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Roberts, Brad

Publications and source records attributed to Roberts, Brad.

Technical Issues in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Ratification Debate: A 20 Year Retrospective

Two decades after the U.S. Senate declined in 1999 to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty remains in legal and political limbo. Legally, the treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ratification. However, the Senate’s rejection does not strip the treaty of its force as an element of customary international law or alter the will of other signatories to see it enter into force. Politically, the debate over the virtues and flaws of the treaty remains as strong as ever, with some CTBT advocates pushing energetically for U.S. re-review while some opponents seek ways to “un-sign” the treaty. Meanwhile, despite the Senate’s rejection of the treaty, the United States acts in a manner consistent with its main obligations by maintaining a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and providing financial support (as well as technical expertise) to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO)—in particular the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS). The CTBT may well remain in such limbo for a long time to come, unless some catalytic event comes along to re-shape national perceptions and priorities, one way or the other. The treaty’s future, whatever it might be, will be determined in part by how much perspectives might have changed in light of interim developments. Our purpose is to shed light on some of those developments and to assess their relevance. The 1999 ratification debate addressed a large number of issues. Rejection was driven by various policy and technical judgments. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine those technical judgments in light of what has been learned over the following two decades. On some technical matters, there was explicit recognition of extant uncertainties, as well as a conviction and hope that time would dispel them. To be doubly clear, our purpose is not to recommend a way forward on CTBT ratification. The policy judgments of 1999 and 2020 are beyond the scope of this paper. This technical re-examination proceeds as follows. It begins with a short background section to introduce the key technical matters in discussion in the U.S. ratification process. Then it moves systematically through each of those topics with a review of relevant background information, a discussion of key points in debate, an analysis of subsequent experience, and a current assessment. The historical analysis draws on many sources including the primary documents of the Congressional debate, the official article-by-article interpretation by the Department of State, and the statements of key players in the process. We also relied on key technical reports and publications by subject matter experts that have addressed in more detail many of the issues in our focus. These sources include the 2002 and 2012 reports of the National Academy of Sciences as well as publications by senior technical staff of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) who were actively involved in the ratification debate, including then-Laboratory Director Bruce Tarter. We also conducted several interviews with government officials from the 1990s, past laboratory directors, and other members of the scientific community. But, except where individuals are specifically cited by name, the judgments offered here are our own and should not be attributed to any other individual or to LLNL as such.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Annotated Bibliography for Workshop: "Adapting Deterrence Strategies to a Changing Security Environment"

The list of readings below provides some overview and background for the topics covered in the workshop. While some references are to book or materials not available online, where possible references include links to accessible versions of articles. Key questions posed for the workshop: 1. How are the U.S. and its allies adapting their deterrence strategies to the evolving security environment? Are they converging or diverging? 2. Is the balance of strategic influence shifting favourably or unfavourably in Europe and Asia? 3. What can be done to accelerate deterrence transformation and improved strategic competitiveness

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century: Understanding the New U.S. Policy Context (Meeting Summary)

The annual Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century (SW21), co-hosted by Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LANL, LLNL), brought together a diverse group of about two hundred experts from the three United States nuclear weapons labs, U.S. federal government and military, think tanks, universities, and foreign partners to share perspectives on important issues in strategic deterrence. All remarks and discussion were on a non-attribution basis. The objectives of this year’s event were: To understand the new policies and approaches of the Trump administration; To understand areas of continuity and change with previous Nuclear Posture Reviews and the challenges of implementation; To better understand domestic and foreign reactions; To characterize and assess implications for the U.S. nuclear enterprise.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Thinking Globally about U.S. Extended Deterrence

In contrast to the Cold War bilateral global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, the modern nuclear age features a more complex, multiplayer arena on the regional scale. With the exception of the U.S. and Russia, most major powers retain relatively small nuclear arsenals or technical hedge capabilities. The U.S., with strong interests and security partnerships in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East, must navigate through long-standing rivalries and active conflicts while attempting to divine the intentions of less experienced nuclear decision makers in charge of weak domestic institutions. As a result, analysts and policymakers must think globally about U.S. extended deterrence. How have the requirements of extended deterrence and assurance changed? Are there important threads that connect each region? What should the U.S. do differently? To explore these questions, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research, in partnership with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Pacific Forum CSIS, held a workshop on “Thinking Globally about U.S. Extended Deterrence” in Washington, DC on November 2, 2015. The workshop brought together approximately 40 U.S. and foreign deterrence specialists and government officials, all attending in their private capacities. The participants joined a day of not-for-attribution discussions on the changing deterrence and assurance requirements, the threads that connect the regions, and U.S. strategy to deal with emerging challenges. The following is a summary of key takeaways.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗