Engineering topics

Miller, J. E.

Publications and source records attributed to Miller, J. E..

At least 19 records

NASA NTRS2017

Failure Mechanisms of Ni-H2 and Li-Ion Batteries Under Hypervelocity Impacts

Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) batteries have yielded significant performance advantages for many industries, including the aerospace industry, and have been selected to replace nickel hydrogen (Ni-H2) batteries for the International Space Station (ISS) program to meet the energy storage demands. As the ISS uses its vast solar arrays to generate its power, the solar ar-rays meet their sunlit power demands and supply excess power to battery packs for power de-livery on the sun obscured phase of the approximate 90 minute low Earth orbit. These large battery packs are located on the exterior of the ISS, and as such, the battery packs are ex-posed to external environment threats like naturally occurring meteoroids and artificial orbital debris (MMOD). While the risks from these solid particle environments has been known and addressed to an acceptable risk of failure through shield design, it is not possible to completely eliminate the risk of loss of these assets on orbit due to MMOD, and as such, failure consequences to the ISS have been considered.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Orion Exploration Flight Test Post-Flight Inspection and Analysis

The multipurpose crew vehicle, Orion, is being designed and built for NASA to handle the rigors of crew launch, sustainment and return from scientific missions beyond Earth orbit. In this role, the Orion vehicle is meant to operate in the space environments like the naturally occurring meteoroid and the artificial orbital debris environments (MMOD) with successful atmospheric reentry at the conclusion of the flight. As a result, Orion's reentry module uses durable porous, ceramic tiles on almost thirty square meters of exposed surfaces to accomplish both of these functions. These durable, non-ablative surfaces maintain their surface profile through atmospheric reentry; thus, they preserve any surface imperfections that occur prior to atmospheric reentry. Furthermore, Orion's launch abort system includes a shroud that protects the thermal protection system while awaiting launch and during ascent. The combination of these design features and a careful pre-flight inspection to identify any manufacturing imperfections results in a high confidence that damage to the thermal protection system identified post-flight is due to the in-flight solid particle environments. These favorable design features of Orion along with the unique flight profile of the first exploration flight test of Orion (EFT-1) have yielded solid particle environment measurements that have never been obtained before this flight.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Development of a Numerical Model of Hypervelocity Impact into a Pressurized Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel

As the outlook for space exploration becomes more ambitious and spacecraft travel deeper into space than ever before, it is increasingly important that propulsion systems perform reliably within the space environment. The increased reliability compels designers to increase design margin at the expense of system mass, which contrasts with the need to limit vehicle mass to maximize payload. Such are the factors that motivate the integration of high specific strength composite materials in the construction of pressure vessels commonly referred to as composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPV). The COPV consists of a metallic liner for the inner shell of the COPV that is stiff, negates fluid permeation and serves as the anchor for composite laminates or filaments, but the liner itself cannot contain the stresses from the pressurant it contains. The compo-site-fiber reinforced polymer (CFRP) is wound around the liner using a combination of hoop (circumferential) and helical orientations. Careful consideration of wrap orientation allows the composite to evenly bear structural loading and creates the COPV's characteristic high strength to weight ratio. As the CFRP overwrap carries most of the stresses induced by pressurization, damage to the overwrap can affect mission duration, mission success and potentially cause loss-of-vehicle/loss-of-crew. For this reason, it is critical to establish a fundamental understanding of the mechanisms involved in the failure of a stressed composite such as that of the COPV. One of the greatest external threats to the integrity of a spacecraft's COPV is an impact from the meteoroid and orbital debris environments (MMOD). These impacts, even from submillimeter particles, generate extremely high stress states in the CFRP that can damage numerous fibers. As a result of this possibility, initial assumptions in survivability analysis for some human-rated NASA space-craft have assumed that any alteration of the vessel due to impact is considered a catastrophic failure. This assumption is conservative and made due to lack of knowledge on the level of allow-able damage to the composite overwrap that can be sustained and still allow successful completion of the mission. To quantify the allowable damage level to the composite overwrap involves assessing stress redistribution following damage as well as evaluating possible time-dependent mechanisms involved in the COPV response to an impact event. Limited published work in this subject has shown that COPV can withstand at least some level of damage due to high energy impacts. These observations have been confirmed and expanded upon in recent experimental research performed by NASA. This research has demonstrated that there is not only robustness in a COPV to compensate for CFRP damage, but has also identified two significant failure modes for pressurized COPV. The lowest threshold failure mode involves the perforation of the vessel, and the highest threshold failure mode is the catastrophic rupture. While both of these failure modes mean a loss of the COPV, system robustness affords some tolerance to the venting as opposed to the more catastrophic rupture. As a consequence, it is necessary to understand the conditions that result in the transition between these failure modes. The aforementioned experimental research has been performed in both the unpressurized and pressurized condition to identify the damage level that triggered the failure thresh-old. This COPV test program was sponsored by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), and tests were performed at NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). Planning and coordination were provided by NASA JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group, and the COPVs were provided by the ISS Program. Unpressurized testing has been conducted at the pressure of the vacuum test chamber, while, the pressurized testing has been conducted at 290 +/- 10 bar (4,200  100 psi) using nitrogen as the pressurizing gas, which corresponds to the design pressure for the target COPV. In this research, spherical aluminum projectiles with varying diameter has been chosen as the impactor. For the unpressurized COPV, the dependence of penetration up to the dependence of hole size in the liner has been obtained as a function of impact conditions. For the pressurized research, the dependence of penetration up to rupture has been obtained as a function of im-pact conditions. Two representative post-test photographs of the failed COPV's from a nor-mal impact into the COPV surface are shown in Fig. 1. These images display the dramatic difference between failure modes, venting (Fig. 1a) and rupture (Fig. 1b). For venting, liner perforation, severed composite fibers/tows and ply delamination are commonly observed damage characteristics of this COPV failure mode. In the case of rupture, the COPV typically experienced a separation of its domed regions and severe break-up of the cylindrical region. Fully understanding the transition from venting to rupture experimentally is costly and potentially unachievable for conditions that cannot be generated in the laboratory. These shortcomings have motivated the performance of three-dimensional numerical simulations to expand the existing experimental database. These simulations have been carried out with the nonlinear-structural-dynamics, analysis-tool, CTH. A typical pressure contour plot from an impact simulation of an entire COPV is shown in Fig. 2. To generate the COPV stress state without initiating a shock wave, the pressure in the simulated COPV is ramped up to the final pressure over a millisecond prior to impact of the projectile with nitrogen gas. Figure 2a shows the system in this initial condition. After one millisecond, a projectile is initiated into the simulation and impacts the COPV. Figure 2b shows the system after this impact. In the figure, the onset of venting is represented as the change in pressure (μbar), red to green, at the perforation site. Also seen in the figure is the eroded projectile that had passed into the COPV vessel with the generated shock wave in the pressurant propagating just ahead of the material. In this paper, pertinent experimental details and the development of the material constitutive models necessary for this work along with the efforts to validate their use are dis-cussed. The simulation results are presented and compared with the NASA experimental observations. While work is on-going from this effort, early observations pertinent to the failure threshold are presented.

Garcia, M. A.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Failure Mechanisms of Ni-H2 and Li-Ion Batteries Under Hypervelocity Impacts

Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) batteries have yielded significant performance advantages for many industries, including the aerospace industry, and have been selected to replace nickel hydrogen (Ni-H2) batteries for the International Space Station (ISS) program to meet the energy storage demands. As the ISS uses its vast solar arrays to generate its power, the solar arrays meet their sunlit power demands and supply excess power to battery packs for power delivery on the sun obscured phase of the approximate 90 minute low Earth orbit. These large battery packs are located on the exterior of the ISS, and as such, the battery packs are exposed to external environment threats like naturally occurring meteoroids and artificial orbital debris (MMOD). While the risks from these solid particle environments has been known and addressed to an acceptable risk of failure through shield design, it is not possible to completely eliminate the risk of loss of these assets on orbit due to MMOD, and as such, failure consequences to the ISS have been considered.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Orion Exploration Flight Test Post-Flight Inspection and Analysis

The principal mechanism for developing orbital debris environment models, is to make observations of larger pieces of debris in the range of several centimeters and greater using radar and optical techniques. For particles that are smaller than this threshold, breakup and migration models of particles to returned surfaces in lower orbit are relied upon to quantify the flux. This reliance on models to derive spatial densities of particles that are of critical importance to spacecraft make the unique nature of the EFT-1's return surface a valuable metric. To this end detailed post-flight inspections have been performed of the returned EFT-1 backshell, and the inspections identified six candidate impact sites that were not present during the pre-flight inspections. This paper describes the post-flight analysis efforts to characterize the EFT-1 mission craters. This effort included ground based testing to understand small particle impact craters in the thermal protection material, the pre- and post-flight inspection, the crater analysis using optical, X-ray computed tomography (CT) and scanning electron microscope (SEM) techniques, and numerical simulations.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2016

IADC Vulnerability Report, IT32-13

This section provides hypervelocity impact test data for two types of batteries: Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) and Nickel Hydrogen (Ni-H2) batteries. The impact tests were directed by the NASA Johnson Space Center Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group in Houston Texas, and were performed at the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF).

Christiansen, E. L.↗

NASA NTRS2016

IADC Vulnerability Report, IT32-21

Numerous mission support hardware systems and their spares are maintained outside of the habitable volume of the International Space Station (ISS), and are arranged covered by a multi-layer insulation (MLI) thermal blanket which provides both thermal control and a measure of protection from micrometeoroids and orbital debris (MMOD). The NASA Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group at the Johnson Space Center in Houston Texas has assessed the protection provided by MLI in a series of hypervelocity impact tests using a 1 mm thick aluminum 6061-T6 rear wall to simulate the actual hardware behind the MLI. HVIT has also evaluated methods to enhance the protection provided by MLI thermal blankets. The impact study used both aluminum and steel spherical projectiles accelerated to speeds of 7 km/s using a 4.3 mm, two-stage, light-gas gun at the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF).

Christiansen, E. L.↗

NASA NTRS2015

HVI Ballistic Limit Characterization of Fused Silica Thermal Panes

Fused silica window systems are used heavily on crewed reentry vehicles, and they are currently being used on the next generation of US crewed spacecraft, Orion. These systems improve crew situational awareness and comfort, as well as, insulating the reentry critical components of a spacecraft against the intense thermal environments of atmospheric reentry. Additionally, these materials are highly exposed to space environment hazards like solid particle impacts. This paper discusses impact studies up to 10 km/s on a fused silica window system proposed for the Orion spacecraft. A ballistic limit equation that describes the threshold of perforation of a fuse silica pane over a broad range of impact velocities, obliquities and projectile materials is discussed here.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Analytic Ballistic Performance Model of Whipple Shields

The dual-wall, Whipple shield is the shield of choice for lightweight, long-duration flight. The shield uses an initial sacrificial wall to initiate fragmentation and melt an impacting threat that expands over a void before hitting a subsequent shield wall of a critical component. The key parameters to this type of shield are the rear wall and its mass which stops the debris, as well as the minimum shock wave strength generated by the threat particle impact of the sacrificial wall and the amount of room that is available for expansion. Ensuring the shock wave strength is sufficiently high to achieve large scale fragmentation/melt of the threat particle enables the expansion of the threat and reduces the momentum flux of the debris on the rear wall. Three key factors in the shock wave strength achieved are the thickness of the sacrificial wall relative to the characteristic dimension of the impacting particle, the density and material cohesion contrast of the sacrificial wall relative to the threat particle and the impact speed. The mass of the rear wall and the sacrificial wall are desirable to minimize for launch costs making it important to have an understanding of the effects of density contrast and impact speed. An analytic model is developed here, to describe the influence of these three key factors. In addition this paper develops a description of a fourth key parameter related to fragmentation and its role in establishing the onset of projectile expansion.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Multi-Shock Shield Performance at 15 MJ for Catalogued Debris

While orbital debris of ten centimeters or more are tracked and catalogued, the difficulty of finding and accurately accounting for forces acting on the objects near the ten centimeter threshold results in both uncertainty of their presence and location. These challenges result in difficult decisions for operators balancing potential costly operational approaches with system loss risk. In this paper, the assessment of the feasibility of protecting a spacecraft from this catalogued debris is described using numerical simulations and a test of a multi-shock shield system against a cylindrical projectile impacting normal to the surface with approximately 15 MJ of kinetic energy. The hypervelocity impact test has been conducted at the Arnold Engineering Development Complex (AEDC) with a 598 g projectile at 6.905 km/s on a NASA supplied multi-shock shield. The projectile used is a hollow aluminum and nylon cylinder with an outside diameter of 8.6 cm and length of 10.3 cm. Figure 1 illustrates the multi-shock shield test article, which consisted of five separate bumpers, four of which are fiberglass fabric and one of steel mesh, and two rear walls, each consisting of Kevlar fabric. The overall length of the test article was 2.65 m. The test article was a 5X scaled-up version of a smaller multi-shock shield previously tested using a 1.4 cm diameter aluminum projectile for an inflatable module project. The distances represented by S1 and S1/2 in the figure are 61 cm and 30.5 cm, respectively. Prior to the impact test, hydrodynamic simulations indicated that some enhancement to the standard multi-shock system is needed to address the effects of the cylindrical shape of the projectile. Based on the simulations, a steel mesh bumper has been added to the shield configuration to enhance the fragmentation of the projectile. The AEDC test occurred as planned, and the modified NASA multi-shock shield successfully stopped 598 g projectile using 85.6 kg/m(exp 2). The fifth bumper layer remained in tact, although it was torn free from its support structure and thrown into the first rear wall. The outer Kevlar layer of the first rear wall tore likely from the impact of the fifth bumper's support structure, but the back of the rear wall was intact. No damage occurred to the second rear wall, or to the witness plate behind the target.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Multi-shock Shield Performance at 16.5 MJ for Catalogued Debris

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Analytic Ballistic Performance Model of Whipple Shields

The dual-wall Whipple shield is the shield of choice for lightweight, long-duration flight. The shield uses an initial sacrificial wall to initiate fragmentation and melt an impacting threat that expands over a void before hitting a subsequent shield wall of a critical component. The key parameters to this type of shield are the rear wall and its mass which stops the debris, as well as the minimum pressure generated under threat particle impact of the sacrificial wall and the amount of void that is available for expansion. Ensuring the minimum pressure is sufficiently high to achieve large scale fragmentation/melt of the threat particle enables the expansion of the threat and reduces the momentum flux of the debris on the rear wall. Three key factors in the minimum pressure achieved are the thickness of the sacrificial wall relative to the characteristic dimension of the impacting particle, the density and material cohesion contrast of the sacrificial wall relative to the threat particle and the impact speed. The mass of the rear wall and the sacrificial wall are desirable to minimize for launch costs and dynamic concerns making it important to have an understanding of the effects of density contrast and impact speed. In this paper a fourth key parameter is identified related to fragmentation, which corresponds to the ratio of the size of the projectile relative to the transition from brittle to ductile hole growth in the projectile. Ballistic limit equations have been developed to define the failure limits of a MMOD shield, generally in terms of projectile diameter (or mass), impact velocity, and angle. Within the range of impact velocities relevant for Earth-orbiting spacecraft, three distinct regions of penetration phenomenology have been identified for Whipple shields: center dot Low velocity: the projectile is eroded (and possibly deformed) during its passage through the bumper plate, but is not fragmented. Thus, perforation of the rear wall is by a fragment with a mass and speed equal to or less than the original impactor. center dot Intermediate (shatter) velocity: impact velocities are sufficient to induce projectile fragmentation upon impact with the bumper plate, resulting in a coarse debris cloud with large solid fragments. Increasing velocity within the shatter regime results in increased fragmentation, and eventually melting, of the projectile and bumper fragments, generating a finer and more evenly dispersed debris cloud. Failure of the rear wall is a complicated combination of modes observed at low- and hypervelocity. center dot Hypervelocity: the projectile and holed-out bumper material is completely, or nearly completely, melted and/or vaporized by the initial impact. The resultant debris cloud impacts over a dispersed area of the rear wall, loading it impulsively and inducing failure through rupture or petalling. While each of these regimes are well observed with extensive empirical methods to describe these regions, differences in impactor materials, configurations of shields and questions about the limitations of the attainable impact speeds have left questions that are difficult to answer from completely empirical methods.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Ballistic Performance Model of Crater Formation in Monolithic, Porous Thermal Protection Systems

Porous monolithic ablative systems insulate atmospheric reentry vehicles from reentry plasmas generated by atmospheric braking from orbital and exo-orbital velocities. Due to the necessity that these materials create a temperature gradient up to several thousand Kelvin over their thickness, it is important that these materials are near their pristine state prior to reentry. These materials may also be on exposed surfaces to space environment threats like orbital debris and meteoroids leaving a probability that these exposed surfaces will be below their prescribed values. Owing to the typical small size of impact craters in these materials, the local flow fields over these craters and the ablative process afford some margin in thermal protection designs for these locally reduced performance values. In this work, tests to develop ballistic performance models for thermal protection materials typical of those being used on Orion are discussed. A density profile as a function of depth of a typical monolithic ablator and substructure system is shown in Figure 1a.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Ballistic Performance of Porous-Ceramic, Thermal Protection Systems

Porous-ceramic, thermal protection systems are used heavily in current reentry vehicles like the Orbiter, and they are currently being proposed for the next generation of US manned spacecraft, Orion. These systems insulate reentry critical components of a spacecraft against the intense thermal environments of atmospheric reentry. Additionally, these materials are highly exposed to space environment hazards like solid particle impacts. This paper discusses impact studies up to 10 km/s on 8 lb/cu ft alumina-fiber-enhanced-thermal-barrier (AETB8) tiles coated with a toughened-unipiece-fibrous-insulation/ reaction-cured-glass layer (TUFI/RCG). A semi-empirical, first principals impact model that describes projectile dispersion is described that provides excellent agreement with observations over a broad range of impact velocities, obliquities and projectile materials. Model extensions to look at the implications of greater than 10 GPa equation of state is also discussed. Predicted penetration probabilities for a vehicle visiting the International Space Station is 60% lower for orbital debris and 95% lower for meteoroids with this model compared to an energy scaled approach.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Ballistic Performance of Porous-Ceramic, Thermal-Protection-Systems

Porous-ceramic, thermal protection systems are used heavily in current reentry vehicles like the Space Shuttle and are currently being proposed for the next generation of manned spacecraft, Orion. These materials insulate the structural components of a spacecraft against the intense thermal environments of atmospheric reentry. Furthermore, these materials are also highly exposed to space environmental hazards like meteoroid and orbital debris impacts. This paper discusses recent impact testing up to 9 km/s, and the findings of the influence of material equation-of-state on the simulation of the impact event to characterize the ballistic performance of these materials. These results will be compared with heritage models1 for these materials developed from testing at lower velocities. Assessments of predicted spacecraft risk based upon these tests and simulations will also be discussed.

Christiansen, E. L.↗

NASA NTRS1986

An analysis of bi-directional use of frequencies for satellite communications

The bi-directional use of frequencies allocated for space communications has the potential to double the orbit/spectrum capacity available. The technical feasibility of reverse band use (RBU) at C-band (4 GHz uplinks and 6 GHz downlinks) is studied. The analysis identifies the constraints under which both forward and reverse band use satellite systems can share the same frequencies with terrestrial, line of sight transmission systems. The results of the analysis show that RBU satellite systems can be similarly sized to forward band use (FBU) satellite systems. In addition, the orbital separation requirements between RBU and FBU satellite systems are examined. The analysis shows that a carrier to interference ratio of 45 dB can be maintained between RBU and FBU satellites separated by less than 0.5 deg, and that A carrier to interference ratio of 42 dB can be maintained in the antipodal case. Rain scatter propagation analysis shows that RBU and FBU earth stations require separation distances of less than 10 km at a rain rate of 13.5 mm/hr escalating to less than 100 km at a rain rate of 178 mm/hr for earth station antennas in the 3 to 10 m range.

Whyte, W. A., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1986

An analysis of bi-directional use of frequencies for satellite communications

The bi-directional use of frequencies allocated for space communications has the potential to double the orbit/spectrum capacity available. The technical feasibility of reverse band use (RBU) at C-band (4 GHz uplinks and 6 GHz downlinks) is studied. The analysis identifies the constraints under which both forward and reverse band use satellite systems can share the same frequencies with terrestrial, line of sight transmission systems. The results of the analysis show that RBU satellite systems can be similarly sized to forward band use (FBU) satellite systems. In addition, the orbital separation requirements between RBU and FBU satellite systems are examined. The analysis shows that a carrier to interference ratio of 45 dB can be maintianed between RBU and FBU satellites separated by less than 0.5 deg., and that a carrier to interference ratio of 42 dB can be maintained in the antipodal case. Rain scatter propagation analysis shows that RBU and FBU Earth stations require separation distances fo less than 10 km at a rain rate of 13.5 mm/hr escalating to less than 100 km at a rain rate of 178 mm/hr for Earth station antennas in the 3 to 10 m range.

Whyte, W. A., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1986

An analysis of bidirectional use of frequencies for satellite communications

The bi-directional use of frequencies allocated for space communications has the potential to double the orbit/spectrum capacity available. The technical feasibility of reverse band use (RBU) at C-band (4 GHz uplinks and 6 GHz downlinks) is studied. The analysis identifies the constraints under which both forward and reverse band use satellite systems can share the same frequencies with terrestrial, line of sight transmission systems. The results of the analysis show that RBU satellite systems can be similarly sized to forward band use (FBU) satellite systems. In addition, the orbital separation requirements between RBU and FBU satellite systems are examined. The analysis shows that a carrier to interference ratio of 45 dB can be maintained between RBU and FBU satellites separated by less than 0.5 deg., and that a carrier to interference ratio of 42 dB can be maintained in the antipodal case. Rain scatter propagation analysis shows that RBU and FBU earth stations require separation distances of less than 10 km at a rain rate of 13.5 mm/hr escalating to less than 100 km at a rain rate of 178 mm/hr for earth station antennas in the 3 to 10 m range.

Whyte, W. A., Jr.↗