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Preston, Jeff

Publications and source records attributed to Preston, Jeff.

At least 19 records

Experimental Testing of Personal Dosimetry Interference from a Portable X-ray Generator

The determination of the disposition route for a legacy drum in a nuclear facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex is supported by non-destructive testing of the drum and its contents. An advanced radiation measurements organization at the Y-12 National Security Complex proposed a series of active measurements using a portable x-ray generator, imaging the drum and its contents with 360-degree visualization. In rooms near the current storage location for the drum, Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) annunciation is degraded, and Personal Radiation Dosimetry Instruments (PRDI’s) are routinely worn by personnel. The Y-12 Development Organization has procured advanced radiation detection devices and a variety of radiation sources for use in active measurements. These devices are being used to support Y-12 operations and safety engineering disciplines to safely address complex challenges throughout the complex. This paper presents the results of experimental testing of the PRDI’s used at Y-12 with the x-ray generator [1], and notes the unique utilization of a decommissioned facility for this work.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Quantification of 238U Holdup using Iterative, Point-Cloud-Based Compton Imaging

U holdup has impacts on several aspects of operation: Worker dose, Criticality safety, Safeguards, Outage planning. Generalized Geometry Holdup (GGH) currently estimates U mass within a high uncertainty band (± 50%). This method seeks to improve this uncertainty via quantitative Compton imaging.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Quantification of LEU Holdup using gamma ray imaging and inverse transport solver

Holdup is the residual amount of special nuclear material (SNM) remaining in a processing facility after the bulk materials have been cleaned out. In commercial uranium processing facilities, quantification of holdup is a major challenge because of the highly variable shapes and sizes of the deposits. Any method that attempts to generalize and calibrate deposit shapes in order to quantify holdup will be prone to high uncertainties. Uncertainties on the order of ±50% are typical in holdup results. In international safeguards applications, a ±50% uncertainty can result in a large amount of material unaccounted for (MUF) thereby increasing the difficulty of detecting material diversion and facility misuse. An imaging-based methodology has been developed with the objective of significantly reducing this uncertainty by using the true deposit shape, instead of relying on oversimplified geometric assumptions. The project is a collaboration between ORNL, Y-12, and the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN. Uranium sources of known masses were measured using the Germanium Gamma-ray Imager (GeGI), a high-resolution imaging spectrometer, creating a pixelated map for each spectral bin. Two different gamma imaging methods are employed in this work: coded aperture imaging and Compton imaging. A validated MonteCarlo model of the detector has been developed using the GEANT4 code for determining the intrinsic response of the detector, its enclosure, and the coded aperture mask. An inverse transport solver based on the Markov Chain Monte-Carlo approach known as Differential Evolution Adaptive Metropolis (DREAM) is employed to use the measurement data from the image pixels (coded aperture or Compton) to solve for the mass of 235 U in the deposit. A reliable method based on the DREAM solver has been developed to flag the infinite thickness condition of a uranium deposit. The project team is working towards improving the image reconstruction for Compton imaging so that a better localization of the source can be achieved. Besides treating the coded aperture and Compton imaging methods independently, the project is also evaluating a combined method that uses the Compton scatter data from a coded aperture measurement. GEANT4 simulations are being performed to evaluate the combined approach. The impact on the DREAM optimization as the source thickness progressively approaches infinite thickness is being evaluated. A number of uranium sources available at ORNL have been measured, and the DREAM results have been tested and validated for the coded aperture imaging. A similar effort will be carried out to validate the Compton based method once the development of algorithms for better localization are complete. The imaging based quantification is very amenable to unattended monitoring of holdup accumulation at key measurement points. A proof of concept measurement has been completed to demonstrate this capability The current work used the high energy resolution imager GeGI. However, the approach and methodologies are applicable to other imagers such as the cadmium zin telluride (CZT) based imager manufactured by H3D, Inc.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Improved Angular Uncertainty Estimation for Compton Imagers

Compton imaging is a method for localizing a photon source using Compton scatter events as measured by a position sensitive photon detector. Using the measured interaction positions and energy depositions for a Compton event, a cone can be back projected which represents all possible origin locations for that source photon. Given enough Compton events, the source can be localized via identifying the regions where many of these cones intersect. An illustration of this effect is given in the figure below. The region intersected by the three cones in this case is a likely origin point for the photon source.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Design Investigation of a Scalable Fast Neutron Radiography Panel

Advances in flat-panel radiography device design have increased the use of radiation imaging as a nondestructive evaluation tool. Neutron radiography offers many advantages compared to photon-based radiography.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Emerging Threats and Technology Investigation: Industrial Internet of Things - Risk and Mitigation for Nuclear Infrastructure

Industries supporting the global nuclear infrastructure striving for cost savings, expansions in efficiency, and convenience are likely to adopt components (e.g., hardware, software) that comprise the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These devices offer potential improvements along with security challenges. Modern conveniences achieved through application of technology have propagated through society in the form of interconnected devices, from doorbells to microwave ovens, commonly referred to as IoT. IoT devices are often Internet-connected devices that are designed to send data back to a cloud-based server, where a smart phone application then presents device status and control options. Home-based IoT applications carry a different set of risks when compared to a business or security environment, where there is also a history of convenience and interconnection. Industrial settings have long relied on specifically designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for process control where IIoT devices are intended to inform business decisions and augment traditional processes. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report provides a distinction between process control and IIoT in that traditional process control is not replaced by IIoT, but rather IIoT devices are intended to enhance industrial processes through additional monitoring of various sensors and application of data analytics models using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) (Fagan, Marron, et al. 2021) (Ross, et al. 2021).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Uranium Holdup Monitoring with Compton Imaging as Function of Depth and Mass

Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) programs track masses of materials flowing through production processes, where some material remains in process equipment as holdup. Quantification of these masses using gamma emissions typically involves usage of a well characterized radiation detector and assumptions of geometric configuration to constrain detection efficiencies, where the Generalized Geometry Holdup (GGH) method is often used. Uncertainties on the order of ±50% are observed, where the difficulties arise based on the asymmetric and gradient distributions of material that do not fall within the bounds of GGH. Gamma imagers provide a possible means to improve this geometric knowledge. This work describes the process used in creating a series of mass standards to aid the development of imaging algorithms for quantification.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

URANIUM HOLDUP MONITORING WITH COMPTON IMAGING AS FUNCTION OF DEPTH AND MASS

Mass quantification using standoff gamma detection is a logical progression for MC&A applications in uranium processing facilities. While obtaining a ground truth from physical collection and weighing of masses is ideal and routine, it poses a logistical problem from both a standpoint of ALARA programs as well as interruptions to operations. The standard approach is the Generalized Geometry in Holdup (GGH) method that can apply for many cases where geometries of the holdup match simulated models; however, there are many cases where a model may not exist or a feature of the holdup geometry is such that it does not match a model particularly well.1 Gamma imaging at standoff distances and outside process equipment has potential to address these shortcomings and improve mass estimations while reducing personnel exposure; however, algorithms still require a significant degree of benchmarking to build sufficient confidence in algorithms before displacing GGH in some procedures. This paper presents the creation of a set of laboratory standards of depleted U3O8 in fixed size containers covering a range of masses and effective thicknesses up to the infinite thickness for the 185-keV line. These blocks are identically sized aluminum boxes loaded such that a thin, flat face is placed towards the imager, while the back side contains closed cell foam to apply pressure to keep the powder in a fixed position at the front face as the sources are manipulated for measurements. Included is an analysis of the mass estimation using a commercially available Compton imaging instrument where multiple geometries are created showing limitations in current methodologies.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Gamma ray Imaging Based Methods to Improve the Accuracy of Uranium Holdup Quantification

Deposits in commercial uranium processing facilities of interest to nuclear safeguards are predominantly low enriched uranium (LEU). The shapes and sizes of holdup deposits can vary significantly, thus making it difficult to model the deposits accurately for calibration purposes. This presents a challenge to currently employed methods such as the Generalized Geometry Holdup (GGH) that rely on quantifying 235U mass by simplifying deposit shapes as a point, a line, or an area. In this work, gamma ray imaging using high energy resolution Germanium Gamma Imagers (GeGI™) is employed to determine the distribution of uranium inside the source containment. Two types of imaging methods are employed; coded-aperture imaging and Compton imaging. Gamma-ray emissions seen in different regions of the image are quantified using an inverse gamma-ray transport solver being developed at ORNL. Using measured data, the inverse method will be used to solve for unknown source parameters such as source matrix thickness, density, and attenuation due to container wall and shielding. The intrinsic efficiency of the detector is determined based on a library of built-in response functions and key dimensions of the detector (e.g., thickness and radius of the detector crystal). Measurements are performed in both imaging modalities using uranium sources of well-known masses and enrichments configured inside mocked-up holdup fixtures. Results from the two imaging modalities are intercompared. The paper presents preliminary results of the imaging measurements and the progress made in the computational methods to quantify uranium mass.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

First evaluation of fast neutron imaging with LiInSe 2 semiconductors

Fast neutron imaging is a powerful tool to investigate elemental/isotopic compositions of objects, supporting both scientific studies as well as cargo scanning. Current neutron imaging systems are faced with challenges associated with timing, detection efficiency, and/or spatial resolution. Here, we report on the use of a semiconducting lithium indium diselenide neutron sensor coupled to a Timepix ASIC for fast neutron imaging. Using a 15 cm thick copper knife edge, the spatial resolution of the neutron imager was found to be 1.55 mm for 9 MeV neutrons. In conclusion, the experimental detection efficiency at 9 MeV was in general agreement with calculations.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Uncertainty identification in mass estimation applications with imaging detectors

Mass quantification using standoff gamma imaging techniques is a boon to the special nuclear material holdup monitoring community, but before the method is deemed acceptable as a replacement for historical gamma detection-based methods, there are several considerable sources of uncertainty that must be addressed. These uncertainty sources have received sparse coverage in the literature, but provide the bulk of the uncertainty estimated in practice outside of standard counting statistics. For imaging, there is a fundamental difference between detection/localization and mass estimation operating modalities, where detection/localization can tolerate significantly larger uncertainty because the goal is detection of a distant source, rather than the quantification of that source. Historically, quantification requires a known geometry between source and detector, as well as a calibrated efficiency correction curve, which is well suited to laboratory practice for a stationary detector; however, this requires some corrections and assumptions (e.g., generalized geometry) for field applications, since additional degrees of freedom are present in the source-to-detector position, intervening materials, and non-uniform source distributions, when compared against the laboratory case. Use of an imaging detector during holdup measurements would address these issues by calculating the spatial geometry of the distant source as seen by the detector, with efficiency corrected according to the source-to-detector angle. While this aim promises a better estimation accuracy than generalized geometry assumptions, additional uncertainties are added from the imaging mechanism itself. Of these uncertainties, some are readily mitigated and methods to do so are included in the discussion, while some uncertainties are specific to the imaging class of instruments and are investigated and discussed in detail. Uncertainties are categorized into two general areas: instrument design and algorithmic. Instrument design-based uncertainties include basic detector characteristics for timing and energy resolution, handling of list mode data for coincidence detection, and geometric layout of and propagation of spatial uncertainty into imaging uncertainty. Algorithmic-based uncertainties discussed herein pertain to image reconstruction, the weight assignment problem from cone interactions, and the effects of spatial discretization on mass estimation. With these major sources of uncertainty identified, the path towards acceptance of imaging as a holdup monitoring method becomes clearer.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Designing Hands-on Exercises for the Nuclear Detection and Sensor Test Center [Poster]

The Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center (NDSTC) provides a test bed for researchers to test both their instrumentation systems and analytical techniques using nuclear material from Y-12. Students and professionals from outside of Y-12 visit Site 2 of the NDSTC as a part of Nonproliferation Workshops and other Y-12-hosted events. Site 2 of the NDSTC holds Category IV quantities of uranium-bearing materials and radiological sources. The goal of this project is to design engaging, hands-on activities which will be implemented during these visits in order to give the participants a more informative experience in nuclear detection.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗