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Robb, K.

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U.S. Efforts in Support of Examinations at Fukushima Daiichi- November 2020 Meeting Notes with Updated Information Requests

Much is still not known about the end-state of core materials in each unit that was operating on March 11, 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Daiichi). Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This information also has important implications for the safety and operation of U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. This document summarizes results from the Fiscal Year 2021 (FY2021) U.S. effort to review Daiichi information and extract insights to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This U.S. effort, which was initiated in 2014 by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), is completed by a group of experts in reactor safety and plant operations that identify examination needs and evaluate recent Daiichi examination data to address these needs. Since its inception, annual reports were issued that document significant safety insights being obtained in areas of special emphasis: system and component performance, radionuclide surveys and sampling, debris end-state location, combustible gas effects, and plant operations and maintenance. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights have and continue to be used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations that inform future D&D activities. A key aspect of prior U.S. efforts, the updated list of information requests, is included in this FY2021 report to ensure that they are transmitted to organizations within Japan. This report also continues to emphasize how information obtained from the affected reactors at Daiichi has been and will continue to be used to update severe accident management strategies and reduce uncertainties in systems analysis code models. In addition, recommendations are included that would expand the use of this information to provide insights regarding maintenance, radiation protection, design, and siting activities for existing and new reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

U.S. Efforts in Support of Examinations at Fukushima Daiichi: 2019 Evaluations

Much is still not known about the end-state of core materials in each unit that was operating on March 11, 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Daiichi). Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This document, which has been updated to include Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019) information, summarizes results from a U.S. effort to review Daiichi information and extract insights to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This U.S. effort, which was initiated in 2014 by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), is completed by a group of experts in reactor safety and plant operations that identify examination needs and evaluate recent Daiichi examination data to address these needs. Each year, annual reports are issued that document significant safety insights being obtained in areas of special emphasis. For FY2019, the areas emphasized by the expert panel include component performance, radionuclide surveys and sampling, debris end-state location, combustible gas effects, and plant operations and maintenance. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights have and continue to be used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations that inform future D&D activities. In addition, the process established by this U.S. effort provides an example that Japan may wish to implement in future international efforts to support D&D. As emphasized in this FY2019 report, important insights are being gained from examinations of the affected units at Daiichi. Although many results from prior years have been moved to appendices, key areas of interest are highlighted in the main document. For example, larger intact components and fuel containing materials observed on the floor of the primary containment and retained on ex-vessel structures continue to be emphasized because of insights that may be gained with respect to vessel failure and ex-vessel interactions with structures and concrete. In addition, the main report presents insights gained by focused evaluations of plant data because of potential use of systems and components during severe accident conditions and alternate perspectives regarding accident progression that may be inferred from such data. The report also illustrates how systems analysis codes can be applied to reduce uncertainties about the progression of events at Daiichi and how practical insights obtained from Daiichi can be used to enhance radiation safety for the existing fleet. Recent and planned updates to systems analysis codes are also discussed. As in prior years, this report contains an appendix with a list of examination needs that was updated after U.S. experts reviewed recently obtained information from Daiichi. Additional details for higher priority, near-term, examination activities are also provided. This report also includes an appendix with a description of a website that was developed to assist U.S. experts by providing information in an archived retrievable location.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

US Efforts in Support of Examinations at Fukushima Daiichi – 2016 Evaluations

Although it is clear that the accident signatures from each unit at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) [Daiichi] differ, much is not known about the end-state of core materials within these units. Some of this uncertainty can be attributed to a lack of information related to cooling system operation and cooling water injection. There is also uncertainty in our understanding of phenomena affecting: a) in-vessel core damage progression during severe accidents in boiling water reactors (BWRs), and b) accident progression after vessel failure (ex-vessel progression) for BWRs and Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). These uncertainties arise due to limited full scale prototypic data. Similar to what occurred after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, these Daiichi units offer the international community a means to reduce such uncertainties by obtaining prototypic data from multiple full-scale BWR severe accidents. Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings (TEPCO) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This document reports recent results from the US Forensics Effort to use information obtained by TEPCO to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This Forensics Effort, which is sponsored by the Reactor Safety Technologies Pathway of the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Light Water Reactor (LWR) Sustainability Program, consists of a group of US experts in LWR safety and plant operations that have identified examination needs and are evaluating TEPCO information from Daiichi that address these needs. Examples presented in this report demonstrate that significant safety insights are being obtained in the areas of component performance, fission product release and transport, debris end-state location, and combustible gas generation and transport. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights are being used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Furthermore, reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi will improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations and inform future D&D activities by improving the capability for characterizing potential hazards to workers involved with cleanup activities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Reactor Safety Technologies Pathway Technical Program Plan

In the aftermath of the March 2011 multi-unit accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (Fukushima), the nuclear community has been reassessing certain safety assumptions about nuclear reactor plant design, operations and emergency actions, particularly with respect to extreme events that might occur and that are beyond each plant’s current design basis. Because of our significant domestic investment in nuclear reactor technology (99 operating reactors in the fleet of commercial LWRs with five under construction), the United States has been a major leader internationally in these activities. The U.S. nuclear industry is voluntarily pursuing a number of additional safety initiatives. The NRC continues to evaluate and, where deemed appropriate, establish new requirements for ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety in the occurrence of low probability events at nuclear plants; (e.g., mitigation strategies for beyond design basis events initiated by external events like seismic or flooding initiators). The DOE has also played a major role in the U.S. response to the Fukushima accident. Initially, DOE worked with the Japanese and the international community to help develop a more complete understanding of the Fukushima accident progression and its consequences, and to respond to various safety concerns emerging from uncertainties about the nature of and the effects from the accident. DOE R&D activities are focused on providing scientific and technical insights, data, analyses methods that ultimately support industry efforts to enhance safety. These activities are expected to further enhance the safety performance of currently operating U.S. nuclear power plants as well as better characterize the safety performance of future U.S. plants. In pursuing this area of R&D, DOE recognizes that the commercial nuclear industry is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of licensed nuclear facilities. As such, industry is considered the primary “end user” of the results from this DOE-sponsored work. The response to the Fukushima accident has been global, and there is a continuing multinational interest in collaborations to better quantify accident consequences and to incorporate lessons learned from the accident. DOE will continue to seek opportunities to facilitate collaborations that are of value to the U.S. industry, particularly where the collaboration provides access to vital data from the accident or otherwise supports or leverages other important R&D work. The purpose of the Reactor Safety Technology R&D is to improve understanding of beyond design basis events and reduce uncertainty in severe accident progression, phenomenology, and outcomes using existing analytical codes and information gleaned from severe accidents, in particular the Fukushima Daiichi events. This information will be used to aid in developing mitigating strategies and improving severe accident management guidelines for the current light water reactor fleet.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Reactor Safety Gap Evaluation of Accident Tolerant Components and Severe Accident Analysis

The overall objective of this study was to conduct a technology gap evaluation on accident tolerant components and severe accident analysis methodologies with the goal of identifying any data and/or knowledge gaps that may exist, given the current state of light water reactor (LWR) severe accident research, and additionally augmented by insights obtained from the Fukushima accident. The ultimate benefit of this activity is that the results can be used to refine the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Reactor Safety Technology (RST) research and development (R&D) program plan to address key knowledge gaps in severe accident phenomena and analyses that affect reactor safety and that are not currently being addressed by the industry or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗