Search NASA⌕ Search

Engineering topics

Robert F Hodson

Publications and source records attributed to Robert F Hodson.

15 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2024

Key Considerations When Developing Avionics for Safety-Critical Systems

Multiple human spaceflight programs are underway at NASA including Orion, Space Launch System, Gateway, Human Landing System, and EVA and Lunar Surface Mobility programs. Achieving success in these programs requires NASA to collaborate with a variety of commercial partners, including both new spaceflight companies and robotic spaceflight companies pursuing crewed spaceflight for the first time. It is not always clear to these organizations how to show their systems are safe for human spaceflight. This is particularly true for avionics systems, which are responsible for performing some of a crewed spacecraft’s most critical functions. NASA recently published guidance describing how to show the design of an avionic system meets safety requirements for crewed missions.

Safety-Critical Systems↗
NASA NTRS2024

The NASA Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) Process Standard

This paper presents status on the upcoming NASA Agency-level RHA Process Standard. Based on recommendations provided by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), the NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program has led development of an agency-level standard for space flight avionics and electronics RHA. The standard introduces a novel RHA taxonomy and prescribes the process required by NASA programs and projects to baseline their RHA programs consistent with the MEAL (Mission, Environment, Application, and Lifetime) criteria including the risk tolerance posture. The standard also provides requirements for the RHA schedule integration in the program or project lifecycle and requirements for data deliverables content. Additional non-prescriptive technical content is provided in the standard appendices to guide development of RHA programs for NASA missions.

Avionics↗
NASA NTRS2024

Examination of Space Vehicle Ethernet Interconnects

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was requested to examine the performance of Ethernet in space vehicle configurations at the physical layer and develop guidance for system designers to ensure correct Ethernet operation in these systems. The objective of the assessment was to develop guidance and requirements for Ethernet cable and connectors for spaceflight environments and make recommendations for Ethernet systems used in flight-critical space applications. This report contains the results of the NESC assessment.

Ethernet↗
NASA NTRS2023

Assessment of Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Copper Wire Bonds for Space Programs

The NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging Program co-manager, requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to compile a body of publicly available knowledge on copper (Cu) wire bonds and perform reliability testing and analysis on these bonds, including environment tests, sample destructive physical analysis, and bond pull/shear tests during environment test intervals. The goal was to understand the risks of using Cu wire bonds for space applications and develop guidelines on Cu bond pull/shear limits for NASA applications. This document contains the results of the NESC assessment.

Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical↗
NASA NTRS2023

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 23-02: Safety Considerations when Repurposing Commercially Available Flight Termination Systems from Uncrewed to Crewed Launch Vehicles

Both uncrewed and crewed launch vehicles (LV) require Flight Termination Systems (FTS) for Range Safety to protect the public and ground assets in the event of a LV failure. Flight crew safety in this context is an added consideration for human spaceflight. The FTS is an electroexplosive system that activates destruct charges to rupture propellant tanks and shutdown engines during flight termination. Commercially available FTS units have been developed for uncrewed applications and are now being repurposed to crewed applications. A consequence of using these systems is that they are designed for public and ground crew safety, though inadequate for flight crew safety. Missing are Human Space Flight (HSF) design controls for inadvertent activation during crewed ascent and protection for crew emergency abort.

Flight Termination Systems↗
NASA NTRS2023

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 23-01: Including Key Design Features in Safety-Critical Pyrotechnic Firing Circuits

Pyrotechnic systems often fall into a unique category in that inadvertent activation of these systems resulting from a fault and/or lack of safe margins can lead directly to loss of crew. For example, untimely activation of pyrotechnics used for a flight termination system could override an abort capability. Over the years, NASA and the military have learned lessons about safe pyrotechnic circuit design and test, many of which are codified. However, with NASA’s recent efforts to move toward a development model than leans more heavily on Commercial Partners these requirements have not always been directly levied on projects and in some cases been misinterpreted. This bulletin describes key safety features of pyrotechnic firing circuit design and provides rationale for inclusion of each feature.

Pyrotechnic Firing Curcuits↗
NASA NTRS2023

Ceramic Capacitor Grain Size Analysis Using Electron Backscatter Diffraction (EBSD)

The overall scope of this NESC study was to identify (or develop) a tool, methodology, or process that can inspect a ceramic capacitor and consistently return repeatable grain size distribution results. It is important to note that the development of a machine learning technique was considered as an option for this study, but only if an existing automated tool was not available. This report explains why the Electron Backscatter Diffraction analysis method for grain structure and size distribution was deemed a suitable candidate for this work.

Electron Backscatter Diffraction↗
NASA NTRS2022

Controlling Triboelectrification Effects on Spacecraft Ethernet Cabling

Triboelectric charging of a spacecraft and launch vehicles on ascent may occur due to the process of contact and separation between the vehicle skin and aerosols, dust, ice, water droplets, smoke, and other particulates encountered in the flight path. Depending on characteristics at the atomic and molecular levels of the vehicle skin’s surface and the substances and particulates encountered, electrical charge will transfer between the vehicle and the encountered substances, resulting in an accumulation of electrical charge on the vehicle skin. If the vehicle skin is conductive and electrically bonded such that in its entirety it presents an equipotential surface, then the accumulated electrical charge will spread in a nearly uniform manner leaving all regions with a nearly equal potential with respect to each other and the surrounding environment. Regions that are not electrically bonded as described, or surfaces that have resistivity values, can reach different potentials than the surrounding surfaces. When this happens, the differing potentials may grow to very large magnitudes, leading to electrostatic discharge events between the regions. As the vehicle rises in altitude, the breakdown potential between these regions of differing potential decreases commensurate with decreases in atmospheric density and pressure. If the potential differences between surfaces of the vehicle become equal to or exceed the breakdown potential, one or more discharge events may occur, each of them generating voltage and current transients that can easily damage or interfere with the designed operation of on-board electrical, avionic, and communications and navigation systems. This lesson learned discusses an in-flight anomaly caused by triboelectric discharge events and exacerbated by the lack of adequate cable shielding that affected flight computer communication links. Also discussed are mitigations to prevent this occurrence.

Ethernet↗
NASA NTRS2021

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 19-01-1: Mitigating Risks of Single-Event Effects in Space Applications

Since most Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts are intended for terrestrial applications, they are susceptible to a range of radiation threats in the space environment if the resulting effects are not properly characterized and mitigated. Even specially designed radiation-hardened parts may not be tolerant to all types of radiation effects. Radiation hardness is a multi-dimensional property of any part that describes intrinsic abilities to tolerate various radiation environments [1,2]. Effects to be concerned with include total ionizing dose, total non-ionizing dose, and single-event effects (SEE) – all of which depend on the mission, environment, application, and lifetime. Radiation effects concerns may be the same whether a EEE part is Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), MIL-SPEC, or some other variant, all of which are susceptible to the same radiation threats [3]. SEE consequences range from recoverable faults to catastrophic failure. Like other random faults, SEE can be mitigated with informed circuit design practices at the device, card, and/or system level.

Single-event effects↗
NASA NTRS2021

Avionics Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) Guidelines

Based on the need to develop and adopt timely and up-to-date guidance to ensure that natural space radiation environment threats do not compromise mission success, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was solicited to develop and publish guidance for deriving radiation hardness assurance (RHA) requirements and for evaluating avionics hardware elements with respect to total ionizing dose, total non-ionizing dose, and single event effects. This document contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Guidelines↗
NASA NTRS2020

Recommendations on Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions

The NASA Electronic Parts & Packaging Program Manager, requested a NASA Engineering and Safety Center independent assessment to summarize Commercial Crew Program and NASA Centers’ current and best practices, and lessons learned, on use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) for all mission risk classifications, and provide recommendations that could lead to future NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging Program and/or Agency guidance on COTS parts. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf↗