003). Since CY2003, six camera equipped crawlers have been used. Crawlers have evolved and improved by incorporating lessons learned from the previous inspections. The latest 2019 crawler successfully traveled the entire length of the tunnel between the Canyon and Sand Filter System and captured images that were previously unseen, thus providing key visual data for the Structural Integrity Program report [2]. The inspection data serves as 1) input to qualification calculations, 2) validates current conditions remain bounded by qualification calculations, and 3) documents a record of change over time. This data is vital for the effective evaluation of the tunnel structure and aids with predicting the life cycle service life safety envelope to protect the public, environment, and facility worker. The goal of the 2019 deployment was to use a more robust vehicle to ensure travel over obstacles, perform the inspection with higher resolution cameras, and have the ability to elevate the cameras to view surfaces previously obscured by abandon-in-place ducts in the tunnel. The inspection information will serve to strengthen the input basis for qualification calculations, versus using excessive conservative calculation assumptions. This 2019 inspection was compared with previous crawler visual evidence to identify change over time to project remaining service life and confirm field conditions remain bounded by qualification calculations. The results of the 2019 Exhaust Tunnel inspection continue to improve and provide a firm basis to make sound engineering judgements regarding tunnel capability and approaches in projecting remaining service life with an aging system and component. (authors)

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