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McKenzie, Penny L.

Publications and source records attributed to McKenzie, Penny L..

Cyber Halo Innovation Research Program (CHIRP) Student Research Report: Program Analysis

The Cybersecurity and Space Systems Research Program (CHIRP) conducted multi-year, mission-focused research addressing emerging cybersecurity challenges affecting space and ground systems. Students from California State University San Bernardino (CSUSB), University of Texas El Paso (UTEP), and California State University Dominguez Hills (CSUDH) conducted structured research, developed proof-of-concept demonstrations, participated in applied cybersecurity training, and collaborated with Space Systems Command (SSC), academic, and industry partners. This report documents the research questions, methodologies, findings, demonstrations, and student contributions associated with each cohort. It also summarizes the program’s workforce-development outcomes, including applied cybersecurity training, professional certifications, technical credentials, and partnerships with organizations such as CT Cubed, Inc. and ISC2. Collectively, CHIRP strengthened the space-cybersecurity workforce pipeline and produced research and prototype efforts that may inform future cybersecurity assessments, test and evaluation activities, cyber-range development, acquisition planning, operational training, and mission-assurance initiatives.

McKenzie, Penny L.↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) Data Categorization Study: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Detection Device Data

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) seeks to address critical questions related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection devices. This research aims to enhance the security and understanding of these devices by investigating various aspects of their identification, communication, and functionality. The primary focus is on network security, malware detection, device identification, and intelligence gathering. CBRN data can be categorized in various ways depending on the purpose of CBRN detection devices and the specific context of the applications for analysis. Criteria that can be used to assist in this effort include but are not limited to data type, data protocol, source/destination, application, time, security, and content. This study will inform additional paths for data classification, data profiling, data mapping, and data modeling. This will help the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) better understand their data and make informed decisions based on the insights gained from this study and their application. The CBRN Data Categorization study will include the identification of 5–10 different CBRN detection devices with unique characteristics for assessing and analyzing the data that is being produced by and transmitted from these devices.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Zero Trust Cybersecurity: Concepts and Models for Application

Zero Trust is a cybersecurity paradigm centered on the idea that a network breach is inevitable and so no user or asset should be implicitly trusted. Entities on the network are continuously monitored and access-granting decisions are based on dynamic risk assessment using multiple inputs. To limit the damage from an attack, privileges and lateral access are constrained by default. This report provides an overview of current models and constructs employed in building out these concepts into a zero trust architecture.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Integrated behavior-based infrastructure command validation

A cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system is provided herein for validating asset commands issued within an infrastructure network. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can be integrated into an infrastructure network to monitor and validate infrastructure asset commands in real-time or while the infrastructure network is active. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can receive or intercept commands issued by asset controllers. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can validate the commands based on a command validation model. The command validation model can represent normal operating behavior of the infrastructure network. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can provide valid commands to the intended infrastructure asset, or can reject invalid commands. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can store validation results for use in updating the command validation model. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can flag or otherwise warn the infrastructure network or administrators of invalid commands.

Akyol, Bora A.↗

Internet of Things Data Characterization Process: Pattern of Life Behavioral Data Study

The HoneyBee™ TARDIS LDRD team completed a data scoping study that identified the initial processes and procedures to baseline the normal and expected behaviors during operability and interoperability of Internet of Things (IoT) device networks. This research is the initial step in developing a process (or methodology) to inform a much broader information framework incorporating machine learning to determine device pattern-of-life which enables the detection of abnormal IoT behaviors on an individual device, as well as in the context of a larger network.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Emerging Threats and Technology Investigation: Industrial Internet of Things - Risk and Mitigation for Nuclear Infrastructure

Industries supporting the global nuclear infrastructure striving for cost savings, expansions in efficiency, and convenience are likely to adopt components (e.g., hardware, software) that comprise the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These devices offer potential improvements along with security challenges. Modern conveniences achieved through application of technology have propagated through society in the form of interconnected devices, from doorbells to microwave ovens, commonly referred to as IoT. IoT devices are often Internet-connected devices that are designed to send data back to a cloud-based server, where a smart phone application then presents device status and control options. Home-based IoT applications carry a different set of risks when compared to a business or security environment, where there is also a history of convenience and interconnection. Industrial settings have long relied on specifically designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for process control where IIoT devices are intended to inform business decisions and augment traditional processes. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report provides a distinction between process control and IIoT in that traditional process control is not replaced by IIoT, but rather IIoT devices are intended to enhance industrial processes through additional monitoring of various sensors and application of data analytics models using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) (Fagan, Marron, et al. 2021) (Ross, et al. 2021).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Cybersecurity Risk Assessment Framework for Externally Exposed Energy Delivery Systems

Securing the energy delivery system (EDS) from complex, nonlinear, and evolving cyber threats requires a complex set of changing and interwoven classes of technologies, policies, relationships, and personnel. One key area in this technological milieu is assessment methodologies to compare information, gathered by a variety of means, about networked devices with publicly known possible threat information about said devices. This information is used to generate risk-based characterizations that allow for the adjudication and proper corresponding management action chains to be assigned.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗

Cyber Threat Dictionary Using MITRE ATT&CK Matrix and NIST Cybersecurity Framework Mapping

Cyber-attack and defense frameworks offer numerous ways to protect systems and networks from threats. However, only a few of these numerous attack and defense frameworks provide countermeasures by linking multiple frameworks. Due to the lack of attack-defense mapped frameworks, a number of cyber security practitioners are often puzzled how to cope with cyber-attacks when it occurs. The objective of this paper is to present a tool called the “Cyber Threat Dictionary” to solve the problem . Cyber Threat Dictionary offers approaches and practical solutions to the threats by mapping MITRE ATT&CK Matrix to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. By providing immediate solutions to cyber security practitioners, Cyber Threat Dictionary enables effective responses against cyber-attacks.

MITRE ATT&CK MATRIX, NIST Cybersecurity Framework,↗

Attack Scenarios Relating to Army Facility-Related Control Systems: Quantifying the Cost to Secure and Cost Savings of the Army’s FRCS Program

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) analyzed the cyber-threat environment to U.S. Army facilities. This report describes three key factors in securing Army-owned facility-related control systems (FRCS). First, Section 1.0 provides background information about the project. Section 2.0 describes the various types of cyber-attacks. Section 3.0 provides a series of attack scenarios from real-world use cases are described in Section 3. These examples are relevant to the Army because the targeted systems or operating environments are like those used at Army installations. An estimated range for the cost to secure these systems is described in Section 4.0. Finally, the cost savings of preventing these kinds of attacks are described in Section 5.0.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Demonstration of the Cybersecurity Framework through Real-world Cyber Attack

The Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity, provides five concurrent and continuous functions to Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover from cyber threats and vulnerabilities to buildings. Based on the core architecture and security best practices defined in the CSF guidelines, we developed the CSF webtools. The CSF webtools provide actionable functions that can be easily adopted by a facility operator to enhance their critical infrastructure security. The essence is captured in a set of “how-to” instructions for the facility operators to adopt, adapt, and apply to their critical infrastructure facilities. When considered together, these functions provide a high-level, strategic view of the lifecycle of an organization’s cybersecurity risk management. The CSF webtools provide an easy to follow set of cybersecurity best practices, policies, and procedures to improve the cybersecurity posture of our nation’s buildings and other critical infrastructures. The CSF webtools are also designed to facilitate communication of cybersecurity activities and outcomes across the organization from the executive to operations levels. Finally, the CSF webtools allow the critical infrastructure operators to assess the overall cybersecurity maturity and posture. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the capabilities of the CSF webtools through an illustrative cyber-attack based on a real-world scenario.

cybersecurity framework, maturity model, critical ↗