Engineering topics

McFly, Shane

Publications and source records attributed to McFly, Shane.

7 records

DOE OSTI2024

Cyber Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide

The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide provides a framework, guidance, and resources for incorporating CIE into university-level engineering programs and related educational activities. A key goal of this guide is to help institutions deliver CIE focused education to produce future engineers and technicians who meet the nation’s infrastructure needs. To accommodate a broad range of educational goals and approaches, this guide outlines several practical integration strategies, links to resources that can accelerate CIE adoption, and offers perspectives from partner academic institutions on the various implementation strategies.

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DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Informed Engineering Adoption in University Engineering Programs: An Overview of CIE Integration Successes at Nine U.S. Educational Institutions

This report examines the adoption of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) in university engineering programs, driven by the need to protect critical energy infrastructure from adversarial threats. CIE equips current and future engineers and technicians with the necessary mindset, skills, and competencies to enhance the resilience of engineered systems against cyber attacks. This report highlights nine academic partners who are incorporating CIE into their curricula through various approaches, including lectures, courses, and certificates.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Alerga: Alert Aggregation and Reasoning in GOOSE Simulation Pipeline

IEC 61850 specifies the Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) protocol as one option for low latency communication of substation-related events. Due to its strict timing requirements, GOOSE lacks any form of encryption or authentication and has only minimal integrity guarantees. These absences render the protocol vulnerable to a variety of communication anomalies, including adversarial action. In particular, an adversary with access to the substation network can launch man in the middle (MITM) attacks. We propose Alerga, a set of tools to allow operators to mitigate some of the risks of the protocol while retaining its strengths. To that end, we have developed first a GOOSE simulation pipeline including data generation, anomaly detection, alert handling, causal reasoning and data visualization components. The simulator is designed to be modular, allowing operators to swap components to better fit their network capabilities. The volume of alert traffic on a substation network threatens operators with alert fatigue. In order to combat this, we secondly present a novel form of alert aggregation and processing, offering operators a condensed view of any threats to the system. Thirdly, to facilitate the handling of these threats, our causal reasoning system traces the alerts back to their most likely cause, generating an initial hypothesis for operators to investigate.

alert aggregation↗

DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system’s lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide: Version 1.0 [Slides]

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system's lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements - but does not replace - the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system's engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2023

Distributed Energy Resource Visual Emulator: Phase 1

To help federal energy managers assess, monitor, and manage cybersecurity while achieving decarbonization, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) offers a comprehensive, web-based assessment tool focusing on cyber governance or policies, technical management, and physical security. The DER-CF currently presents users with a series of pertinent cybersecurity questions, which are used to generate a site-specific report and recommendations. This paper outlines a technical approach to integrate the DER-CF with another key asset—NREL's Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems (ARIES) Cyber Range—to visualize cybersecurity resilience and compliance and to enhance the usability and accessibility of the DER-CF. The result is a new tool called the Distributed Energy Resource Visual Emulator (DER-VE). Its development will include regular conversations with stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of these efforts, refine the visualization capability, and ensure its value to our partners. Phase 0 of the integration project was concluded in 2021. Phase 1, completed in 2022, has two components: The first is developing a working visualization of system compliance using the DER-CF, and the second is planning the design of a server application that takes input data from the DER-CF and creates a personal emulated environment of the user's system or a selected reference architect. Major components that were addressed in this phase are the DER-CF output, compliance visualization, data model, and compliance server design.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework and Cyber Range Integration

Distributed energy resource (DER) systems feature complex, data-driven communications networks that require careful system coordination and constant vigilance to ensure that grid assets are secure. Because DERs are an important component of the decarbonization strategy, agencies need to secure energy data that could implicate issues of national security if compromised. To help federal energy managers assess, monitor, and manage cybersecurity while achieving decarbonization, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL's) Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) offers a comprehensive, web-based assessment tool focusing on cyber governance or policies, technical management, and physical security. The DER-CF currently presents users with a series of pertinent cybersecurity questions that are used to generate a site-specific report and recommendations. This paper outlines a plan to integrate the DER-CF with another key asset-NREL's cyber range-to visualize cybersecurity resilience and compliance and to enhance the usability and accessibility of the DER-CF for federal facility energy managers and planners. This integration will result in a visualization environment to interpret and interact with compliance data. Its development will include regular conversations with stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of these efforts, refine the visualization capability, and ensure its value to our partners.

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