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Saylor, Ellen Marie

Publications and source records attributed to Saylor, Ellen Marie.

9 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Analysis of the 30B UF 6 Container for Use with Increased Enrichment

Commercial light-water reactor (LWR) operators and fuel vendors are pursuing advancements in fuel and reactor design that include increasing 235 U enrichment from low enrichment (<5 wt.% 235 U) to low-enriched uranium+ (LEU+) (10 wt.% > 235 U > 5 wt.%) and high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) (20 wt.% > 235 U > 10 wt.%). These advancements will necessitate the ability to transport LEU+ and HALEU fuel materials. Assessment of Existing Transportation Packages for Use with HALEU(ORNL/TM-2020/1725) assesses the potential to use currently licensed transportation packages for the transportation of HALEU by evaluating a representative package for each uranium fuel form category (for example, oxide and/or metal in fuel assemblies, fuel pins, powder, pellets, and uranium hexafluoride [UF 6 ].) This report expands on the UF 6 analysis.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

KENO V.a Primer: Performing Calculations using SCALE’s Criticality Safety Analysis Sequence (CSAS5) with Fulcrum

The SCALE code system developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory is widely used and accepted around the world for criticality safety analyses. The well-known KENO V.a three-dimensional Monte Carlo criticality computer code is one of the primary criticality safety analysis tools in SCALE. The KENO V.a primer is designed to help a new user understand and use the SCALE/KENO V.a Monte Carlo code for nuclear criticality safety analyses. It assumes that the user has a college education in a technical field. There is no assumption of familiarity with Monte Carlo codes in general or with SCALE/KENO V.a in particular. The primer is designed to teach by example, with each example illustrating two or three features of SCALE/KENO V.a that are useful in criticality analyses. The primer is based on SCALE 6.2 and 6.3, which includes the Fulcrum graphical user interface (GUI). Each example uses Fulcrum to provide the framework for preparing input data and viewing output results. Starting with a Quickstart section, the primer gives an overview of the basic requirements for SCALE/KENO V.a input and allows the user to quickly run a simple criticality problem with SCALE/KENO V.a. The sections that follow Quickstart include a list of basic objectives at the beginning that identifies the goal of the section and the individual SCALE/KENO V.a features that are covered in detail in the sample problems in that section. Upon completion of the primer, a new user should be comfortable using Fulcrum to set up criticality problems in SCALE/KENO V.a. The primer provides a starting point for the criticality safety analyst who uses SCALE/KENO V.a. Complete descriptions are provided in the SCALE/KENO V.a manual. Although the primer is self-contained, it is intended as a companion volume to the SCALE/KENO V.a training and documentation. The SCALE manual and training schedule are available at https://scale.ornl.gov. The primer provides specific examples of using SCALE/KENO V.a for criticality analyses; the SCALE/KENO V.a manual provides information on the use of SCALE/KENO V.a and all its modules. The primer also contains an appendix with sample input files. In addition, this primer, its errata and sample inputs are also available at https://code.ornl.gov/scale/primers/kenova.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

KENO-VI Primer: Performing Calculations using SCALE’s Criticality Safety Analysis Sequence (CSAS6) with Fulcrum

The SCALE code system developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory is widely used and accepted around the world for criticality safety analysis. The well-known KENO-VI three-dimensional Monte Carlo criticality computer code is one of the primary criticality safety analysis tools in SCALE. The KENO-VI primer is designed to help a new user understand and use the SCALE/KENO-VI Monte Carlo code for nuclear criticality safety analysis. It assumes that the user has a college education in a technical field. There is no assumption of familiarity with Monte Carlo codes in general or with SCALE/KENO-VI in particular. The primer is designed to teach by example, with each example illustrating two or three features of SCALE/KENO-VI that are useful in criticality analysis. The primer is based on SCALE 6.2 and 6.3, which includes the Fulcrum graphical user interface. Each example uses Fulcrum to provide the framework for preparing input data and viewing output results. Starting with a Quickstart section, the primer gives an overview of the basic requirements for SCALE/KENO-VI input and allows the user to quickly run a simple criticality problem with SCALE/KENO-VI. Each following section begins with a list of basic objectives identifying the goal of the section and the individual SCALE/KENO-VI features covered in detail in the section’s sample problems. Upon completion of the primer, a new user should be comfortable using Fulcrum to set up criticality problems in SCALE/KENO-VI. The primer provides a starting point for the criticality safety analyst who uses SCALE/KENO-VI. Complete descriptions are provided in the SCALE/KENO-VI manual. Although the primer is self-contained, it is intended as a companion volume to the SCALE/KENO-VI training and documentation. The SCALE manual and training schedule are available at https://scale.ornl.gov. The primer provides specific examples of using SCALE/KENO-VI for criticality analysis; the SCALE/KENO-VI manual provides information on the use of SCALE/KENO-VI and all its modules. The primer also contains an appendix with sample input files. In addition, this primer, its errata, and sample inputs are also available at https://code.ornl.gov/scale/primers/kenovi/.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Initial Efforts Organizing WPNCS SG-8: Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks

The Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS) under the guidance of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has over 20 years of experience addressing concerns related to static and transient configurations encountered within the nuclear fuel cycle: fuel fabrication, transportation, reprocessing, storage, and geological disposal. One of the cornerstone activities of the WPNCS is the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP), which was established to identify a comprehensive set of criticality benchmark data, evaluate the data, including quantification of overall uncertainties; compile the data into a standardized format, perform sample calculations utilizing modern nuclear data sets and codes utilized in nuclear criticality safety, and formally document the work into a single source of verified benchmark data. Annually, members of the ICSBEP Technical Review Group (TRG) contribute evaluated benchmark data that undergoes comprehensive technical review prior to publication in the ICSBEP Handbook. In the years since the ICSBEP was established, there has been much work to prepare benchmark data to support validation activities in nuclear criticality safety. The 2020 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook contains acceptable benchmark specifications for 5,053 critical, subcritical, or near-critical configurations in 582 benchmark evaluations. Modern benchmark development benefits from decades of experienced international participants, a well-established handbook format, supplementary guides to deal with uncertainty quantification, and a comprehensive review process based upon independent reviews from international experts. The ICSBEP Handbook also contains 838 configurations deemed unacceptable to support criticality safety efforts. They are recorded, with the reasoning for their rejection, to preserve the experimental data, prevent reevaluation of data that are incomplete or contain known errors, and/or to potentially allow future reevaluation of the experiment pending the identification of sufficient data to resolve identified inconsistencies and errors. Users of the ICSBEP Handbook today might notice that the rigor and quality of modern criticality safety benchmarks is much greater than those prepared within the initial decade of the project. Benchmarks with 1s uncertainties in k eff greater than 1% were traditionally rejected unless they were identified as unique experiment types that encompassed materials, fuels, or designs not available from other benchmark experiments. However, benchmarks developed using modern experimental techniques and practices typically have uncertainties on the order of a few tenths of a percent. There have been ongoing efforts to improve the overall quality of previously published benchmark evaluations. Seventy-eight evaluations, containing approximately 600 configurations, have been revised just within the past decade. An additional eleven benchmarks are under revision for updated release in the 2020 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook. If some of the historic benchmarks were resubmitted in their current form to the TRG today, they would be rejected due to lack of data, missing components in the uncertainty analysis, or incomplete benchmark model development. The use of historic criticality safety benchmarks that underestimate the total uncertainty, lack properly quantified biases, or provide inadequate benchmark specifications do not sufficiently support modern criticality safety and nuclear data efforts. Although the ICSBEP Handbook is recognized by regulating bodies to support criticality safety, users are required to justify their reasons to ignore historic benchmark data and include additional safety margins within their designs. Discussions were held at the WPNCS 23rd Annual Meeting in September 2019 regarding the aforementioned issues. The resultant decision was to establish Subgroup 8 (SG-8): Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks. The current activities of SG-8 are discussed herein.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Sulfur Pellets Responses to a Bare and Steel Reflected Pulse of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Health Physics Research Reactor

The experiments analyzed in this report were conducted at the Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR), also known as the $\textit{Fast Burst Reactor}$. The reactor was designed and built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in 1961. The HPRR was an unmoderated, unshielded fast reactor that used highly enriched uranium and molybdenum alloy as fuel. The reactor was initially sent to the Nevada Test Site in 1962, where it was used to evaluate radiation doses received as a result of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings during World War II. A few years later, the reactor was sent back to ORNL to be part of the Dosimetry Application Research (DOSAR) facility shown in Figure 1, which included a reactor building shown on the left (west) of the picture and a control and laboratory building in the upper right corner (northeast). The critical assembly was used for numerous technical studies, including systems calibration, dosimetry, radiobiology of plants and animals, testing of radiation alarms, as well as teaching and training in radiation dosimetry and nuclear engineering. Between 1963 and 1987, the HPRR was operated for thousands of hours, achieving criticality close to 10,000 times and motivating many publications. The HPRR was decommissioned in 1987. The goal of this effort was to use historical data from operation of the HPRR to create a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) benchmark to be included in the $\textit{International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments}$ (ICSBEP Handbook). A thorough inspection was performed of all available documentation and information available. The most promising experiments that were selected for evaluation were those described in the 1987 ORNL report entitled $\textit{Health Physics Research Reactor Reference Dosimetry}$, ORNL-6240. The report includes reference dosimetry results of the shielded and unshielded configurations of the HPRR after burst operations. Because of changes to the reactor positioning and storage systems that were made in 1985, the previous dosimetry reports became obsolete, and the newly designed experiments were needed to create the HPRR’s adjusted dosimetry data. The various results reported in ORNL-6240 include reference doses and dose equivalents from different conventions at different distances and elevations as determined using the detected neutron fluence and conversion factors. The HPRR neutron fluence was obtained through different methods, including sulfur pellet analysis and threshold detector unit data. Information about the HPRR spectrum was also obtained through Bonner sphere measurements. This benchmark is focused on a part of the measured sulfur fluences reported in Appendix H of ORNL-6240. Standard commercial sulfur pellets were placed at different distances from the HPRR centerline during burst operation and were activated due to the 32 S(n,p) 32 P reaction. The resulting 32 P activity was then measured and the information about the corresponding sulfur fluence and/or neutron dose could be extracted. Many of those measurements have 7 been performed with the HPRR in its bare configuration or with different shields (combinations of Lucite, concrete, steel). All the necessary, precise information about material and/or dimensions of the different shields was not found, so it was decided to focus only on the unshielded and steel-shielded configurations to minimize the benchmark uncertainty. A total of 31 cases (24 unshielded and 7 shielded cases at different positions) of sulfur fluence were selected before evaluation to develop the benchmark.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗