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Prescott, Steven R

Publications and source records attributed to Prescott, Steven R.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

An Evaluation of The Dynamic Physical Security Risk Assessment Methodology for Fleet-Wide Applications

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Plant-specific Model and Data Analysis using Dynamic Security Modeling and Simulation

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large on-site physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework or MASS-DEF. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report does not contain any plant's sensitive information and/or Safeguards Information. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

State of the Art for Integrated Mod Sim

Slides for presentation at INSTAR FY24 annual meeting Slides 6-14 from INL/RPT-23-74073 Slides 16-28 from SAND2021-14105C at https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1898479 Slides 29-35 from INL/RPT-23-73490

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Methodology and Tool for the Physical Security Analysis of Micro and Advanced Reactors

This work proposes a dynamic evaluation methodology to relax the conservatism in physical security evaluation, by leveraging an ongoing work in the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway. This methodology is implemented in a dynamic risk assessment tool named Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). The work extends EMRALD’s capability to support a sandbox feature where analysts can easily create attack scenarios and modify advanced/small modular reactor (A/SMR) security and safety features using templates. This approach saves time and cost since the analysis does not require creating detailed computer-aided design models, as is commonly required in commercial force-on-force software tools. EMRALD is completely free to use at https://emraldapp.inl.gov. We have developed basic templates including physical barriers, intrusion sensors, physical areas, and safety actions, that can be downloaded from EMRALD’s GitHub site: https://github.com/idaholab/EMRALD. These templates use generic data commonly used for training purposes, which do not reflect any actual operating nuclear reactor. Users may adjust the data in the templates with their own dataset and/or create new templates in EMRALD. The proposed methodology combines security and safety by assessing sabotage effects up to the radiological consequence to the public instead of merely the core damage state. This practice follows the industry standard for advanced non-light-water reactors currently proposed for endorsement by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The combination of security and safety is expressed in an achievability-consequence chart. EMRALD can be used to generate data for this chart. A hypothetical case study using a representative sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) facility is presented in this report to demonstrate this methodology. This case study does not contain any actual nuclear plant information. This work will benefit A/SMR vendors and utilities to implement security by design during the reactor design iteration phase, such that they do not have to perform upgrades and retrofits to the reactor after it is installed to improve its physical protection system. The tool may also be used to analyze domestic or foreign reactor designs to support the International Nuclear Security Techniques for Advanced Reactors (INSTAR) bilateral missions. Future works are planned to implement the methodology on a reference SFR reactor and a reference high-temperature gas-cooled reactor to obtain insights and lessons-learned for the A/SMR community.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Technical and Regulatory Aspects of Integrating Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants

This paper provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. It describes how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with safety mitigation actions in EMRALD, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as MAAP. The work performed in this paper is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are presented for dissemination. No plant’s sensitive information is included in this paper. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the proposed methodology.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Simulation-Based Recovery Action Analysis Using the EMRALD Dynamic Risk Assessment Tool

Recovery human action is defined as the action that prevents deviant conditions from producing unwanted effects. Analyzing recovery actions has been a critical part in human reliability analysis (HRA). However, there are a couple of limitations to treating recovery actions using only the current HRA methods available. Representatively, the existing recovery analysis does not specifically consider recovery actions as they have occurred in actual nuclear power plants (NPPs). To handle the challenges in the existing recovery analyses, this study suggests a way to analyze recovery actions under a dynamic HRA method, the Procedure-based Risk Investigation MEthod-Human Reliability Analysis (PRIME-HRA) method. The PRIME-HRA method suggests a way on how to develop dynamic simulation models using dynamic risk assessment tools such as the Event Modeling Risk Assessment Using Linked Diagram (EMRALD) [1] and the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) [2]. EMRALD and HUNTER are the dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and HRA tools developed at Idaho National Laboratory. In this paper, differences on analyzing recovery actions in the Technique for Human Error-Rate Prediction (THERP), the Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT) and the Korean Standard HRA (K-HRA) and challenges of these approaches are introduced. How we have developed the PRIME-HRA is also introduced in this paper. Then, the proposed approach to analyzing recovery human actions in dynamic context is partially discussed with an example.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Physical Security Risk for Potential Implementation of FLEX using Dynamic Simulation Methods

The requirements for United States nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their large operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Physical Security Pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. This pathway will analyze and minimize the conservatisms built into current security postures in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within this pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force (FOF) modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrated them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System or Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance of the use of the framework. Such an assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants. NOTE: The work performed in this report is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are in the report. No plant’s sensitive information is discussed in this report. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the MASS-DEF methodology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Industry Level Feasibility of LiDAR Data into Fire Modeling Using Fire Risk Investigation in 3D (FRI3D)

Many evaluation, assessment, and modeling tasks at nuclear power plants require spatial information this often requires physical visits to locations within the facility because the 2D or 3D schematics and current models do not contain enough detail or do not capture as-built and real-world conditions. These visits require extensive manual labor for not only the requesting party, but support groups such as security. LIDAR mapping is trying to solve that problem by providing very detailed 3D models for low costs. However, the use of these models can be very limited because either component reference information is missing and too costly to add, or there is no way to extract specific spatial data needed for other tools. This report presents Idaho National Lab's work with Environmental Intellect (Ei) covering two main efforts. First, to reduce the effort of "tagging" data in large 3D models. By using both existing plant database information, and artificial intelligence (AI) to find and read equipment labels. This research explores the ability of to provide a simple way for the user to tag items and verify plant data, capturing both the speed of AI and human verification. The second part of the work is the development of an interface for importing pieces needed for Modeling & Simulation. Analysis work such as that for fire, flood, or physical security all require spatial or 3D models in various levels of detail. This interface will allow for the retrieval of item location or boundaries, enabling the auto generation of models for varying tools. The application program interface (API) of the fire risk investigation in 3D (FRI3D) was used to test feasibility of exporting the LiDAR tagged spatial information. Outcomes from this work provide preliminary data to determine if the tools and methods could provide substantial industry benefit if fully matured.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Modeling Predictive Maintenance for NuScale’s Condensate and Feedwater System Using EMRALD

Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) is used to model of NuScale’s feedwater and condenser system to capture component degradation and repairing process. To model the reliability of the components, a three-stage failure rate is used contrary to a constant rate leading to component failure. Results from EMRALD will be used to compare different maintenance strategies to reduce system downtime. The outcome of the project will assist in maximizing remaining useful life of the overall system and increasing the availability and revenue of the plant.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Dynamic Risk Framework for the Optimization of Physical Security Posture of Nuclear Power Plants

This paper describes an ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize security and cost of nuclear power plants. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). EMRALD was leveraged to optimize the security posture of a nuclear power plant by integrating force-on-force (FOF) simulations and operator mitigation actions including the dynamic and flexible coping strategies (FLEX). To illustrate the methodology, four attack scenarios were modeled in a commercially available FOF simulation tool using a hypothetical nuclear power plant facility. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes, as well as the probabilistic risk of core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures were modeled in EMRALD dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. The results demonstrate that the number of armed responders can be optimized, while still maintaining the same protection level as the initial security posture. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Probabilistic Methods for Cyclical and Coupled Systems with Changing Failure Rates

Advancements in nuclear system designs with automated control features provide many benefits, but can lead to complex coupled systems and dynamic failure scenarios. This is especially true for microreactor designs where components are not expected to be replaced during the reactor’s lifetime. Hence, the life of the system, in addition to the safety, needs to be evaluated. Modeling these sequences of time-dependent events requires addressing cyclical processes and changing failure rates in ways that represent the actual system dynamics in contrast to a single sampling for a component’s time to failure. This research presents two distinct analytical methods for several failure distributions that evaluate a final time to failure used for different scenarios where the time to failure must be sampled multiple times. The first method is used when evaluating a component whose failure rate increases due to an outside event after the initial sampling but before the initially sampled time to failure. The second method is used when evaluating multiple identical components or a component that has been replaced with a new identical version before the second sampling. The two methods were implemented in a few representative case studies developed in the dynamic probabilistic risk assessment tool Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams. Overall, this paper provides guidelines on how these approaches give a more realistic and accurate dynamic probabilistic risk assessment of complex systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

June 2021 SAPHIRE 8 Algorithm Enhancements Status Report

This letter report documents the accomplishments and recommendations for the two subtasks that are part of this contract, SAPHIRE Algorithm Enhancements, as set forth in the NRC IAA NRC-HQ-60-17-T-0007 for the period of June 2020 through June 2021.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

METHODOLOGY AND APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS BASED ON DYNAMIC FORCE-ON-FORCE MODELING

This paper describes ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize security and cost of nuclear power plants (NPPs). It reviews the conservatisms in conventional physical security posture and regulations. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). The dynamic assessment methodology leverages EMRALD to process results of force-on-force (FOF) simulations and crediting safety mitigation actions from probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models as well as diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) mitigation strategies. Timing information from these simulations are compared against the available time to perform mitigations obtained from Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP5) simulations. To illustrate the methodology, a station blackout (SBO) attack scenario was modeled in commercially available FOF simulation tools. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes and as the probabilistic risk of a core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures were modeled in EMRALD, and were dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. RELAP5 simulations incorporating human and hardware uncertainties were performed to estimate the distribution of time-to-core damage. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, plant mitigation strategies provide significantly high-likelihood of preventing radiological release. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the NPPs to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Methodology and Application of Physical Security Effectiveness Based on Dynamic Force-on-Force Modeling

This report describes the research and development being performed at INL towards a dynamic modeling and simulation framework to enable physical security optimization at commercial nuclear power plants. The framework is based on the dynamic modeling tool EMRALD and is demonstrated for applications that can result in physical security optimization. Two main applications are presented: 1. Integrating FLEX portable equipment performance with FOF models of a plant’s physical security posture, and 2. Location optimization of bullet resistant enclosure. The generic framework for modeling FLEX portable equipment is described in detail, followed by a case study modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical PWR. Two distinct FLEX deployment strategies, series and parallel, are modeled with distinct timelines. The results of the adversarial attack modeled in a commercial FOF tool, AVERT, are integrated with the FLEX deployment model in EMRALD. Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the distribution of the timeline in FLEX deployment strategies. Thermal-hydraulic analysis of FLEX performance is performed in RELAP5 and integrated with the EMRALD simulations to provide more realistic timelines in the models. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, deployment of FLEX equipment can result in a significantly high likelihood of preventing radiological release. The modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the NPPs to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security. The objective of location optimization of BRE is to determine the best location in the plant for a new BRE being planned by the plant to enhance their physical security effectiveness. The plant physical security FOF model is integrated with EMRALD that performs Monte Carlo simulation to run different attack scenarios and a discrete set of potential BRE locations. Sensitivity analysis is used to determine the most effective location for the BRE. The optimization approach can be extended to wide applications such as location optimization of remotely operated weapons and other strategic fixed assets.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

INTEGRATION OF FLEX EQUIPMENT AND OPERATOR ACTIONS IN PLANT FORCE-ON-FORCE MODELS WITH DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT

The overall operation and maintenance cost to protect nuclear power plants accounts for approximately 7% of the total cost of power generation, with labor accounting for half of this cost. In the current research, from interaction with utilities and other stakeholders, it was determined that physical security forces account for nearly 20% of the entire workforce at several nuclear power plants. Labor costs continue to rise in the U.S., so any measures to reduce the cost of operating a nuclear power plant will need to include a reduction in labor. The physical security pathway within the DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability program aims to lower the cost of physical security through directed research into modeling and simulation, application of advanced sensors or deployment of advanced weapons. This report presents a modeling and simulation framework for integrating Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability (FLEX) portable equipment performance with Force on Force models of a plant’s physical security posture. The generic framework is described in detail, followed by a case study of modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical nuclear power plant. Two different FLEX deployment strategies, series and parallel, are modeled with distinct timelines. The results of the adversarial attack modeled in a commercial Force on Force tool are integrated with the FLEX deployment model in INL’s dynamic modeling tool EMRALD. Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the distribution of the timeline in FLEX deployment strategies. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, deployment of FLEX equipment can result in a significantly high likelihood of preventing radiological release. The modeling and simulation framework integrating FLEX equipment with Force on Force models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fire Risk Investigation in 3D (FRI3D) Software and Process for Integrated Fire Modeling

Modeling and implementing fire safety for nuclear power plants is a costly activity. Because of the complexity of fire phenomena and multiple operational procedures, it is difficult to computationally provide assurance that mitigation methods are adequate for critical areas using current analysis methods in a cost-effective manner. The nuclear industry needs efficient methods to provide more accurate modeling and optimize mitigation methods to improve nuclear power plant understanding for fire scenarios. This report describes the work done over the last two year on the Fire Risk Investigation in 3D (FRI3D) software. This software simplifies the modeling process by importing existing plant models and data, incorporating a 3D modeling environment and coupling with the fire simulation software CFAST. This eliminates the manual labor and errors associated with much of the fire modeling process. The report lays out the status and path of FRID software for the Risk Informed Safety Analysis pathway of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability project at Idaho National Laboratory and industry collaborators to best help reduce costs and improve realism in fire probabilistic risk analysis.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗