Engineering topics

Newhouse, Marilyn

Publications and source records attributed to Newhouse, Marilyn.

14 records

NASA NTRS2014

Cost Analysis in a Multi-Mission Operations Environment

Spacecraft control centers have evolved from dedicated, single-mission or single mission-type support to multi-mission, service-oriented support for operating a variety of mission types. At the same time, available money for projects is shrinking and competition for new missions is increasing. These factors drive the need for an accurate and flexible model to support estimating service costs for new or extended missions; the cost model in turn drives the need for an accurate and efficient approach to service cost analysis. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) provides operations services to a variety of customers around the world. HOSC customers range from launch vehicle test flights; to International Space Station (ISS) payloads; to small, short duration missions; and has included long duration flagship missions. The HOSC recently completed a detailed analysis of service costs as part of the development of a complete service cost model. The cost analysis process required the team to address a number of issues. One of the primary issues involves the difficulty of reverse engineering individual mission costs in a highly efficient multi-mission environment, along with a related issue of the value of detailed metrics or data to the cost model versus the cost of obtaining accurate data. Another concern is the difficulty of balancing costs between missions of different types and size and extrapolating costs to different mission types. The cost analysis also had to address issues relating to providing shared, cloud-like services in a government environment, and then assigning an uncertainty or risk factor to cost estimates that are based on current technology, but will be executed using future technology. Finally the cost analysis needed to consider how to validate the resulting cost models taking into account the non-homogeneous nature of the available cost data and the decreasing flight rate. This paper presents the issues encountered during the HOSC cost analysis process, and the associated lessons learned. These lessons can be used when planning for a new multi-mission operations center or in the transformation from a dedicated control center to multi-center operations, as an aid in defining processes that support future cost analysis and estimation. The lessons can also be used by mature service-oriented, multi-mission control centers to streamline or refine their cost analysis process.

Felton, Larry↗

NASA NTRS2013

V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes

This paper describes the results of a special breakout session of the NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Workshop held in the fall of 2012 entitled "V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes." The NASA IV&V Program is in a unique position to interact with projects across all of the NASA development domains. Using this unique opportunity, the IV&V program convened a breakout session to enable IV&V teams to share their challenges and successes with respect to the V&V of Fault Management (FM) architectures and software. The presentations and discussions provided practical examples of pitfalls encountered while performing V&V of FM including the lack of consistent designs for implementing faults monitors and the fact that FM information is not centralized but scattered among many diverse project artifacts. The discussions also solidified the need for an early commitment to developing FM in parallel with the spacecraft systems as well as clearly defining FM terminology within a project.

Verification↗

NASA NTRS2012

NASA InterCenter Collaboration Increases ROI

Funding for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) space mission operations is tighter than ever in the current environment of federal government deficit reductions. Conventional wisdom would expect this environment to drive increasing competition between NASA centers for the limited available funds. However, recent inter-center activities at the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center emphasize collaboration rather than competition and demonstrate the value of partnerships to increase the return on shrinking investments. These efforts cover a variety of activities and potential returns. To facilitate sharing data from test and verification through operations without levying requirements on data format or software tools, the HOSC is working with multiple centers on an evolutionary path toward a distributed data architecture and archive. The approach reduces the required investment by allowing the partners to reuse their existing formats and tools, while facilitating gone ]stop h user visibility into and controlled access to the full complement of data regardless of user or data location. The HOSC is also working on two activities to promote sharing operations implementations and leveraging the experts and expertise across multiple NASA sites. In one, the use of Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) standards for the message abstraction layer provides an interoperability layer on top of existing ground data system communication architectures. This allows missions to select the most appropriate solutions for their requirements with a minimal investment in rehosting the components in a coherent operational environment. The other emphasizes shared tools and increased remote access to minimize travel for tests and critical activities and reduce the floor space required for a dedicated operations center. This paper summarizes these and other inter-center collaboration activities at the HOSC and the benefits that each can bring, not just to the participants, but to the broader operations community.

Lankford, Kimberly↗

NASA NTRS2012

Managing Small Spacecraft Projects: Less is Not Easier

Managing small, low cost missions (class C or D) is not necessarily easier than managing a full flagship mission. Yet, small missions are typically considered easier to manage and used as a training ground for developing the next generation of project managers. While limited resources can be a problem for small missions, in reality most of the issues inherent in managing small projects are not the direct result of limited resources. Instead, problems encountered by managers of small spacecraft missions often derive from 1) the perception that managing small projects is easier if something is easier it needs less rigor and formality in execution, 2) the perception that limited resources necessitate or validate omitting standard management practices, 3) less stringent or unclear guidelines or policies for small projects, and 4) stakeholder expectations that are not consistent with the size and nature of the project. For example, the size of a project is sometimes used to justify not building a full, detailed integrated master schedule. However, while a small schedule slip may not be a problem for a large mission, it can indicate a serious problem for a small mission with a short development phase, highlighting the importance of the schedule for early identification of potential issues. Likewise, stakeholders may accept a higher risk posture early in the definition of a low-cost mission, but as launch approaches this acceptance may change. This presentation discusses these common misconceptions about managing small, low cost missions, the problems that can result, and possible solutions.

Barley, Bryan↗

NASA NTRS2012

Leveraging Independent Management and Chief Engineer Hierarchy: Vertically and Horizontally-Derived Technical Authority Value

In the development of complex spacecraft missions, project management authority is usually extended hierarchically from NASA's highest agency levels down to the implementing institution's project team level, through both the center and the program. In parallel with management authority, NASA utilizes a complementary, but independent, hierarchy of technical authority (TA) that extends from the agency level to the project, again, through both the center and the program. The chief engineers (CEs) who serve in this technical authority capacity oversee and report on the technical status and ensure sound engineering practices, controls, and management of the projects and programs. At the lowest level, implementing institutions assign project CEs to technically engage projects, lead development teams, and ensure sound technical principles, processes, and issue resolution. At the middle level, programs and centers independently use CEs to ensure the technical success of their projects and programs. At the agency level, NASA's mission directorate CEs maintain technical cognizance over every program and project in their directorate and advise directorate management on the technical, cost, schedule, and programmatic health of each. As part of this vertically-extended CE team, a program level CE manages a continually varying balance between penetration depth and breadth across his or her assigned missions. Teamwork issues and information integration become critical for management at all levels to ensure value-added use of both the synergy available between CEs at the various agency levels, and the independence of the technical authority at each organization.

Barley, Bryan↗

NASA NTRS2011

The Development of NASA's Fault Management Handbook

NASA is developing a FM Handbook to establish guidelines and to provide recommendations for defining, developing, analyzing, evaluating, testing, and operating FM systems. It establishes a process for developing FM throughout the lifecycle of a mission and provides a basis for moving the field toward a formal and consistent FM methodology to be applied on future programs. This paper describes the motivation for, the development of, and the future plans for the NASA FM Handbook.

fault tolerant control↗

NASA NTRS2011

The Development of NASA's Fault Management Handbook

Goal: (1) Ameliorate schedule, cost and predictability challenges that often are faced when testing and operating FM systems (2) Improve reliability and safety of NASA s flight and ground systems (3) Coalesce the FM field. Approach: (1) Identify qualified team of FM practitioners and systems engineers (2) Evaluate findings and recommendations from 2008 FM Workshop (3) Initial emphasis on foundational issues; e.g. establish common terminology (1) Capitalize on existing material

Fault Management↗

NASA NTRS2011

Systems Engineering Using Heritage Spacecraft Technology: Lessons Learned from Discovery and New Frontiers Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced or heritage systems and the system environment identifies unanticipated issues that result in cost overruns or schedule impacts. The Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays resulting from advanced technology or heritage assumptions for 6 D&NF missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that the cost and schedule growth did not result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. Instead, systems engineering processes did not identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement the heritage or advanced technology. This presentation summarizes the study s findings and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the risks inherent in the technology and heritage design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗

NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned for Planning and Estimating Operations Support Requirements

Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead projects to focus on hardware development schedules and costs, de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations, and any LCC growth can directly impact the programs ability to fund new missions. The D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center recently studied cost overruns for 7 D&NF missions related to phase C/D development of operational capabilities and phase E mission operations. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential operations risks and controlling the associated impacts to operations development and execution costs. The study found that the drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This presentation summarizes the study and the results, providing a set of lessons NASA can use to improve early estimation and validation of operations costs.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗

NASA NTRS2010

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for four of the five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study's lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project's ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗

NASA NTRS2010

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Space Missions

Use of heritage and new technology is necessary/enabling to implementing small, low cost missions, yet overruns decrease the ability to sustain future mission flight rates The majority of the cost growth drivers seen in the D&NF study were embedded early during formulation phase and later realized during the development and I&T phases Cost drivers can be avoided or significantly decreased by project management and SE emphasis on early identification of risks and realistic analyses SE processes that emphasize an assessment of technology within the mission system to identify technical issues in the design or operational use of the technology. Realistic assessment of new and heritage spacecraft technology assumptions , identification of risks and mitigation strategies. Realistic estimates of effort required to inherit existing or qualify new technology, identification of risks to estimates and develop mitigation strategies. Allocation of project reserves for risk-based mitigation strategies of each individual area of heritage or new technology. Careful tailoring of inheritance processes to ensure due diligence.

Barley, Bryan↗

NASA NTRS2010

Heritage Systems Engineering Lessons from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for all five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to be the result of technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the systemwide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study s lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop Results

Fault Management is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. For the purposes of this paper, fault management is defined as the ability of a system to detect, isolate, and mitigate events that impact, or have the potential to impact, nominal mission operations. The fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, as well as opportunities identified for future investment in tools, processes, and products to facilitate the development of space flight fault management capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗

NASA NTRS2010

Life Cycle Cost Growth Study for the Discovery and New Frontiers Program Office

The D&NF Program Office LCC Management Study provides a detailed look at the drivers underlying cost overruns and schedule delays for five D&NF missions. While none of the findings are new, the study underlines the importance of continued emphasis on sound project management techniques: a clean project management structure with a clear definition of roles and responsibilities across the various partners in a project, an understanding of institutional standards and procedures and any differences among the partners, and the critical need for a comprehensive IMS that can be used easily and routinely to identify potential threats to the critical path. The study also highlights the continuing need for realistic estimates of the total LCC. Sufficient time and resources must be allocated early in a project to ensure that the appropriate trade studies and analyses are performed across all aspects of a mission: spacecraft, ground system, operations concept, and fault management, to ensure that proposed and confirmed costs truly reflect the resource requirements over the entire mission life cycle. These studies need to include a realistic review of the assumptions underlying the use of new technologies, the integration of heritage and new hardware and software into the total mission environment, and any development and test savings based on heritage technology and lessons learned. Finally, the LCC Management Study stresses the need to listen to, carefully consider, and take positive action regarding the issues raised during reviews by the expert review teams.

Barley, Bryan↗