Interface Consistency Phase I: Characterization and Measurement
See attached document.
Amanda L Smith↗
Engineering topics
Megan Parisi
Publications and source records attributed to Megan Parisi.
NASA Exploration Systems Maintainability Standards for Artemis and Beyond
This assessment was requested by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), which, based on findings from the NESC study “Safe Human Expeditions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO)” (Valinia et al., 2022), determined its topic to be an underrecognized critical and urgent Agency need, due to impending Artemis vehicle procurements. The principal objective of this assessment was to review and update current Agency-level maintainability requirements for space systems to support crew on expeditions beyond LEO in both preventive and corrective maintenance. This report contains the results of the NESC assessment.
Orbital Replacement Units↗
Risk Trade-Space Analysis for Safe Human Expeditions to Mars
We assessed the integrated safety, health, and performance risk to crews on long-duration missions, specifically to Mars. Using a systems approach rather than one focused on individual countermeasures, we examined the trade space around several such risks to identify high-potential risk mitigation strategies and characterize aspects of Mars mission architectures that could lower aggregated risk. Current Mars Design Reference missions would require durations well over two years and would increase crew exposure to radiation and microgravity well beyond ISS levels, likely resulting in significantly reduced performance beyond our current capability to mitigate that could jeopardize mission success. A “fast Mars transit” round-trip mission concept was studied using an innovative flight dynamics approach to quantify the minimum total mission energy required for a Mars transit with total mission duration less than 400 days. This approach holds promise for sending humans to Mars and returning them safely with acceptable, potentially mitigatable, exposure to microgravity and radiation using current or near-term technologies. The fast transit concept would also result in fewer time-driven vehicle failures and enable sustainable deployment of humans and infrastructure to Mars on a regular cadence, allowing steady exploration and colonization of Mars. Finally, we conclude that reliance on the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) mission operations paradigm – i.e., one of near-complete real-time dependence on experts at Mission Control to manage the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew – is high risk given the communication delays and limited resupply of any Mars mission, and this risk is not eliminated by the shorter missions durations of fast transit scenarios. Based on historical trends, it is highly likely that the crew will face a high-consequence problem of uncertain origin during Mars transit when ground support will be greatly reduced. While it may be possible to reduce anomaly rates through improved reliability analysis and testing, and to reduce anomaly impacts through added robustness, such mitigations address only known failure modes and known uncertainties. Therefore, a radical shift in the Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) that defines the operational paradigm, systems design, and human-systems interactions is required to improve the risk posture to an acceptable level regardless of mission duration.
Mars↗
Extreme Problem Solving: The New Challenges of Deep Space Exploration
On the International Space Station today, the crew has the near real-time support of a large group of system experts on the ground when dealing with problems on-board. For exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit, however, intermittent and delayed communication with ground will force small crews to take the lead in responding to vehicle anomalies. Enabling a flight crew of roughly four astronauts to perform the job that has traditionally been done by a ground crew of over 80 experts will require a fundamental rethinking of human-systems integration. Through observations of anomaly resolution processes, interviews with system experts and astronauts, and analyses of problem-solving models, we have identified the capabilities that are not currently available on-board but will be needed to enable safe exploration further away from Earth. These include increased data access, just-in-time training tools and technologies, and troubleshooting decision support. Important questions remain on how these technologies can be designed and implemented for increased crew autonomy. We present this critical challenge for deep space exploration to the human-computer interaction research community to reflect on the areas identified by our needs analysis and contemplate how they might be manifested as solutions.
autonomy↗
NASA's Identified Risk of Adverse Outcomes due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture
The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to evaluate those risks and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are ranked by likelihood and consequence. Intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes are described using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The DAGs are also useful for identifying common factors and countermeasures across the top 30 risks as well as communicating how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes. One of the top risks tracked by the HSRB is The Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). This risk captures the possibility that due to decreasing real-time ground support during missions beyond LEO, crew will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety-critical procedural errors. The HSIA risk is ranked red (high) for Lunar surface and Mars missions due to the probability of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences. This paper describes the evidence that supports the HSIA risk ranking and presents the central narrative of the HSIA risk DAG-- i.e., anomaly detection, diagnosis, intervention, and task performance. Characterizations of the current state of practice for each of the DAG’s central nodes and the future tools needed for successful anomaly response are provided.
human-systems integration architecture↗
NASA’S Identified Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Risk↗
Architecture Requirements for Safe Human Expeditions to Mars
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Azita Valinia↗
Architecture Requirements for Safe Human Expeditions to Mars
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Azita Valinia↗
Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions
Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.
human-systems integration↗
The Impact of Delayed Communication on NASA’s Human-Systems Operations: Preliminary Results of a Systematic Review
Throughout the history of human spaceflight, NASA has relied on a team of ground-based experts on Earth to manage its missions, vehicles, and crews to ensure crew safety and mission success. However, as missions progress beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO), this paradigm of dependence on ground must evolve. Beyond LEO, in missions to the moon and Mars, crews will confront new challenges: limited evacuation options, reduced resupply capabilities, and significant communication delays that impede real-time support from experts on the ground. This reduction in ground support amplifies the likelihood that crews will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated, safety-critical events. Understanding the scope of these risks and identifying effective countermeasures hinges on understanding the impact of communication delays on complex operations, especially in urgent, unforeseen events. Real-time communication currently provides the crew with continuous access to a large, extensively resourced ground team skilled in anomaly resolution. However, as communication delays grow, the need to transfer some responsibilities from ground experts to onboard crew becomes evident. NASA has been exploring this shift in operational responsibilities and its effectiveness in managing complex operations for decades. Nevertheless, a comprehensive understanding of the specific challenges posed by communication delays and the necessary countermeasures to mitigate them remains a gap. In this paper, we present an update on our systematic review of the literature on communication delays, the first in-depth review since 2013 (Rader et al.). We introduce a coding taxonomy to capture key constructs from papers of interest and discuss preliminary findings. These preliminary results suggest two significant research gaps: limited studies have been conducted 1) with lunar-like latencies and 2) on problem-solving strategies for the maximum latencies expected in Mars missions. We outline plans and propose recommendations to address these gaps through ongoing and future research.
human-systems integration↗
Information Systems for Crew-Led Operations Beyond Low-Earth Orbit
On past and present human space missions, the management of vehicle health and status has primarily been executed from Earth. Missions such as Apollo, Space Shuttle, and ISS have relied on a safety net of ground-based experts with access to real-time telemetry data, broad and deep systems expertise, and powerful analytical and computing capabilities. The ground team monitors and manages the vehicle’s health in real-time and responds quickly to critical situations and malfunctions. Ground operators also provide real-time oversight and verbal guidance to flight crew members, especially during complex procedure execution and high-risk activities like extra-vehicular activities. However, this operational paradigm, in place for 60 years, will not transfer to long duration exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). Lunar and deep-space crewed missions will encounter delayed communications that prohibit real-time operational and medical support. Additionally, there will be infrequent resupply and a diminished capacity to evacuate or rescue crew members. A small crew must operate independently, managing the vehicle’s state, responding to time-critical events, and executing complex procedures, all without the safety net of real-time support.
data representation↗
Interface Consistency: Phase I Results & Phase II Status
Future exploration missions will rely on designing and developing vehicles and complex systems from within NASA and through multiple external commercial partners to meet mission goals. Despite existing consistency-related agency requirements, NASA’s approach to commercial spaceflight development encourages providers’ flexibility and innovation. This strategy is resulting in significant design diversity across Artemis vehicles. Design best practices and guidelines champion interface consistency to promote mental model development and knowledge transfer. However, research investigating the benefits of consistency is mixed, and little is known about its role in complex systems. Determining the level of risk that system diversity presents is difficult, as there is no established method for quantifying the degree of consistency within and across interfaces, nor is there information about the differential impacts of different types of inconsistency. Phase I of this project (Characterization and Measurement) served as a starting point to better understand the construct of consistency, its application, and the range of studies and methods for measuring it. The project team created a taxonomy of consistency to apply to interfaces as a framework to guide the development of tools to assess intersystem consistency. Checklist and cognitive walkthrough methods were developed for use by human factors (HF) and human-computer interaction (HCI) experts. The Intersystem Consistency Scale (ICS) was developed for interface evaluations with crew. A pilot study evaluated the methods’ ability to distinguish differences between Artemis-like prototype pairs exhibiting either high or low design consistency. In addition, click errors and time on task were collected within the ICS (crew-like) group. Results from our exploratory analysis and lessons learned from the pilot study will be discussed. The project team will also present the status of Phase II (Risk Assessment, Standards and Guidelines). This includes incorporating feedback to redesign the assessment tools, and inputs from displays and training Subject Matter Experts to update tasks and prototype designs. The team will present the risk assessment study design to identify the types and levels of inconsistency that pose the greatest risk to performance. Plans to apply these results toward agency standards and guideline recommendations will also be discussed.
Human-Computer Interaction↗
Content and Representation of Information Needed to Support Time-Constrained Problem Solving
NASA’s current mission-operations paradigm originated with Project Mercury and endured with minimum evolution through the Apollo Program, Space Shuttle Program, and ISS missions. At its foundation is a near-complete real-time dependence on a ground team to manage the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew. Utilizing many engineers and operators with broad and deep expertise; large, distributed datasets including extensive telemetry; and expansive analytical and computing power, this ground team has served as the safety net for crewed spaceflight missions over the past 60 years. This approach must change to address challenges associated with missions beyond low Earth orbit (BLEO), including infrequent resupply, reduced ability to evacuate, and delayed communications that prohibit real-time operational support. We anticipate that a necessary part of this change will be increased independence for the crew, as roles and responsibilities traditionally performed by ground teams move on board the vehicle. While many risks are associated with Earth-independent operations, one particular concern is ensuring that the crew will have adequate onboard support to perform urgent problem solving when communication with the ground is delayed or intermittent. A key resource that enables the ground team to respond to anomalies quickly and effectively is the extraordinary expertise and experience it possesses. It is comprised of 80+ experts on at any given time, with a combined 600+ years of system-specific experience across 22 unique console disciplines. A small crew will face the unprecedented challenge of independently responding to anomalies that have historically been handled by a team 20 times their size. Another important resource upon which the ground heavily relies to support procedure execution and anomaly response is data. The amount of telemetry data that each flight controller monitors is extensive. In addition, as the ground team works to further assess impacts, trouble shoot, identify workarounds, and oversee procedure execution, it accesses and synthesizes engineering and procedure information, as well as system build, test, and configuration documentation. It is not feasible nor useful to put all these data onboard as crews become more Earth independent. Each member of a small Mars mission small crew will have multiple roles beyond monitoring telemetry and data gathering, and multiple roles within anomaly resolution processes, thereby limiting their capacity for copious amounts of information. Moreover, while access is necessary, it alone is insufficient. Information will need to be compiled, refined, and represented appropriately to support the crew’s reduced attention and expertise. This work seeks to understand the content and representation of information needed to support time-constrained problem solving and decision making by the crew without real-time ground support. To build this understanding, we first surveyed the literature, focusing on how expert problem solvers construct and manipulate their mental models. Next, we interviewed expert problem solvers in spaceflight and analogous domains and surveyed industry solutions for data presentation. Finally, we analyzed current spaceflight operations by investigating flight controller anomaly resolution processes during ISS training simulations and real operational events. These methods led to creating a problem-solving framework that details common themes and features of attending to, assessing, analyzing, and acting on problems in complex, time-constrained domains. Using this framework and the results of our analysis, we identified conceptual data representations needed for crew-led problem-solving. Preliminary onboard user interface concepts to meet identified needs will be presented.
anomaly response↗