Search NASA⌕ Search

Engineering topics

Oka, Jude M.

Publications and source records attributed to Oka, Jude M..

At least 19 records

In-glovebox container

A container having two different closing mechanism designs including an upright strike-less latch design and a Buttress thread design.

Oka, Jude M.↗

2021 Hagan Container Surveillance Plan

Prior to 2021, Hagan containers were examined on an ad hoc basis as part of the SAVY-4000 surveillance plan. Given the size, aging horizon, and unique potential failure mechanisms of the Hagan population, the authors identified the need for Hagan-specific surveillance (Kelly, et al., 2020) and have developed this surveillance plan to meet that need.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Thermal Evaluation of the SAVY-4000 1 Quart Container at High Heat Loads

The SAVY-4000 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was published in 2013 which established the design life of the container series through physical testing that meets applicable requirements from DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. One critical requirement in DOE M 441.1-1 is to set a maximum heat load for the entire series to ensure that throughout the lifetime of the container, each of the components still performs within manufacture specifications. The original maximum decay heat limit has been defined within the SAVY-4000 SAR, which was accomplished by completing a series of tests that heat loaded the SAVY-4000 series and measured the steady state temperature and graded it against manufacture specifications. The container series is comprised of a corrosion resistant 316L stainless steel containment boundary, ceramic composite filter for the prevention of radiological particulate release and a chemically stable O-ring made of Viton ® . Currently, the SAVY 4000 maximum decay heat load is set at 25 Watts and the heat load expected during normal handling and storage is considered sufficient that the SAVY 4000 container requirements will not be the limiting factor for storage of most common material in use at TA-55, e.g. weapons grade oxide, americium, Pu-238 oxide and encapsulated heat sources. The SAVY 4000 lifetime was originally set as 5 years within the SAVY-4000 SAR, but in July 2019 the lifetime was extended to 15 years through a technical basis justification approved by the Department of Energy (DOE) Los Alamos Field Office. The 25 Watt limit applies to all SAVY 4000 container sizes; 1-quart, 2-quart, 3-quart, 5-quart, 8-quart, 12-quart, 5-gallon, and 10-gallon.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Investigation of Critical Pit Size in Savy 4000 Wall

The Department of Energy (DOE) issued DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual, in March 2008 to protect workers who handle nuclear material from exposure due to loss of containment of stored materials. The Manual specifies a detailed approach to achieve high confidence in containers and includes requirements for container design and performance, design-life determinations, material contents, and surveillance and maintenance to ensure container integrity over time.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Surveillance Report on SAVY 4000 and Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers Update for FY2020

A Surveillance Program is in place to assess how nuclear material storage containers at LANL are aging in-service. This program is guided by the LANL Surveillance Plan which is required by DOE M441.1-1. The plan is modified as necessary to ensure that any issues identified during surveillance or laboratory studies are examined in future surveillances, and that any lifetime implications are taken into account. Under the plan, overall container integrity is evaluated by a combination of visual inspections and photographs. Multiple measurements are made to assess the SAVY 4000 performance, including, helium leakage rate, O-ring hardness (durometer), O-ring compression set, filter performance and filter water resistance. The containers for surveillance are chosen annually based on the previous surveillance program results and observations. The surveillance plan targets items believed to provide the greatest challenge to the SAVY 4000 container integrity.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Proposal for a Hagan Container Surveillance Plan

This white paper proposes a Hagan-specific surveillance plan. Currently, Hagan containers are examined on an ad hoc basis as part of the SAVY-4000 surveillance plan. Given the size, aging horizon, and unique potential failure mechanisms of the Hagan population, the authors believe there is a need to have a Hagan-specific surveillance plan.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Surveillance Report on SAVY 4000 and Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers ( FY2019 Update)

A Surveillance Program is in place to assess how nuclear material storage containers at LANL are aging in-service. This program is guided by the LANL Surveillance Plan which is required by DOE M441.1-1. The plan is modified as necessary to ensure that any issues identified during surveillance or laboratory studies are examined in future surveillances, and that any lifetime implications are taken into account. Under the plan, overall container integrity is evaluated by a combination of visual inspections and photographs. Multiple measurements are made to assess the SAVY 4000 performance, including, helium leakage rate, O-ring hardness (durometer), O-ring compression set, filter performance and filter water resistance. The containers for surveillance are chosen annually based on the previous surveillance program results and observations. The surveillance plan targets items believed to provide the greatest challenge to the SAVY 4000 container integrity.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluating Corrosion Effects on the Stainless Steel Components of the SAVY-4000/Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers: FY19 Update

This report provides an update of the FY19 corrosion observations, laboratory studies, and mitigation efforts for the nuclear material storage program at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Nuclear material packages outside of an approved engineered contamination barrier must meet packaging, surveillance, and testing requirements designed to protect workers from airborne contamination per Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging.1 The SAVY-4000 containers were developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in conjunction with Nuclear Filter Technology as a manually-compliant container system for staging and storage of plutonium for LANL and the DOE complex.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Water Ingress Testing of Commercially Available Containers for the TA-55 Criticality Safety Program

This memorandum outlines the water ingress test results for several commercially available container types that are advertised as “leak tight” but need to be tested to the water resistant criteria set forth by the TA-55 Criticality Safety Program. The usage of SAVY-4000 containers as water resistant containers inside gloveboxes, although allowed, is expensive, ergonomically challenging, and could be avoided if there is a commercial alternative that meets the water ingress criterion. The contents of this document are strictly for TA55 Criticality Safety Requirements (PA-RD01009), and it is not to be used to assign a damage ratio for the reduction of material at risk or implementation in the documented safety analysis. The NMCC will proceed as identified under PA-DOP-0091, and will be invoked as the review and approval control regarding usage of these containers in the facility.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Characterization of Mechanical and Thermal Factors Related to Glovebox Container Water Ingress (Final Report)

This report summarizes tests conducted to quantify water ingress into nuclear material containers when damaged. The damage inflicted is meant to replicate realistic worst-case seismic/fire scenario at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Four types (SAVY, Hagan, K-flange, and ROCK) of three-quart containers were subject to drop and then furnace testing. At each stage (as-delivered, post-drop, and post-furnace), water ingress potential was tested by subjecting the containers to a static water column. Key results of these experiments include: • LANL provided two water ingress testing criteria. The first, and most stringent, was a 24 inAq column for a period of one week. These parameters were used for baseline testing on as-delivered containers. The second was a 6 inAq column for a period of two hours. These parameters were used to test containers after impact and furnace testing. • Under the more severe criteria for as-delivered containers, the measured water ingress was: SAVY 7–14 g; Hagan 168–493 g; K-flange 4–5 g; and ROCK 24–280 g of water ingress. • Under the less severe criteria and after drop testing, all containers permitted less than 50 g of water ingress with one exception a ROCK container that had one of three latches release during impact. • Finally, after furnace testing (500°C, 45 minutes), which destroyed the o-ring/gasket materials, and under the same 6 inAq, 2 hr column test, the measured water ingress exceeded 50 g for all but one K-flange and one ROCK container.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Surveillance Report on SAVY 4000 and Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers for Fiscal Year 2018

A Surveillance Program is in place to assess how nuclear material storage containers at LANL are aging in-service. This program is guided by the LANL Surveillance Plan [1] which is required by DOE M441.1-1 requirements, and is modified as necessary to ensure that any issues identified during surveillance or laboratory studies are examined in future surveillances, and that any lifetime implications are taken into account. Under the plan, overall container integrity is evaluated (visual inspections and photographs), and helium leakage rate, O-ring durometer and compression set, and filter performance are measured. The containers for surveillance are chosen annually based on the previous surveillance program results and observations. The surveillance plan targets items believed to provide the greatest challenge to the SAVY-4000 container integrity.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Thermal dissipation studies and Pu238/Li source simulation (MCNP) of the K2 containers (COWS)

The six K2 containers (COWS) have been proposed to be shipped to WIPP in the configuration depicted in Figure 1. Currently, the containers reside in the water bath storage and have not been opened since LANL received them. The K2 containers containing the mound scrap material each have their own unique dose rate and thermal loading. 3 The properties of each container are listed below in Table 1. The problem with loading the K2 container into the proposed configuration is the thermal load the package will experience. Each component within the package has a thermal working limit that should not be exceeded. 2 However, the package must also maintain enough shielding to lower the measured dose rate at the surface of the drum to be accepted by WIPP. Testing the current configuration through simulation LANL can prove heat will not compromise any components and dose can be reduced to a safe configuration.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SAVY-4000 O-Ring and Filter Lifetime Extension Report

The 3-year accelerated aging study of the SAVY-4000 O-ring detailed in our previous Lifetime Extension Report showed very little evidence of significant degradation to samples subjected to aggressive elevated temperature and radiation conditions. Whole container thermal aging studies followed by helium leakage testing and compression set measurements were used to establish a failure criterion estimate for O-ring compression set of ≥ 65 %, which led to an O-ring lifetime estimate of greater than 65 years at 80°C. Herein, we describe a statistical model of the 3-year accelerated aging study and present additional results gathered in FY17 that further support the lifetime extension of the O-ring to 40 years at 80°C. Because we are choosing an extremely conservative lifetime value (40 years) compared to the aging study results (>65 years), the O-ring lifetime could be extended further, especially if supported by surveillance results collected over the years to come.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Surveillance Report on SAVY-4000 and Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers for FY 2017

In accordance with the SAVY-4000 Surveillance Plan [1] and DOE M441.1-1 requirements, storage container surveillance continued through fiscal year 2017 at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Surveillance items for the year consisted of 8 SAVY-4000 storage containers, 8 Hagan containers, and 39 SAVY-4000 transfer containers. The SAVY-4000 surveillance items ranged in age from 1 year to 5.6 years and the Hagan containers ranged in age from 6.3 years to 17.6 years. The surveillance containers for this year were selected primarily to better understand the extent of corrosion of the stainless steel components of the containers. Accelerated aging studies indicate that the O-ring and filter components of the SAVY-4000 will last at least 40 years under LANL storage conditions. However, the observation of corrosion on the inside of SAVY-4000 and Hagan surveillance containers has shifted the emphasis to understanding both the nature and the extent of corrosion on the stainless steel body. The restriction on handling soluble residues greater than 500 grams continued this year, delaying the surveillance of some items that was scheduled in earlier surveillance plans.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

M441.1-1 Site Update

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

Stone, Timothy Amos↗