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Mcclard, J

Publications and source records attributed to Mcclard, J.

SELECTION OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM MATERIALS FOR DISPOSITION TO WIPP

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is preparing a Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS). Included in the evaluation are up to 6 metric tons (MT) of plutonium in the form of impure oxides and metals for which a disposition plan has not been decided, among options that include preparation as feed for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility; disposing to high-level waste through the Savannah River Site (SRS) HB Line and H Canyon; can-in-canister disposal using the SRS Defense Waste Processing Facility; and preparation for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE and SRS have identified at least 0.5 MT of plutonium that, because of high levels of chemical and isotopic impurities, is impractical for disposition by methods other than the WIPP pathway. Characteristics of these items and the disposition strategy are discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION OF PLUTONIUM-BEARING MATERIAL CONTAINERS

The first nondestructive examination (NDE) of 3013-type containers as part of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) was performed in February, 2005. Since that date 280 NDE surveillances on 255 containers have been conducted. These containers were packaged with plutonium-bearing materials at multiple DOE sites. The NDE surveillances were conducted at Hanford, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Savannah River Site (SRS). These NDEs consisted of visual inspection, mass verification, radiological surveys, prompt gamma analysis, and radiography. The primary purpose of performing NDE surveillances is to determine if there has been a significant pressure buildup inside the inner 3013 container. This is done by measuring the lid deflection of the inner 3013 container using radiography images. These lid deflection measurements are converted to pressure measurements to determine if a container has a pressure of a 100 psig or greater. Making this determination is required by Surveillance and Monitoring Plan (S&MP). All 3013 containers are designed to withstand at least 699 psig as specified by DOE-STD-3013. To date, all containers evaluated have pressures under 50 psig. In addition, the radiography is useful in evaluating the contents of the 3013 container as well as determining the condition of the walls of the inner 3013 container and the convenience containers. The radiography has shown no signs of degradation of any container, but has revealed two packaging anomalies. Quantitative pressure measurements based on lid deflections, which give more information than the 'less than or greater than 100 psig' (pass/fail) data are also available for many containers. Statistical analyses of the pass/fail data combined with analysis of the quantitative data show that it is extremely unlikely that any container in the population of 3013 containers considered in this study (e.g., containers packaged according to the DOE-STD-3013 by 2006) would exceed a pressure of 100 psig. At this time, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and LLNL continue to package containers. Future NDE surveillances will address containers packaged after 2006 for both sites as well as containers requested by the Materials Identification Surveillance (MIS) working group based on knowledge gained from shelf-life study and surveillance results.

42 ENGINEERING↗

EVALUATION OF PLUTONIUM OXIDE DESTRUCTIVE CHEMICAL ANALYSES FOR VALIDITY OF ORIGINAL 3013 CONTAINER BINNING

The surveillance program for 3013 containers is based, in part, on the separation of containers into various bins related to potential container failure mechanisms. The containers are assigned to bins based on moisture content and pre-storage estimates of content chemistry. While moisture content is measured during the packaging of each container, chemistry estimates are made by using a combination of process knowledge, packaging data and prompt gamma analyses to establish the moisture and chloride/fluoride content of the materials. Packages with high moisture and chloride/fluoride contents receive more detailed surveillances than packages with less chloride/fluoride and/or moisture. Moisture verification measurements and chemical analyses performed during the surveillance program provided an opportunity to validate the binning process. Validation results demonstrated that the binning effort was generally successful in placing the containers in the appropriate bin for surveillance and analysis.

42 ENGINEERING↗

SUPPORTING SAFE STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM-BEARING MATERIALS THROUGH SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND SURVEILLANCE

Reductions in the size of the U. S. nuclear weapons arsenal resulted in the need to store large quantities of plutonium-bearing metals and oxides for prolonged periods of time. To assure that the excess plutonium from the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites was stored in a safe and environmentally friendly manner the plutonium-bearing materials are stabilized and packaged according to well developed criteria published as a DOE Standard. The packaged materials are stored in secure facilities and regular surveillance activities are conducted to assure continuing package integrity. The stabilization, packaging, storage and surveillance requirements were developed through extensive science and engineering activities including those related to: plutonium-environment interactions and container pressurization, corrosion and stress corrosion cracking, plutonium-container material interactions, loss of sealing capability and changes in heat transfer characteristics. This paper summarizes some of those activities and outlines ongoing science and engineering programs that assure continued safe and secure storage of the plutonium-bearing metals and oxides.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

CONTAINER MATERIALS, FABRICATION AND ROBUSTNESS

The multi-barrier 3013 container used to package plutonium-bearing materials is robust and thereby highly resistant to identified degradation modes that might cause failure. The only viable degradation mechanisms identified by a panel of technical experts were pressurization within and corrosion of the containers. Evaluations of the container materials and the fabrication processes and resulting residual stresses suggest that the multi-layered containers will mitigate the potential for degradation of the outer container and prevent the release of the container contents to the environment. Additionally, the ongoing surveillance programs and laboratory studies should detect any incipient degradation of containers in the 3013 storage inventory before an outer container is compromised.

42 ENGINEERING↗