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Rios, Daniel

Publications and source records attributed to Rios, Daniel.

At least 19 records

Overview of SAVY-4000 Lifetime Extension Activities in Fiscal Year 2024

This report provides an overview of activities engaged in during the 2024 fiscal year in support of the SAVY-4000 (hereafter “SAVY”) lifetime extension. As the final full year prior to the submittal of the technical basis, efforts were made to assess the current understanding regarding SAVY degradation in service as well as any knowledge that provided a more substantive view of the challenges that SAVYs face in storage. Close coordination with the stakeholders (i.e. LANL program office) ensured alignment with expectations regarding timelines for the remainder of the activities supporting the technical basis document for the lifetime extension request.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

3013 Fire Test 2020: Post-Test Measurements and Analysis

Sandia National Laboratory conducted fire tests on ten 3013 containers with varying amounts of water. The containers with attached manifolds were sent to Los Alamos National Laboratory for post-test measurements of the plastic deformation, the amount of water remaining on the material post-test and the mass loss. The measurements of the plastic deformation were used to determine the free gas volume in each container and manifold post-test. The disassembly of each container was documented by photographs. The amount of pre-test gas constituents is also reported using data in the Sandia Final Report.

3013 fire test↗

The 65 Elevated Risk Container Status Relative Humidity Measurements RFID RH/T Sensors in Containers [Slides]

In March of 2023, a memo was issued, drafted by the Container Management, Safety, and Engineering Team, identifying 65 elevated risk legacy containers for priority disposition at TA-55. These 65 were identified separately from the “typical” prioritization decision-making method used at TA-55 to disposition legacy items. This new technique gave important feedback and revealed improvement opportunities for the selection process of legacy containers for disposition. The DOE complex and TA-55 have a long history of nuclear operations and therefore the disposition of these legacy materials is vital.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Comparing elemental measurements at packaging and after storage for signatures of chloride salt radiolysis

Radiolysis of hydrated alkaline earth chloride salts by alpha radiation from plutonium produces the chloride containing gases HCl and Cl 2 . These gases are known to diffuse out of the plutonium-containing material and contribute to corrosion outside of the convenience container. The alkaline earth elements remain with the plutonium-containing material as oxides or hydroxides. The amount of chlorine within the material after storage will be reduced compared to the amount at packaging. The fraction of the alkaline earth elements that are soluble after storage will be reduced compared to the amount at packaging. These signatures may be observable by comparing the chemical analysis measurements made at packaging and after storage. Comparison of measurements on a single Hanford container shows that the chloride does decrease and the alkaline earth elements have reduced solubility in water. Differences seen with other elements make conclusions difficult.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Hydrogenous Content in Residues from Aqueous Chloride Pu and Am Recovery Operations

Byproduct residues generated from Aqueous Chloride Pu and Am recovery operations at Los Alamos National Laboratory have been investigated and determined to contain high weight % chloride salts and minimal hydrogen content. Hydrogen content is the result of limited surface area adsorption of ambient moisture. The assumption used in technical analysis NCS-TECH-19-029 to model potentially hydrogenous items as mixtures of polyethylene is shown to be overly conservative. Our results and literature precedent indicate that water adsorption of 1-3 % by weight is expected for hydroxide cakes and Pu oxides, and a conservative bounding assumption for these materials is 5% water by weight. LOH results for a dissolution heel stored long term showed 6.25% weight loss, which was conservatively assumed to be water. A conservative bounding assumption for dissolution heels is 8 wt.% water content. This equates to 0.55 % hydrogen by weight for hydroxide cakes, and 0.88% hydrogen by weight for dissolution heels. The bulk composition of dissolution heels reflects the composition of the original byproduct feed material, chloride salts of potassium, sodium, magnesium and calcium. The bulk composition of calcined hydroxide precipitation residues is composed of potassium chloride as a result of potassium hydroxide neutralization of hydrochloric acid solutions. Metal hydroxides generated during the hydroxide precipitation process are decomposed under the conditions of calcination to metal oxide forms.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Focused Ion Beam analysis of non radioactive samples [PowerPoint]

The presentation includes various images to illustrate the analysis. Helios G4 Plasma FIB: Xe ion columns mills material 30 times faster than Ga; Options include: Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy (EDS), Wavelength Dispersive spectroscopy (WDS) Electron backscattered Diffraction (EBSD), Time of Flight Sims (ToF SIMS), Inert gas/vacuum sample transfer system; Excels at micromachining and collecting 3D datasets using various detection systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗

An Investigation of Critical Pit Size in Savy 4000 Wall

The Department of Energy (DOE) issued DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual, in March 2008 to protect workers who handle nuclear material from exposure due to loss of containment of stored materials. The Manual specifies a detailed approach to achieve high confidence in containers and includes requirements for container design and performance, design-life determinations, material contents, and surveillance and maintenance to ensure container integrity over time.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

SAVY-4000 Corrosion Evaluation Plan

Nuclear material packages, with few exceptions, outside of an approved engineered contamination barrier must meet packaging, surveillance, and testing requirements designed to protect workers from airborne contamination per Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging. The SAVY-4000 containers were developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in conjunction with Nuclear Filter Technology Inc. (NFT Inc.) as a general purpose vented manually-compliant container system for staging and storage of plutonium for LANL and the DOE complex. The SAVY-4000 containers have a 316L stainless steel containment barrier, which was selected based on its corrosion resistant properties. These containers were approved for use in 2014 with a five-year design life; LANL requested and DOE has approved lifetime extension from 5 to 15 years. The 10-year lifetime extension was proposed as a conservative recommendation based on the corrosion observations for the metal components in surveillance and results from laboratory studies. Extensive accelerated aging studies have been done on the SAVY-4000 O-ring with very little evidence of significant degradation when subjected to aggressive elevated temperature and radiation conditions. Therefore, our current conservative lifetime estimate for the O-ring and the filter is 40 years at 80°C. Additional work is ongoing in a phased approach to further extend the design life of the Manual compliant SAVY-4000 storage container; the limiting component for further life extension is still the 316L containment barrier.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Evaluating Corrosion Effects on the Stainless Steel Components of the SAVY-4000/Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers: FY19 Update

This report provides an update of the FY19 corrosion observations, laboratory studies, and mitigation efforts for the nuclear material storage program at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Nuclear material packages outside of an approved engineered contamination barrier must meet packaging, surveillance, and testing requirements designed to protect workers from airborne contamination per Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging.1 The SAVY-4000 containers were developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in conjunction with Nuclear Filter Technology as a manually-compliant container system for staging and storage of plutonium for LANL and the DOE complex.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A computational framework for quantifying and analyzing system flexibility

We present a computational framework for analyzing and quantifying system flexibility. Our framework incorporates new features that include: general uncertainty characterizations that are constructed using composition of sets, procedures for computing well-centered nominal points, and a procedure for identifying and ranking flexibility-limiting constraints and critical parameter values. These capabilities allow us to analyze the flexibility of complex systems such as distribution networks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Evaluating Corrosion Effects on the Stainless Steel Components of the SAVY-4000/Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers

Surveillance of vented, stainless-steel Hagan and SAVY-4000 storage containers with some plutonium materials has revealed evidence of corrosion inside the container. There are ~3000 items stored in Hagan containers and ~600 items currently stored in SAVY-4000 containers at TA -55. The Hagan is made of 304L steel, while the SAVY-4000 is made of 316L and should be less susceptible to corrosion. Given the relatively thin body wall of these containers (nominally 0.762 millimeters), it is essential to understand the effects of corrosion on the lifetime of the containers to ensure worker safety. Studies are being conducted on both container types to determine the relative susceptibility of the two containers to corrosion. This paper describes the potential cause of corrosion, the extent of corrosion, and types of corrosion observed, along with the results of accelerated aging experiments. The combined results of the surveillance and lifetime extension studies establish a technical basis for extending the design life of the stainless steel components of the SAVY-4000 container from 5 years to 15 years.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Surveillance and Monitoring Program Full-Scale Experiments to Evaluate the Potential for Corrosion in 3013 Containers

A set of six long-term, full-scale experiments were initiated to determine the type and extent of corrosion that occurs in 3013 containers packaged with chloride-bearing plutonium oxide materials. The materials were exposed to a high relative humidity environment representative of actual packaging conditions for the materials in storage. The materials were sealed in instrumented, inner 3013 containers with corrosion specimens designed to test the corrosiveness of the environment inside the containers under various conditions. This report focuses on initial loading conditions that are used to establish a baseline to show how the conditions change throughout the storage lifetime of the containers.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

M441.1-1 Site Update

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

Stone, Timothy Amos↗

Residual Stresses and Other Properties of Teardrops

The Department of Energy’s 3013 Standard for packaging plutonium-bearing materials for storage up to fifty years specifies a minimum of two individually welded, nested containers herein referred to as the 3013 outer and the 3013 inner.1 Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is a potential failure mechanism for 3013 inner containers.2,3 The bagless transfer container (BTC), a 3013 inner container used by Hanford and Savanna River Site (SRS) made from 304L stainless steel (SS), poses the greatest concern for SCC.4,5 The Surveillance and Monitoring Program (SMP) use stressed metal samples known as teardrops as screening tools in SCC studies to evaluate factors that could result in cracks in the 3013 containers.6,7 This report provides background information on the teardrops used in the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SMP studies including method of construction, composition and variability. In addition, the report discusses measurements of residual stresses in teardrops and compares the results with residual stresses in BTCs reported previously.4 Factors affecting residual stresses, including teardrop dimensions and surface finish, are also discussed.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

The application of visible absorption spectroscopy to the analysis of uranium in aqueous solutions

Through assay analysis into an excess of 1 M H 2 SO 4 at fixed temperature a technique has been developed for uranium concentration analysis by visible absorption spectroscopy over an assay concentration range of 1.8 – 13.4 mgU/g. Once implemented for a particular spectrophotometer and set of spectroscopic cells this technique promises to provide more rapid results than a classical method such as Davies-Gray (DG) titration analysis. While not as accurate and precise as the DG method, a comparative analysis study reveals that the spectroscopic method can analyze for uranium in well characterized uranyl(VI) solution samples to within 0.3% of the DG results. For unknown uranium solutions in which sample purity is less well defined agreement between the developed spectroscopic method and DG analysis is within 0.5%. The technique can also be used to detect the presence of impurities that impact the colorimetric analysis, as confirmed through the analysis of ruthenium contamination. Finally, extending the technique to other assay solution, 1 M HNO 3 , HCl and Na 2 CO 3 , has also been shown to be viable. As a result, of the four aqueous media the carbonate solution yields the largest molar absorptivity value at the most intensely absorbing band, with the least impact of temperature.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗