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Miller, James Christopher

Publications and source records attributed to Miller, James Christopher.

Nuclear and radiological Security: Introduction.

Nuclear security includes the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive substances or their associated facilities. The presentation begins by discussing the concept and its importance, then moves on to consider threats--insider threat, sabotage, diversion of materials--with considerable emphasis on the former. The intrusion at Pelindaba, South Africa, is described as a case study. The distinction between nuclear security and security of radiological and portable sources is clarified, and the international legal framework is touched upon. The paper concludes by discussing the responsibilities of the various entities involved in nuclear security.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DEPO-related to Radioactive Sources.

Design and Evaluation Process Outline (DEPO) is discussed as it pertains to protection of radioactive sources. The bulk of the report describes features of various kinds of detection systems, and follows this with systems for entry control and personnel identification.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Assessment of Radiation Background Variation for Moving Detection Systems

The introduction points out that radiation backgrounds fluctuate across very short distances: factors include geology, soil composition, altitude, building structures, topography, and other manmade structures; and asphalt and concrete can vary significantly over short distances. Brief descriptions are given of the detection system, experimental setup, and background variation measurements. It is concluded that positive and negative gradients can greatly reduce the detection sensitivity of an MDS: negative gradients create opportunities for false negatives (nondetection), and positive gradients create a potentially unacceptable FAR (above 1%); the location of use for mobile detection is important to understand; spectroscopic systems provide more information for screening out false alarms and may be preferred for mobile use; and mobile monitor testing at LANL accounts for expected variations in the background.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗