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Robert Sanders

Publications and source records attributed to Robert Sanders.

14 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’S Break-in-Prebreathe Flight Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during hypobaric ground testing at Johnson Space Center (JSC) identified a ~3 min break-in-prebreathe (BiP) late in the prebreathe (13 min prior to depressurization) as the leading credible cause for the DCS case. This occurred despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 min in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Breaks lasting longer than 10 min require a complete restart of the prebreathe protocol. The adequacy of NASA’s BiP rules was evaluated prior to resuming any hypobaric ground testing or International Space Station (ISS) extravehicular activity (EVA). Of particular interest to the authors was the timing of the BiP in relation to the overall prebreathe timeline. Although there exists no agreed-upon definition, a ‘late’ BiP means towards the end of the prebreathe period, and in particular, the last hour prior to depressurization. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) the type II DCS case report and findings from the investigation; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA); iv) relevant published literature; v) tissue gas loading model estimates; and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe.

Andrew F J Abercromby↗
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗
NASA NTRS2023

Extravehicular Activity on the Lunar Surface: Mapping Mitigation Risk Consequence for Crew Needing Assistance or Rescue

The lunar environment offers unique challenges for human health and safety over the course of performing Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) during early Artemis missions. Driver medical conditions leading to an injured EVA crewmember needing assistance or rescue were analyzed and correlated to established, defined consequence categories. Catastrophic Drivers were identified, and three mitigation strategies were analyzed to determine if there was a potential change in consequence with their application. Risk consequence across the mitigations were compared with each other and the original risk without mitigations. Mitigations were further evaluated in a broader context with prospective preventions to understand the design and risk trade space associated with an early Artemis EVA.

Risk↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A physician’s working group guides COVID-19 prevention in a mission critical environment

Background A team was assembled at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC) to help navigate the shifting COVID-19 pandemic. Their goal was to mitigate the impact of COVID on astronauts, other essential personnel, and the human spaceflight program. This team supplemented the JSC Pandemic Incident Response Group, whose function is to set policy for the overall management of JSC’s COVID-19 mitigations for all onsite mission-essential and mission-critical activities, including health policy. Context The first mission to return to Earth from the International Space Station at the start of the pandemic returned when there was limited information about the transmission and prevention of COVID-19. The medical leadership at JSC determined that a dedicated team was required to navigate the uncharted waters of the pandemic. Description of Activities Issues tackled by this panel included: prevention of COVID-19 transmission during altitude, dive, and spacecraft training – activities that require prolonged close contact between multiple individuals who often cannot safely wear face masks; mitigating the risks of domestic and international travel for essential personnel; securing COVID-19 testing from local and foreign hospital systems; acquiring antigen and PCR analyzers for in-house testing; and the development of quarantine policies for crewed spacecraft launches and landings in Kazakhstan and the United States. The panel also provides clinical return-to-work guidance for cases of COVID-19 in essential personnel.

covid↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Mapping Mitigation Risk Consequence for Crew Needing Assistance or Rescue on the Lunar Surface

Extravehicular activity (EVA) on the lunar surface presents unique risks to crew with possibility for injury. Without appropriate assistance or rescue capability, inability to nominally ambulate and return to a lander, especially during early Artemis missions, could have catastrophic consequences. Mapping likelihood and consequence safety risk associated with identified injury scenarios establishes a baseline from which to assess potential mitigation solutions to ensure crew health and safety.

lunar surface↗