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Santi, Peter

Publications and source records attributed to Santi, Peter.

Point model equations for neutron correlation counting: Extension of Böhnel's equations to any order

Various methods of autocorrelation neutron analysis may be used to extract information about a measurement item containing spontaneously fissioning material. The two predominant approaches being the time correlation analysis (that make use of a coincidence gate) methods of multiplicity shift register logic and Feynman sampling. The common feature is that the correlated nature of the pulse train can be described by a vector of reduced factorial multiplet rates. We call these singlets, doublets, triplets etc. Within the point reactor model the multiplet rates may be related to the properties of the item, the parameters of the detector, and basic nuclear data constants by a series of coupled algebraic equations – the so called point model equations. Solving, or inverting, the point model equations using experimental calibration model parameters is how assays of unknown items is performed. Currently only the first three multiplets are routinely used. In this work we develop the point model equations to higher order multiplets using the probability generating functions approach combined with the general derivative chain rule, the so called Faà di Bruno Formula. Explicit expression up to 5th order are provided, as well the general iterative formula to calculate any order. This study represents the first necessary step towards determining if higher order multiplets can add value to nondestructive measurement practice for nuclear materials control and accountancy.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Joint IAEA/NNSA International Workshop Nuclear Forensics Methodologies for Practitioners 2013 Scenario Based Exercise – Version 4.0 Instructor’s Manual

[Participants will serve as border guards for Reimerland. They will be given brief instruction on the operation of hand-held RadioIsotope DetectorS (RIDS) and be provided an intelligence briefing that tells them to be on the lookout for suspicious activity at their post. Their instruction will include directing suspicious vehicles to a location for secondary screening. If, after secondary screening, suspicions of a criminal act involving nuclear and or radioactive materials remain, participants have been instructed to request assistance from the NLEA, who will then setup and manage a radiological crime scene. Participants will watch a demonstration of two vehicles containing radioactive materials driving through and setting off a portal monitor. The first vehicle, a semi-tractor trailer, sets off only a gamma alarm. After the driver provides a shipping manifest of fertilizer, participants, posing as border guards, are expected to waive this vehicle through inspection. The second vehicle, an SUV, set off both gamma and 2 neutron alarms. The alarming of the neutron monitor should prompt participants to set up a secondary inspection of the vehicle immediately. The driver of the vehicle indicates he is in legal possession of an industrial instrument containing an old 133Ba source that has decayed to a level no longer requiring official paperwork according to the IAEA and internationally accepted transportation regulations. Authorities have verified that the industrial source does fit the description of one that is sold commercially. However, upon setting up a secondary screening, participants will use hand-held detectors to locate several other radioactive sources emanating from a black duffle bag in the rear of the vehicle (Figure 1). Hand held detectors detect the presence of 133Ba, and Pu. Upon questioning, the driver only commits to having the 133Ba industrial source and cannot account for the detection of neutrons within his vehicle. Since neutron alarms also sounded, participants should indicate that a neutron alarm would be inconsistent with a 133Ba source alone and should therefore conclude further investigation is warranted. This will prompt participants to call in a response team from the NLEA to set up a radiological crime scene around the vehicle in question. The response team is able to shoot a 3-D X-ray radiograph of the duffle bag without moving it to ensure it is rendered safe and moveable without disturbing the contents in the field (Figure 2). At this point, the duffle bag is entered into inventory as evidence and a chain of custody form is initiated. Swipes are taken from the outer bag to confirm there is no dispersible contamination. The bag and its contents are considered valuable for the investigation by the lead investigator. He determines the duffle bag is safe to transport to RRL for evidence inventory and analysis. The duffle bag and its contents are packaged and sent off to the RRL.]

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Ruminations on NDA Measurment Uncertainty Compared to DA Uncertainty

It is difficult to overestimate the importance that physical measurements performed with nondestructive assay instruments play throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. They underpin decision making in many areas and support: criticality safety, radiation protection, process control, safeguards, facility compliance, and waste measurements. No physical measurement is complete or indeed meaningful, without a defensible and appropriate accompanying statement of uncertainties and how they combine to define the confidence in the results. The uncertainty budget should also be broken down in sufficient detail suitable for subsequent uses to which the nondestructive assay (NDA) results will be applied. Creating an uncertainty budget and estimating the total measurement uncertainty can often be an involved process, especially for non-routine situations. This is because data interpretation often involves complex algorithms and logic combined in a highly intertwined way. The methods often call on a multitude of input data subject to human oversight. These characteristics can be confusing and pose a barrier to developing and understanding between experts and data consumers. ASTM subcommittee C26-10 recognized this problem in the context of how to summarize and express precision and bias performance across the range of standards and guides it maintains. In order to create a unified approach consistent with modern practice and embracing the continuous improvement philosophy a consensus arose to prepare a procedure covering the estimation and reporting of uncertainties in nondestructive assay of nuclear materials. This paper outlines the needs analysis, objectives and on-going development efforts. In addition to emphasizing some of the unique challenges and opportunities facing the NDA community we hope this article will encourage dialog and sharing of best practice and furthermore motivate developers to revisit the treatment of measurement uncertainty.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Designing a 3rd generation, authenticatable attribute measurement system

Attribute measurement systems (AMS) are designed to measure potentially sensitive items containing Special Nuclear Materials to determine if the items possess attributes which fall within an agreed-upon range. Such systems could be used in a treaty to inspect and verify the identity of items in storage without revealing any sensitive information associated with the item. An AMS needs to satisfy two constraints: the host party needs to be sure that none of their sensitive information is released, while the inspecting party wants to have confidence that the limited amount of information they see accurately reflects the properties of the item being measured. The former involves 'certifying' the system and the latter 'authenticating' it. Previous work into designing and building AMS systems have focused more on the questions of certifiability than on the questions of authentication - although a few approaches have been investigated. The next step is to build a 3rd generation AMS which (1) makes the appropriate measurements, (2) can be certified, and (3) can be authenticated (the three generations). This paper will discuss the ideas, options, and process of producing a design for a 3rd generation AMS.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Analysis of historical delta values for IAEA/LANL NDA training courses

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by providing training for IAEA inspectors in neutron and gamma-ray Nondestructive Assay (NDA) of nuclear material. Since 1980, all new IAEA inspectors attend this two week course at LANL gaining hands-on experience in the application of NDA techniques, procedures and analysis to measure plutonium and uranium nuclear material standards with well known pedigrees. As part of the course the inspectors conduct an inventory verification exercise. This exercise provides inspectors the opportunity to test their abilities in performing verification measurements using the various NDA techniques. For an inspector, the verification of an item is nominally based on whether the measured assay value agrees with the declared value to within three times the historical delta value. The historical delta value represents the average difference between measured and declared values from previous measurements taken on similar material with the same measurement technology. If the measurement falls outside a limit of three times the historical delta value, the declaration is not verified. This paper uses measurement data from five years of IAEA courses to calculate a historical delta for five non-destructive assay methods: Gamma-ray Enrichment, Gamma-ray Plutonium Isotopics, Passive Neutron Coincidence Counting, Active Neutron Coincidence Counting and the Neutron Coincidence Collar. These historical deltas provide information as to the precision and accuracy of these measurement techniques under realistic conditions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗