Engineering topics

Pedley, Michael D.

Publications and source records attributed to Pedley, Michael D..

12 records

NASA NTRS2017

NASA-STD-6001B Test 7: Impact of Test Methodology and Detection Advancements on the Obsolescence of Historical Offgas Data

NASA-STD-6001B states "all nonmetals tested in accordance with NASA-STD-6001 should be retested every 10 years or as required by the responsible program/project." The retesting of materials helps ensure the most accurate data are used in material selection. Manufacturer formulas and processes can change over time, sometimes without an update to product number and material information. Material performance in certain NASA-STD-6001 tests can be particularly vulnerable to these changes, such as material offgas (Test 7). In addition, Test 7 analysis techniques at NASA White Sands Test Facility were dramatically enhanced in the early 1990s, resulting in improved detection capabilities. Low level formaldehyde identification was improved again in 2004. Understanding the limitations in offgas analysis data prior to 1990 puts into question the validity and current applicability of that data. Case studies on Super Koropon (Registered trademark) and Aeroglaze (Registered trademark) topcoat highlight the importance of material retesting.

Buchanan, Vanessa D.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Flammability Configuration Analysis for Spacecraft Applications

Fire is one of the many potentially catastrophic hazards associated with the operation of crewed spacecraft. A major lesson learned by NASA from the Apollo 204 fire in 1966 was that ignition sources in an electrically powered vehicle should and can be minimized, but can never be eliminated completely. For this reason, spacecraft fire control is based on minimizing potential ignition sources and eliminating materials that can propagate fire. Fire extinguishers are always provided on crewed spacecraft, but are not considered as part of the fire control process. "Eliminating materials that can propagate fire" does not mean eliminating all flammable materials - the cost of designing and building spacecraft using only nonflammable materials is extraordinary and unnecessary. It means controlling the quantity and configuration of such materials to eliminate potential fire propagation paths and thus ensure that any fire would be small, localized, and isolated, and would self-extinguish without harm to the crew. Over the years, NASA has developed many solutions for controlling the configuration of flammable materials (and potentially flammable materials in commercial "off-the-shelf" hardware) so that they can be used safely in air and oxygen-enriched environments in crewed spacecraft. This document describes and explains these design solutions so payload customers and other organizations can use them in designing safe and cost-effective flight hardware. Proper application of these guidelines will produce acceptable flammability configurations for hardware located in any compartment of the International Space Station or other program crewed vehicles and habitats. However, use of these guidelines does not exempt hardware organizations of the responsibility for safety of the hardware under their control.

Pedley, Michael D.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Pressure Flammability Thresholds of Selected Aerospace Materials

A test program was performed to determine the highest pressure in oxygen where materials used in the planned NASA Constellation Program Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Crew Module (CM) would not propagate a flame if an ignition source was present. The test methodology used was similar to that previously used to determine the maximum oxygen concentration (MOC) at which self-extinguishment occurs under constant total pressure conditions. An upward limiting pressure index (ULPI) was determined, where approximately 50 percent of the materials self-extinguish in a given environment. Following this, the maximum total pressure (MTP) was identified; where all samples tested (at least five) self-extinguished following the NASA-STD-6001.A Test 1 burn length criteria. The results obtained on seven materials indicate that the non-metallic materials become flammable in oxygen between 0.4 and 0.9 psia.

Hirsch, David B.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Pressure Effects on the Self-Extinguishment Limits of Aerospace Materials

The Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle Module (CM) is being designed to operate in an atmosphere of up to 30% oxygen at a pressure of 10.2 psia for lunar missions. Spacecraft materials selection is based on an upward flammability test conducted in a closed chamber under the worst expected conditions of pressure and oxygen concentration. Material flammability depends on both oxygen concentration and pressure but, since oxygen concentration is the primary driver, all materials are certified in the 30% oxygen, 10.2 psia environment. Extensive data exist from the Shuttle Program at this condition which used relatively the same test methodology as currently used in the Constellation Program. When the CM returns to Earth, a snorkel device will be activated after splashdown to provide outside air to the crew; however, for operational reasons, it is desirable to maximize the time the crew is able to breathe cabin air before the snorkel device is activated. To maximize this time, it has been proposed to raise the partial pressure of oxygen in the CM immediately before reentry while maintaining the total cabin pressure at 14.7 psia. In addition, it has been proposed to leak-test the Orion CM with ambient air at a maximum pressure of 17.3 psia. No data exist to assess how high the cabin oxygen concentration can be at 14.7 psia or 17.3 psia. One is to re-test a large number of materials at these pressures at a significant cost. However, since the maximum oxygen concentration (MOC) at which a material will self-extinguish has been determined for a variety of spacecraft materials as a function of pressure, a second alternative is to use existing data to estimate the MOC at 14.7 psia and 17.3 psia. This data will be examined in this paper and an analysis presented to determine the oxygen concentrations at the increased pressures that will result in self-extinguishment of a material. This analysis showed that the oxygen concentration for the Orion CM at 14.7 psia cannot be set higher than 25.6% without potentially invalidating the materials flammability certification in 30% oxygen at 10.2 psia for some materials. Materials certified under these conditions would still be self-extinguishing in ambient air at 17.3 psia. alternative

Hirsch, David B.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Materials Safety - Not just Flammability and Toxic Offgassing

For many years, the safety community has focused on a limited subset of materials and processes requirements as key to safety: Materials flammability, Toxic offgassing, Propellant compatibility, Oxygen compatibility, and Stress-corrosion cracking. All these items are important, but the exclusive focus on these items neglects many other items that are equally important to materials safety. Examples include (but are not limited to): 1. Materials process control -- proper qualification and execution of manufacturing processes such as structural adhesive bonding, welding, and forging are crucial to materials safety. Limitation of discussions on materials process control to an arbitrary subset of processes, known as "critical processes" is a mistake, because any process where the quality of the product cannot be verified by inspection can potentially result in unsafe hardware 2 Materials structural design allowables -- development of valid design allowables when none exist in the literature requires extensive testing of multiple lots of materials and is extremely expensive. But, without valid allowables, structural analysis cannot verify structural safety 3. Corrosion control -- All forms of corrosion, not just stress corrosion, can affect structural integrity of hardware 4. Contamination control during ground processing -- contamination control is critical to manufacturing processes such as adhesive bonding and also to elimination foreign objects and debris (FOD) that are hazardous to the crew of manned spacecraft in microgravity environments. 5. Fasteners -- Fastener design, the use of verifiable secondary locking features, and proper verification of fastener torque are essential for proper structural performance This presentation discusses some of these key factors and the importance of considering them in ensuring the safety of space hardware.

Pedley, Michael D.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Oxygen Concentration Flammability Thresholds of Selected Aerospace Materials Considered for the Constellation Program

Materials selection for spacecraft is based on an upward flammability test conducted in a quiescent environment in the highest expected oxygen concentration environment. The test conditions and its pass/fail test logic do not provide sufficient quantitative materials flammability information for an advanced space exploration program. A modified approach has been suggested determination of materials self-extinguishment limits. The flammability threshold information will allow NASA to identify materials with increased flammability risk from oxygen concentration and total pressure changes, minimize potential impacts, and allow for development of sound requirements for new spacecraft and extraterrestrial landers and habitats. This paper provides data on oxygen concentration self-extinguishment limits under quiescent conditions for selected materials considered for the Constellation Program.

Hirsch, David B.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Corrosion Testing of Brazed Space Station IATCS Materials

Increased nickel concentrations in the IATCS coolant prompted a study of the corrosion rates of nickel-brazed heat exchangers in the system. The testing has shown that corrosion is occurring in a silicon-rich intermetallic phase in the braze filler of coldplates and heat exchangers as the result of a decrease in the coolant pH brought about by cabin carbon dioxide permeation through polymeric flexhoses. Similar corrosion is occurring in the EMU de-ionized water loop. Certain heat exchangers and coldplates have more silicon-rich phase because of their manufacturing method, and those units produce more nickel corrosion product. Silver biocide additions did not induce pitting corrosion at silver precipitate sites.

Pohlman, Matthew J.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Spacecraft Fire Safety: A Human Space Flight Program Perspective

This paper presents viewgraphs on the International Space Station's fire safety program from a human space flight perspective. The topics include: 1) Typical Manned Spacecraft Materials; 2) Typical Flammable Hardware Protection; 3) Materials Flammability; 4) Fire Retardants; 5) Nonflammable Foam Cushion Material; 6) Electrical Wire and Cable; 7) Russian Solid-Fuel Oxygen Generator (SFOG); 8) GOX Ignition Mechanisms; 9) Fire Detection; and 10) Fire Suppression.

Pedley, Michael D.↗

NASA NTRS1989

An evaluation of the liquid oxygen mechanical impact test

This study was conducted to evaluate the repeatability of the ambient LO2 mechanical impact test used by NASA to screen materials for oxygen service (NHB 8060.1B Test 12 Part 1, which is based on the ASTM method). Four materials were tested: Teflon, Vespel SP-21, Viton A, and nylon 6/6. Each test material was subjected to several series of tests that were conducted at different impact energy levels. The results show that the variability from series to series in the reaction threshold energy level is within the precision statement of the ASTM method. However, this precision is considerably broader than the reaction threshold implied by the NHB 8060.1B test criteria.

Moffett, Gary E.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Ignition of nonmetallic materials by impact of high-pressure oxygen. II - Evaluation of repeatability of pneumatic impact test

The gaseous oxygen pneumatic impact test is used to evaluate the suitability of nonmetallic materials for use in high-pressure oxygen systems. The test was evaluated by testing the reactivity of four materials over a range of impact pressures. The evaluation also investigated the effect of valve opening time and other test variables on the frequency of reaction. The variability of the data obtained for each test material was too large for the test method to be capable of distinguishing other than gross differences in the reactivity of materials. No relation was found between this variability and changes in valve opening time and other test variables. The materials studied were found to be unacceptable for use as reference standards. Because of the high variability of the test data, it is recommended that new methods be developed for evaluating the suitability of materials for use in high-pressure oxygen systems.

Schmidt, Naomi↗

NASA NTRS1988

Ignition of nonmetallic materials by impact of high-pressure gaseous oxygen

The sources of variability in the pneumatic impact test commonly used to screen nonmetallic materials for oxygen service and to rank batches or lots of particular materials were investigated together with the mechanism of ignition. Tests were conducted at the NASA/White Sands Test Facility in which the standard test chamber was replaced by an instrumented chamber to obtain information on the rates of pressurization, specimen heating, and time to ignition. Results showed that much of the variability in test data could be traced to the variability in system cleanliness and in the opening time of the high-speed valve. The prinicipal mechanism of ignition in the test is considered to be the heating of the gas initially in the test chamber by adiabatic compression; the presence of voids in the test materials may also be important.

Moffett, Gary E.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Ignition of contaminants by impact of high-pressure oxygen

The ignition of oil-film contaminants in high-pressure gaseous oxygen systems, caused by rapid pressurization, was investigated using the NASA/White Sands Test Facility's large-volume pneumatic impact test system. The test section consisted of stainless steel lines, contaminated on the inside surface with known amounts of Mobil DTE 24 oil and closed at one end, which was attached to a high-pressure oxygen system; the test section was pressurized to 48 MPa by opening a high-speed valve. Ignition of the oil was detected by a photocell attached to the closed end of the line. It was found that the frequency of ignition increased as a function of both the concentration of oil and of the pressure of the impacting oxygen. The threshold of ignition was between 25 and 65 mg/sq m. The results were correlated with the present NASA and Compressed Gas Association requirements for maximum levels of organic contaminants.

Pedley, Michael D.↗