FORMAL APPROACH TO USE THE SECURITY MODELS FOR DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF THE NPP I&C SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.
Abstract not provided.
Promyslov, Vitaly↗
Engineering topics
Quinn, Edward L.
Publications and source records attributed to Quinn, Edward L..
Development of a utility computer-based training program on setpoint methodology for nuclear power plants - 129
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the development of the Computer- Based Training (CBT) Program for utility engineers on Setpoint Methodology for nuclear power plants. This computer based training module was prepared by the Advanced Engineering Training initiative. The Advanced Engineering Training initiative is a nuclear industry effort to develop technical computer-based training modules for targeted areas of engineering expertise. The target audience is engineers at commercial nuclear power facilities in the U. S. These modules are being developed using the systematic approach to training and are being designed to maintain industry engineering expertise and to facilitate engineering knowledge transfer. The objective of this training effort is to support the development of the next generation of site technical experts for specific topic areas. The training is one part of three key components that would facilitate knowledge transfer to the future site Subject Matter Expert (SME). The following are the major focus areas covered in the Setpoint Methodology CBT: Chapter 1 provides an overview of the role instrument setpoints perform in the defense-in-depth safety analysis for the plant as well introducing key definitions related to setpoints. Chapter 2 provides the history and current regulatory requirements related to setpoint control including the laws and guidance provided by the U.S. NRC. Chapter 3 provides describes the setpoint methodology including terms, formulae, methods of combination, graded approach and methods for drift analysis. This is a major part of the training module in covering the incremental uncertainty terms that need to be considered and how they are combined. Chapter 4 provides and overview of the role of setpoints in Technical Specifications and associated documents. Chapter 5 describes how the regulatory process, related to setpoint control, has been implemented in NRC inspections and how the major elements of the 10 CFR 50.59 reviews apply to the performance of a new or revised setpoint calculation. (authors)
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Development of a new IEC Standard on cybersecurity controls for I and C in Nuclear Power Plants - IEC 63096 - 158
Standards are promoting the enhancement of cybersecurity in Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). Standardizing processes and procedures are also crucial to achieve successful international collaboration. Many information security standards were developed in recent years; however, not many of them could be directly applied to NPPs. This paper provides an overview of the development of a new cybersecurity standard dealing with cybersecurity controls for nuclear power plants around the world. For I and C systems in NPPs, the new IEC 63096 standard targeted for issue in 2019, focuses specifically on the selection and application of cybersecurity controls from the included security controls catalogue. The role of selected and applied cybersecurity controls is to prevent, detect and react to digital attacks against computer-based I and C systems. This standard applies to the I and C of new nuclear power plants and to the I and C modernization in existing plants. It is being prepared and based on IEC 62645 , ISO/IEC 27000 series , IAEA , and country specific guidance in this expanding the technical and the security focus area. The Standard is intended to be used by designers and operators of NPPs (utilities), systems evaluators, vendors and subcontractors, and by licensors. While the development of international standards is essential it is also a lengthy process, taking multiple years. Especially with regard to cybersecurity, all involved stakeholders have to collaborate. (authors)
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
IEC 62859: A new international standard on the coordination between safety and cybersecurity for nuclear I and C systems - 160
Cybersecurity requirements and controls for digital I and C systems are increasingly added to well-established safety-oriented provisions. Interactions and potential side-effects are possible and must be mastered, taking into account the nuclear I and C system specificities as well as their normative and regulatory contexts. The new international standard IEC 62859 'Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control systems - Requirements for coordinating safety and cyber security' aims to optimize the integration of cybersecurity provisions in nuclear I and C architecture and systems, to prevent conflicts between safety and cybersecurity provisions, and to aid the identification and the leveraging of the potential synergies between safety and cybersecurity. The paper presents the structure and the key aspects of this standard. IEC 62859 is structured along three main sections: one dealing with the overall I and C architecture, a second one focusing on the system level, a third one dealing with organizational and procedural issues. The paper also discusses related work in the nuclear industry, and in other sectors. (authors)
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
A new international standard on cybersecurity for nuclear power plants: IEC 62645 - cybersecurity requirements - 161
This paper provides an overview of the IEC 62645, an actual standard by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) focused on the issue of requirements for computer security programmes and system development processes to prevent and/or minimize the impact of cyber attacks against computer-based I and C systems. Developed since 2009 and published end of 2014, the standard is intended to be used for changing or establishing new security programmes for I and C systems of operating and new Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). This paper also presents the key issues being considered in the new revision to IEC 62645, currently in process. (authors)
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Enhanced electrical penetration components meet the high safety standards required for China's HTR-PM Shidaowan and generation mPower small modular reactors - 300
Enhanced glass-to-metal feedthroughs will be used to carry key instrumentation and control (I and C) signals in China's high-temperature, gas-cooled pebble-bed modular reactor (HTR-PM) at Shidaowan, and in Small Modular Reactor (SMR) prototyping. Chinergy Co., Ltd and Jiamusi Electric Machine Co., Ltd will use the feedthroughs, also called electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs), at the Shidaowan twin-reactor high temperature reactor (HTR). These feedthroughs are manufactured using specialized processes that make them far more robust than counterparts made with organic or ceramic materials. Improved EPAs manufactured by SCHOTT are the only feedthrough solution that can be used in the primary loop of an HTR because organic seals cannot withstand the high temperatures and pressures of this environment. Glass-to-metal seals (GTMS) are made using inorganic, non-aging materials which enable a virtually unlimited lifespan in high-temperature, high-radiation and high-pressure applications. This I and C technology package is being enhanced by the development and testing of new mineral-insulated (MI) cable connectors and EPAs made of crystallized glass-ceramic combined with superalloys. The EPAs have a maintenance-free lifespan of over 60 years, preventing any outage time related to these components and subsequently reducing costs associated with shutdowns. They are far more robust than organic seals and provide increased safety at a lower lifetime cost. Resistance against high pressure and high temperature are especially ideal qualities that make EPAs a valuable choice for environments with high standards for fire protection, such as nuclear plants, subsea oil drilling, or any other underwater application. Due to their significant offering of safety-relevant qualities, the EPAs have also been chosen by BWXT for implementation in its mPower SMR. Small modular reactor requirements are complex and very challenging but are met by the new EPA components, which will help form a strong I and C safety chain. Unlike ordinary compression glass-to-metal seals, GTMS with crystallized glass-ceramic have the ability to withstand temperatures of over 350 deg. C / 662 deg. F and operating pressures of 3500 bar. Furthermore, their lifetime is qualified for up to 60 years, including pressure and radiation requirements in accordance with the latest IEC/IEEE standards. Higher-specification EPAs and MI cable connectors have been designed into severe accident I and C instruments, including advanced hydrogen and oxygen sensors that exceed the challenging requirements of both HTR and SMR applications. (authors)
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
Nuclear power plant risk-informed surveillance frequency control program implementation at the Duke Catawba nuclear plant with a focus on instrumentation and control systems - 333
This paper summarizes an updated process for risk-informed surveillance frequency control program (SFCP) implementation at the Catawba Nuclear Power Plant in the past year. This program includes selection and prioritization of specific target surveillance test interval extensions; and development, review, and implementation of surveillance test risk informed documented evaluation (STRIDE) packages designed to support extension of conventional surveillance requirement test intervals, in accordance with 'Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 5b, Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies, Industry Guideline,' NEI 04-10, Revision 1 . The scope of work associated with STRIDE development includes probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) case studies, deterministic assessment (DA) evaluations, and, where required, instrument drift evaluation (IDE). The STRIDE implementation efforts have also included support of independent decision-making panel (IDP) meetings at the implementing power stations and IDP member training. The purpose of this paper is to provide a presentation of a refined process for STRIDE development with a focus on instrumentation and control systems based on author experience, which includes support for the development of multiple STRIDE packages for the Catawba Nuclear Plant. This paper outlines a framework for practical implementation of an SFCP within the context of an integrated risk-informed performance-based regulation application program with emphasis on instrumentation and control systems. (authors)
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
Development of a diversity and defense-in-depth strategy for the CNNC Fuqing, Fangjiashan and Hainan nuclear plants - 379
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the development of the Diversity and Defense-in- Depth (D3) strategy for the China National Nuclear Corporation Fuqing, Fangjiashan, and Hainan Nuclear Plants. The Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Digital Control System (DCS) and advanced control room was completed by Invensys and China Nuclear Power Engineering (CNPE)/Nuclear Power Institute of China (NPIC) for these eight new Chinese built Pressurized Water Reactor plants. (authors)
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
Development of a diversity and defense-in-depth strategy for the TerraPower TWR-P Advanced nuclear power plant - 380
A Diversity and Defense in Depth (D3) analysis was performed for the Traveling Wave Reactor, which is a Generation IV fast reactor design. The analysis demonstrated that the current I and C design for TWR-P provides sufficient diversity in the reactor shutdown system, the engineered safety features, and the post-accident monitoring system. In addition, an analysis was performed for the Embedded Digital Devices (EDD) to ensure a postulated Software Common Cause Failure (SWCCF) will not affect the safety functions of the TWR-P I and C system. (authors)
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
Digital Sensor Technology
The nuclear industry has been slow to incorporate digital sensor technology into nuclear plant designs due to concerns with digital qualification issues. However, the benefits of digital sensor technology for nuclear plant instrumentation are substantial in terms of accuracy and reliability. This paper, which refers to a final report issued in 2013, demonstrates these benefits in direct comparisons of digital and analog sensor applications. Improved accuracy results from the superior operating characteristics of digital sensors. These include improvements in sensor accuracy and drift and other related parameters which reduce total loop uncertainty and thereby increase safety and operating margins. An example instrument loop uncertainty calculation for a pressure sensor application is presented to illustrate these improvements. This is a side-by-side comparison of the instrument loop uncertainty for both an analog and a digital sensor in the same pressure measurement application. Similarly, improved sensor reliability is illustrated with a sample calculation for determining the probability of failure on demand, an industry standard reliability measure. This looks at equivalent analog and digital temperature sensors to draw the comparison. The results confirm substantial reliability improvement with the digital sensor, due in large part to ability to continuously monitor the health of a digital sensor such that problems can be immediately identified and corrected. This greatly reduces the likelihood of a latent failure condition of the sensor at the time of a design basis event. Notwithstanding the benefits of digital sensors, there are certain qualification issues that are inherent with digital technology and these are described in the report. One major qualification impediment for digital sensor implementation is software common cause failure (SCCF).
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗