Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Rodney, George A..
The development of a culture of safety and NASA since the Challenger accident is reviewed. The technical elements of the strengthened NASA safety program are described, including problem reporting, risk/assessment/risk management, operational safety, and safety assurance are addressed. Future directions in the development of safety are considered.
The objectives of NASA product assurance in the 1990s are identified. They are to provide for personnel safety, and safe and reliable operation of hardware and software during the lifetime of a program or mission. The NASA product assurance program, a multi-discipline effort that focuses on safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance expertise to meet NASA operational requirements is described. This program supports NASA 's unmanned launch vehicles such as satellites and planetary probes, manned spacecraft (such as the Space Shuttle and Space Station Freedom), and ground support equipment.
The paper is concerned with the need for a comprehensive test plan for the Space Station Freedom (SST) that would fully verify specification compliance and be based on an error budget. In particular, attention is given to some lessons learned from other NASA programs and the principal challenges for SSF testing, including phase C/D/E agreements, testing parameters, phase testing, and the human element. The importance of close teamwork between the NASA/Contractor systems engineers and assurance engineers is emphasized.
Safety assurance factors for manned spacecraft are discussed with a focus on the Space Station Freedom. A hazard scenario is provided to demonstrate a process commonly used by safety engineers and other analysts to identify onboard safety risks. Fire strategies are described, including a review of fire extinguishing agents being considered for the Space Station. Lessons learned about fire safety technology in other areas are also noted. NASA and industry research on fire safety applications is discussed. NASA's approach to ensuring safety for manned spacecraft is addressed in the context of its multidiscipline program.
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Optical Systems Board of Investigation was established on July 2, 1990 to review, analyze, and evaluate the facts and circumstances regarding the manufacture, development, and testing of the HST Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA). Specifically, the board was tasked to ascertain what caused the spherical aberration and how it escaped notice until on-orbit operation. The error that caused the on-orbit spherical aberration in the primary mirror was traced to the assembly process of the Reflective Null Corrector, one of the three Null Correctors developed as special test equipment (STE) to measure and test the primary mirror. Therefore, the safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance (SRM&QA) investigation covers the events and the overall product assurance environment during the manufacturing phase of the primary mirror and Null Correctors (from 1978 through 1981). The SRM&QA issues that were identified during the HST investigation are summarized. The crucial product assurance requirements (including nonconformance processing) for the HST are examined. The history of Quality Assurance (QA) practices at Perkin-Elmer (P-E) for the period under investigation are reviewed. The importance of the information management function is discussed relative to data retention/control issues. Metrology and other critical technical issues also are discussed. The SRM&QA lessons learned from the investigation are presented along with specific recommendations. Appendix A provides the MSFC SRM&QA report. Appendix B provides supplemental reference materials. Appendix C presents the findings of the independent optical consultants, Optical Research Associates (ORA). Appendix D provides further details of the fault-tree analysis portion of the investigation process.
The Space Station Freedom (SSF) being developed by the United States, European Space Agency (ESA), Japan, and Canada poses novel safety challenges in design, operations, logistics, and program management. A brief overview discloses many features that make SSF a radical departure from earlier low earth orbit (LEO) space stations relative to safety management: size and power levels; multiphase manned assembly; 30-year planned lifetime, with embedded 'hooks and scars' forevolution; crew size and skill-mix variability; sustained logistical dependence; use of man, robotics and telepresence for on-orbit maintenance of station and free-flyer systems; closed-environment recycling; use of automation and expert systems; long-term operation of collocated life-sciences and materials-science experiments, requiring control and segregation of hazardous and chemically incompatible materials; and materials aging in space.