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Petersen, Gordon

Publications and source records attributed to Petersen, Gordon.

Systems Engineering and Analysis in Support of a US Federal Staging Facility for UNF

The US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Office of Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste Disposition is examining a set of system options and conducting supporting analyses to inform the development of an integrated waste management system, which may include one or more federal staging facilities (FSFs) for used nuclear fuel (UNF ) sited using a collaborative siting process. This paper focuses on the ongoing activities in two systems engineering and analysis work areas: (1) data and tools development, validation, and maintenance and (2) systems engineering execution. Within the first work area, the STANDARDS 5.0 UNF data and analysis tool, formerly known as UNF-ST&DARDS, is being developed as a foundational resource to assist in the management of UNF data. It has the key capability to model UNF throughout the entire back end of the fuel cycle. STANDARDS also includes several compatible analysis tools for the time-dependent characterization of UNF and related systems by interfacing with the SCALE code system for nuclear analysis and COBRA-SFS for thermal analysis. Also, within the data and tools area is the Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM), which is an agent-based simulation software tool expressly designed to be capable of modeling the waste management system, including the transportation of UNF to and from a FSF. NGSAM has been developed to enable informed decision-making by providing the capability to analyze various potential system options for the management of UNF and high-level radioactive waste. Finally, in the systems engineering execution area, the team has begun to apply a disciplined systems engineering approach at the system level along with supporting analysis to guide the development of the FSF project requirements (including associated transportation infrastructure). Systems engineering principles and practices and their adaptation/application to design and development activities will ensure that the waste management system is effectively implemented as work proceeds. Other activities include investigating the implications of changes in various assumptions and parameters related to waste management systems, such as UNF acceptance rates, receipt logic, facility capacities and capabilities, use of standardized canisters, and different assumed facility operation start dates. Keywords: federal staging facility (FSF), used nuclear fuel (UNF), integrated waste management (IWM) system, Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM), STANDARDS, systems engineering

Joseph, Robert↗

Damaged Fuel in the United States - 20325

Throughout the history of commercial nuclear power plant operations in the U.S., many fuel assemblies have lost the capability to perform all of their desired functions. Since they can no longer be handled, stored, or transported in accordance with established regulations, they are classified as damaged fuel. The causes of these failed assemblies are diverse and plant-specific. The majority of these failed assemblies are contained in damaged fuel cans to be used in conjunction with storage and/or transportation systems. These systems have a limited number of slots that can be filled with damaged fuel cans. A damaged fuel can is generally a stainless-steel container that confines damaged spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and is closed at one end by mesh endpoints that allow gaseous and liquid media to escape but minimize the dispersal of gross particulate material. Out of extreme caution, a few reactors have loaded high burnup fuel into damaged fuel cans. Damaged fuel is not licensed for storage or transport in the U.S. because relevant regulations do not specify exactly how to classify damaged fuel. Instead, these regulations license/certify packages that specify approved contents. Damaged fuel must be included among the approved contents to be considered acceptable. In many cases, damaged SNF is encapsulated in damaged fuel cans to ensure it can confine gross fuel particles, debris, and/or damaged assemblies to known volumes within loaded casks. A damaged fuel can may then be utilized in the same way as an assembly in a storage and transportation system. Some storage cask systems utilize top and bottom plugs to confine debris in damaged fuel. The most recent domestic documentation on damaged SNF was published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), which used data from U.S. reactors compiled from 1968 to June 30, 2013, to produce Form GC-859, 'Nuclear Fuel Data Survey.' According to this form, there were 136,821 boiling water reactor (BWR) SNF assemblies and 104,647 pressurized water reactor (PWR) SNF assemblies, for a combined total of 241,468. Of these, 4,521 were classified as failed. Some were also disassembled and the fuel rods or pieces of fuel rods combined to make consolidated assemblies. These consolidated assemblies may include damaged fuel or were perhaps consolidated as part of a demonstration project. The GC-859 data includes 2,550 consolidated assemblies containing 0 - 264 entire fuel rods. These consolidated assemblies could be placed in single assembly canisters and stored in the spent fuel pool. For dry storage and transportation, a single assembly canister is generally placed in each damaged fuel can. In addition to the consolidated assemblies, 2,391 un-canistered fuel rod pieces exist, which were removed from 494 assemblies. (authors)

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Co-Disposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW - 20331

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters. (authors)

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History and Status of DoE's Standardized Canister - 19657

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) currently in its possession, as well as SNF that will come into its possession in the future. DOE will rely upon the standardized canister to confine radionuclides and precluding the moderator in order to ensure safe, long-term management and disposition of SNF in its possession. This strategy helps minimize characterization costs (i.e., funds and exposure) and other technical challenges associated with the traditional approach of relying on fuel-specific properties to demonstrate compliance with the regulator. The use of the standardized canister offers the following benefits: - The standardized canister design is complete. It has been tested under a variety of drop and accident scenarios and was subsequently licensed under 10 CFR 72 as a storage system as part of the Foster Wheeler Environmental Corporation (FWENC) Facility. It is also part of the license submittal for Yucca Mountain. - There is high confidence that the standardized canister design can be stored within commercially-available storage casks and licensed as part of a transportation-system package. - A robust standardized canister simplifies accident analyses and does not rely on characterization of the contained waste. This simplifies safety analysis, provides a greater level of confidence with stakeholders and reduces cost and risk. - A common design for the associated packaging, closure, and loadout facilities results in significant savings. - The DOE standardized canister would simplify design efforts, procurement, and fabrication. - Standardizing handling activities and associated training, procedures, equipment, and tooling leads to enhanced safety and surety of operations. The standardized canister is the preferred package for these materials. It withstood scrutiny by the Yucca Mountain Repository License Application, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, an American Society of Mechanical Engineers peer review, and the FWENC storage license application. This evaluation summarizes and documents the status of the design and rationale for the DOE standardized canister, and outlines remaining needs before deployment. In addition, it discusses the factors that have the potential to influence storage, transportation, and disposal of DOE SNF. (authors)

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Potential Cost Implications of an Interim Storage Facility for Commercial SNF+ - 17132

The question of whether or not consolidated interim storage of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) should be part of the federal waste management system as an intermediate step before permanent disposal has been debated for more than four decades. This paper summarizes an evaluation of the cost implications of incorporating a consolidated interim storage facility (ISF) into the waste management system (WMS). In this study, the order-of-magnitude estimates of total system costs were calculated and tabulated. The analyzed scenarios involve shipment of SNF from reactors in dual-purpose storage and transportation canisters (DPCs) currently being used by utilities for dry storage at reactor sites. A number of pertinent conclusions can be drawn from this evaluation, including: - Delay in repository availability increases total system costs. Any delay in opening a repository increases total system costs, regardless of whether the system has an ISF or not. This is due to the increased cost associated with an extended duration for storage, whether at multiple independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) or at an ISF, until waste can be disposed of.- There is a potential total system lifecycle cost avoidance in realistic scenarios with an ISF when compared to scenarios with no ISF. However, most of the cost avoidance occurs several decades after the ISF is opened. The total WMS cost differential over the long term is mainly attributed to the reduced operational costs of storing the fuel in a consolidated facility rather than at individual reactor sites. - Earlier establishment of an ISF allows for more avoidance of post-shutdown at-reactor storage costs for any repository opening date. An ISF allows earlier acceptance of fuel from reactors, which reduces at-reactor costs from a total system perspective. - Transportation costs have little impact on a WMS with or without an ISF. These impacts range from 3-11% of the total cost in all scenarios. Therefore, transporting the fuel twice does not appear to be a significant cost concern driver relative to other system costs. In conclusion, designing, licensing, and constructing an ISF will require a large near-term financial investment. However, reduced annual operating and maintenance costs for an integrated waste management system with an ISF, compared to a system without an ISF, could eventually result in system-wide (integrated) cost avoidance due to reductions in at-reactor storage costs in the long term. The largest cost avoidances would not occur for several decades, so assumptions about inflation, escalation, and discount rates will have a significant effect on potential economic impacts of an ISF. It should be noted that other benefits associated with the investment of an ISF-such as earlier removal of SNF from shutdown reactor sites, earlier prospects for site re-utilization, and additional overall integrated waste management system flexibility-were not addressed in this study. (authors)

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An Evaluation of Standardized Canisters in the Waste Management System - 16317

Development of a standardized canister system represents an opportunity to develop an integrated approach to addressing storage, transportation, and disposal issues in the waste management system. However, regardless of timing and method, deployment of such a system would have the potential to cause significant system-wide impacts. This evaluation expands upon previous standardized-canister system evaluations and compares continued loading of dual-purpose canisters (i.e., the status quo) with loading of standardized canister systems in the near term, that is, before repository requirements are known and/or before operating reactors shut down. This evaluation quantitatively compares order-of-magnitude costs and logistics for different standardization scenarios with those of status quo scenarios, provides insight into quantifiable impacts of loading standardized canister systems in the near term, tests system-level analysis tools and associated input, and identifies scenarios for further analysis. This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract (10 CFR Part 961). As work on assessing standardized canister system scenarios has progressed, new data for at-reactor and interim storage facility (ISF) operations have been collected and/or generated to provide more realism at the system level, and past scenarios were re-evaluated with this new information. In addition, new scenarios were developed and analyzed that focused on (1) bare fuel transported from reactors to an ISF in re-usable bare fuel casks and deferring deployment of a standardized canister system to the ISF, (2) alternative acceptance strategies based on conclusions from previous systems architecture studies, and (3) the impacts of having to accommodate spent fuel in differently sized canisters for different potential repository geologies. Results of this evaluation indicate that shifting the loading of standardized canisters from the reactor to the ISF does not result in a significant change in total system cost. Results also show that some alternative acceptance strategies could reduce the number of years that spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stays on-site at reactors for cases involving standardized canisters (consistent with previous results that looked at dual-purpose canisters). Finally, incorporating the new at-reactor loading data of small standardized canisters shows a significant system-wide cost reduction when compared to previous estimates of at-reactor loading of small canisters. (authors)

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