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Reid, Bruce D.

Publications and source records attributed to Reid, Bruce D..

Nuclear reactor irradiation systems and methods

A reactor irradiation method is provided that can include irradiating Np or Am spheres within a target assembly of a nuclear reactor to form reacted spheres comprising Pu. The target assembly can define a solid core within an exterior housing, and a void between the exterior housing and the solid core, wherein the spheres occupy at least a portion of the void. The irradiating can include exposing the spheres to a neutron energy spectrum while the spheres are in the void of the target assembly to form irradiated spheres.

Katalenich, Jeffrey A.↗

Nuclear reactor assemblies, nuclear reactor target assemblies, and nuclear reactor methods

Reactor target assemblies are provided that can include a housing defining a perimeter of at least one volume and Np or Am spheres within the one volume. Reactor assemblies are provided that can include a reactor vessel and a bundle of target assemblies within the reactor vessel, at least one of the target assemblies comprising a housing defining a volume with Np or Am spheres being within the volume. Irradiation methods are also provided that can include irradiating Np or Am spheres within a nuclear reactor, then removing the irradiated spheres from the reactor and treating the irradiated spheres.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Hafnium Isotope Ratio Method for Enhanced Safeguards at Research Reactors

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing a Hafnium (Hf)-based, enhanced safeguards measure for the verification of energy production in a research reactor. Historically, verification of nuclear reactor use has been based on extracting and measuring physical samples from non-fuel components of the reactor. The Hafnium Isotope Ratio Method for Enhanced Safeguards (HIRMES) provides a means of verifying reactor operation based upon measuring the changes in isotopic ratios in purpose-built coupons. The first activity is installing a purpose-built, integrated sample collection coupon containing hafnium which undergoes isotopic changes when irradiated in the reactor. The second activity is analysis of the isotopic changes of the irradiated coupon after removal of the coupon using the isotope ratio method (IRM). The energy, or plutonium production, in a fission reactor can be estimated using IRM by measuring and correlating stable isotope ratios in non-fuel reactor components using standard reactor modelling methods. This paper presents HIRMES, a technology intended to provide an inexpensive, accurate, and robust measurement capability for validating operator declarations at low-power research reactors. Deploying HIRMES in research reactors would provide the IAEA with an in-core reactor “odometer” on total energy production with higher accuracy than other methods. HIRMES could be integrated in new fuel or reactor core designs as part of a protocol that is simple to implement and minimizes effort required of the operator or inspector. This paper also discusses early demonstrations at U.S. research reactors to-date, which demonstrate HIRMES as a practical tool for independent verification of low-power research reactor utilization. Specifically, the measurement uncertainty during an irradiation campaign of 39766 MWh was 22 MWh, representing two hours at a 10 MW reactor for a total irradiation campaign over the course of approximately six months.

research reactor safeguards, isotope ratio method↗

Estimation of Plutonium-240 Mass in Waste Tanks Using Ultra-Sensitive Detection of Radioactive Xenon Isotopes from Spontaneous Fission

This report details efforts to develop a technique which is able to detect and quantify the mass of 240 Pu in waste storage tanks and other enclosed spaces. If the isotopic ratios of the plutonium contained in the enclosed space is also known, then this technique is capable of estimating the total mass of the plutonium without physical sample retrieval and radiochemical analysis of hazardous material. Results utilizing this technique are reported for a Hanford Site waste tank (TX-118) and a well-characterized plutonium sample in a laboratory environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To broaden the IAEA safeguards toolbox, the study recommends that the Agency consider closing potential gaps in safeguards coverage by, among other things: 1) adapting its safeguards measures based on a case-by-case assessment; 2) using more frequent and expanded/enhanced mailbox declarations (ideally with remote transmission of the data to IAEA Headquarters in Vienna) coupled with short-notice or unannounced inspections; 3) putting more emphasis on the collection and analysis of environmental samples at hot cells and waste storage tanks; 4) taking Safeguards by Design into account for the construction of new research reactors and best practices for existing research reactors; 5) utilizing fully all legal authorities to enhance inspection access (including a strengthened and continuing DIV process); and 6) utilizing new approaches to improve auditing activities, verify reactor operating data history, and track/monitor the movement and storage of spent fuel.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Isotope Ratio Method Analysis of the WWR-SM Reactor

In this paper, we use the Isotope Ratio Method (IRM) to estimate the total energy production of the Uzbekistan Institute of Nuclear Physics WWR-SM research reactor. The isotope ratio method is a technique for verifying the operational history of a nuclear reactor by measuring trace element isotope ratios in non-fuel reactor components. The isotope ratios in these components can then be directly related to cumulative energy production with standard reactor modeling methods. This method has been successfully demonstrated on several shutdown reactors in the past. The WWR-SM is a 10MW pool reactor that has been operating since 1959. In 2013, a Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) team successfully removed a surface sample from the aluminum core shroud during a refueling outage. The sample was subjected to Secondary Ionization Mass Spectrometry (SIMS) analysis at PNNL in 2014. Our results show good agreement with the actual operating history of the reactor.

Nuclear archeology, isotope ratio method, nonproli↗

Estimation of 240 Pu Mass in a Waste Tank Using Ultra-Sensitive Detection of Radioactive Xenon Isotopes from Spontaneous Fission

We report on a technique to detect and quantify the amount of 240 Pu in a large tank used to store nuclear waste from plutonium production at the Hanford nuclear site. While the contents of this waste tank are known from previous grab sample measurements, our technique could allow for determination of the amount of 240 Pu in the tank without costly sample retrieval and analysis of this highly radioactive material. This technique makes an assumption, which was confirmed, that 240 Pu dominates the spontaneous fissions occurring in the tank.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Future of Nuclear Archaeology: Reducing Legacy Risks of Weapons Fissile Material

This report describes the value proposition for a "nuclear archeological" technical capability and applications program, targeted at resolving uncertainties regarding fissile materials production and use. At its heart, this proposition is that we can never be sure that all fissile material is adequately secure without a clear idea of what "all" means, and that uncertainty in this matter carries risk. We argue that this proposition is as valid today, under emerging state and possible non-state nuclear threats, as it was in an immediate post-Cold-War context, and describe how nuclear archeological methods can be used to verify fissile materials declarations, or estimate and characterize historical fissile materials production independently of declarations.

Fissile material, plutonium, Highly Enriched Urani↗

Uranium Oxide Aerosol Transport in Porous Graphite

The objective of this paper is to investigate the transport of uranium oxide particles that may be present in carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) gas coolant, into the graphite blocks of gas-cooled, graphite moderated reactors. The transport of uranium oxide in the coolant system, and subsequent deposition of this material in the graphite, of such reactors is of interest because it has the potential to influence the application of the Graphite Isotope Ratio Method (GIRM). The GIRM is a technology that has been developed to validate the declared operation of graphite moderated reactors. GIRM exploits isotopic ratio changes that occur in the impurity elements present in the graphite to infer cumulative exposure and hence the reactor’s lifetime cumulative plutonium production. Reference Gesh, et. al., for a more complete discussion on the GIRM technology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Trawsfynydd Plutonium Estimate

Report serves to document an estimate of the cumulative plutonium production of the Trawsfynydd Unit II reactor (Traws II) over its operating life made using the Graphite Isotope Ratio Method (GIRM). The estimate of the plutonium production in Traws II provided in this report has been generated under blind conditions. In other words, the estimate ofthe Traws II plutonium production has been generated without the knowledge of the plutonium production declared by the reactor operator (Nuclear Electric). The objective of this report is to demonstrate that the GIRM can be employed to serve as an accurate tool to verify weapons materials production declarations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗