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Pickett, Chris A

Publications and source records attributed to Pickett, Chris A.

At least 19 records

Development of a Whole Container Seal

This paper outlines a technique for utilizing electrically conductive textiles as a whole container seal. This method has the potential to provide more robustness for ensuring that the container has not been breached versus conventional sealing methods that only provide tamper indication at the area used for normal access. The conductive textile is used as a distributed sensor for detecting and localizing container tamper or breach. For sealing purposes, the conductive fabric represents a bounded, near-infinite grid of resistors. The well-known infinite resistance grid problem was used to model and confirm the expected accuracy and validity of this approach. An experimental setup was built that uses a multiplexed Wheatstone bridge measurement to determine the resistances of a coarse electrode grid across the conductive fabric. Non-uniform resistance values of the grid infer the presence of damage or tears in the fabric. Results suggest accuracy proportional to the electrode spacing in determining the presence and location of disturbances in conductive fabric samples. Current work is focused on constructing experimental prototypes for field and environmental testing to gauge the performance of these whole container seals in real world conditions. We are also developing software and hardware to interface with the whole container seals. The latest prototypes are expected to provide more accuracy in detecting and localizing events, although detection of a penetration should be adequate for most sealing applications. We are also developing smart sensing nodes that integrate digital hardware and additional sensors (e.g., motion, humidity) into the electrode nodes within the whole container seal.

Kuhn, Michael J↗

The Importance of Establishing and Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge during 21st Century Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities

During this century, the entire nuclear fuel cycle will expand and become increasingly more global, taxing both the resources and capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to maintain an effective Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) and its ability to provide timely detection of diversion. Uranium that currently is mined and milled in one country will be converted, enriched, and fabricated into fuel for reactors in an expanding set of new countries. This expansion will make it harder to guarantee that regional activities stay regional and that diversion detection is timely unless new and sustainable tools are developed to improve inspector effectiveness. To deal with this emerging reality, the IAEA must increase its use of unattended monitoring and employ new tools and methods that enhance CoK during all phases of the fuel cycle. This approach will help provide useful information to aid in detecting undeclared activities and create opportunities for timely and appropriate responses to events well before they enter phases of greater concern (e.g., enrichment). The systems that maintain CoK of safeguarded assets rely on containment and surveillance (C/S) technologies. The 21st century fuel cycle will require increased use of these technologies and systems, plus greater implementation of unattended systems that can securely collect data when inspectors are not present.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Physical Protection Systems Test Bed for International Counter-Trafficking System Development

Physical protection systems have a widespread impact on the nuclear industry in areas such as nuclear safeguards, arms control, and trafficking of illicit goods (e.g., nuclear materials) across international borders around the world. Many challenges must be overcome in design and deployment of foreign border security systems such as lack of infrastructure, extreme environmental conditions, limited knowledge of terrain, insider threats, and occasional cultural resistance. Successful security systems, whether it be a system designed to secure a single facility or a whole border security system, rely on the entire integrated system composed of multiple subsystems. This test bed is composed of many unique sensors and subsystems, including wireless unattended ground sensors, a buried fiber-optic acoustic sensor, a lossy coaxial distributed sensor, wireless links, pan-tilt-zoom cameras, mobile power generation systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fiber-optic-fence intrusion detection systems. A Common Operating Picture software architecture is utilized to integrate a number of these subsystems. We are currently performance testing each system for border security and perimeter security applications by examining metrics such as probability of sense and a qualitative understanding of the sensor s vulnerability of defeat. The testing process includes different soil conditions for buried sensors (e.g., dry, wet, and frozen) and an array of different tests including walking, running, stealth detection, and vehicle detection. Also, long term sustainability of systems is tested including performance differences due to seasonal variations (e.g. summer versus winter, while raining, in foggy conditions). The capabilities of the test bed are discussed. Performance testing results, both at the individual component level and integrated into a larger system for a specific deployment (in situ), help illustrate the usefulness and need for integrated testing facilities to carry out this mission. The test bed provides access to grassy fields, wooded areas, and a large waterway three distinct testing environments. The infrastructure supporting deployment of systems at the test bed includes grid power, renewable power systems, climate controlled enclosures, high bandwidth wireless links, and a fiber optic communications backbone. With over 10 acres of dedicated area and direct waterway access, the test bed is well suited for long term test and evaluation of physical protection and security systems targeting a wide range of applications.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radio-Frequency (RF) Devices for Safeguards: Where We Are and Where We Need to Go

Radio-Frequency (RF) devices have revolutionized many aspects of modern industrial processes. RF technology can enable wireless communication for tag identification, sensor communication, and asset tracking. Radio-frequency identification (RFID) is a technology that utilizes wireless communication to interrogate and identify an electronic tag attached to an item in order to identify the item. The technology can come in many forms: passive or active tags, low to ultra-wideband frequencies, small paper-thin tags to brick-sized units, and simple tags or highly integrated sensor packages. RF technology, and specifically RFID, has been applied widely in commercial markets for inventory, supply chain management, and asset tracking. Several recent studies have demonstrated the safeguards benefits of utilizing RFID versus conventional inventory tagging methods for tracking nuclear material. These studies have indicated that the RF requirements for safeguards functions are more stringent than the RF requirements for other inventory tracking and accounting applications. Additionally, other requirements must be addressed, including environmental and operating conditions, authentication, and tag location and attachment. Facility restrictions on radio spectrum, method of tag attachment, and sensitivity of the data collected impact the tag selection and system design. More important, the intended use of the system must be considered. The requirements for using RF to simply replace or supplement container identifiers such as bar codes that facilitate the inventory function will differ greatly from the requirements for deploying RF for unattended monitoring applications. Several studies have investigated these considerations to advance commercial RF devices for safeguards use, and a number of system concepts have been developed. This paper will provide an overview of past studies and current technologies, and will investigate the requirements, existing gaps, and several potential next steps for advancing RF techniques for safeguards use.

Radio-Frequency Identification↗

Results of Continuous Load Cell Monitoring Field Trial for UF6 Withdrawals at an Operating Industrial Plant

Continuous load cell monitoring (CLCM) has been implemented and tested for use as a safeguards tool during a 2009 field trial in an operating UF6 transfer facility. The transfer facility is part of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, Ohio, operated by the United States Enrichment Corporation. During the field trial, two process scales for UF{sub 6} cylinders were continuously monitored for a 6-month period as cylinders were being filled. The collected CLCM data were used in testing an event processor serving as a filter for highlighting measurements representing significant operational activities that are important in verifying declared operations. The collection of CLCM data, coupled with rules-based event processing, can provide inspectors with knowledge of a facility's feed and withdrawal activities occurring between site visits. Such process knowledge promises to enhance the effectiveness of safeguards by enabling inspectors to quantitatively compare declared activities directly with process measurements. Selected results of the field trial and event processing will be presented in the context of their value to an independent inspector and a facility operator.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Authentication and Interpretation of Weight Data Collected from Accountability Scales at Global Nuclear Fuels

Accountability scale data from the Global Nuclear Fuels (GNF) fuel fabrication facility in Wilmington, NC has been collected and analyzed as a part of the Cylinder Accountability and Tracking System (CATS) field trial in 2009. The purpose of the data collection was to demonstrate an authentication method for safeguards applications, and the use of load cell data in cylinder accountability. The scale data was acquired using a commercial off-the-shelf communication server with authentication and encryption capabilities. The authenticated weight data was then analyzed to determine facility operating activities. The data allowed for the determination of the number of full and empty cylinders weighed and the respective weights along with other operational activities. Data authentication concepts, practices and methods, the details of the GNF weight data authentication implementation and scale data interpretation results will be presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Results from a Field Trial of the Radio Frequency Based Cylinder Accountability and Tracking System at the Global Nuclear Fuel Americas Fuel Fabrication Facility

The Cylinder Accountability and Tracking System (CATS) is a tool designed for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to improve overall inspector efficiency through real-time unattended monitoring of cylinder movements, site specific rules-based event detection, and the capability to integrate many types of monitoring technologies. The system is based on the tracking of cylinder movements using (radio frequency) RF tags, and the collection of data, such as accountability weights, that can be associated with the cylinders. This presentation will cover the installation and evaluation of the CATS at the Global Nuclear Fuels (GNF) fuel fabrication facility in Wilmington, NC. This system was installed to evaluate its safeguards applicability, operational durability under operating conditions, and overall performance. An overview of the system design and elements specific to the GNF deployment will be presented along with lessons learned from the installation process and results from the field trial.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Working Toward Robust Process Monitoring for Safeguards Applications

New safeguards technologies allow continuous monitoring of plant processes. Efforts to deploy these technologies, as described in a preponderance of literature, typically have consisted of case studies attempting to prove their efficacy in proof-of-principle installations. While the enhanced safeguards capabilities of continuous monitoring have been established, studies thus far have not addressed such challenges as manipulation of a system by a host nation. To prevent this and other such vulnerabilities, one technology, continuous load cell monitoring, was reviewed. This paper will present vulnerabilities as well as mitigation strategies that were identified.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Results from the 2010 INMM International Containment and Surveillance Workshop focused on Concepts for the 21st Century

The Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) held an International Workshop, 'Containment & Surveillance (C/S): Concepts for the 21st Century,' June 6-11, 2010, at the Oak National Laboratory, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development and Office of Nonproliferation and International Security sponsored the event. The workshop focused on determining concepts and needs for 21st century containment and surveillance (C/S) systems that support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and future arms control agreements. Panel discussions by subject matter experts and international practitioners addressed daily topical themes encompassing the following areas of C/S: authentication; tagging, sealing, and containment verification; and surveillance systems. Each panel discussion was followed by a question-and-answer session with the audience and an afternoon breakout session. The facilitated breakout sessions were used to compile information and determine future needs. Individuals attending the workshop included C/S experts and practitioners; IAEA and arms control inspectors; technology providers; vendors; students; and individuals with an interest in, or desire to learn about, future C/S system needs. The primary goal of the workshop was to produce a document that details the future research and development needs for C/S systems that support nuclear safeguards and arms control missions. This talk will present a compilation of the information obtained from breakout sessions at the workshop.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗