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Sayre, Amanda M.

Publications and source records attributed to Sayre, Amanda M..

Understanding the Impact of the Secondary Market on Proliferation

Economic, technological, and social trends are changing the way consumers think about used commodities. Many consumers are now more willing to consider used or remanufactured goods. Simultaneously, new technological innovations are arising that make it more cost-effective to remanufacture these goods and easier to find buyers for them. Together, these changes have led to rapid growth in the secondary market and, along with it, a new threat: the potential export of used, listed weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related commodities by secondary market resellers who are unaware of export control requirements. While the export of WMD-related commodities is regulated throughout the commodity’s lifetime, knowledge of those export control requirements is sometimes lost as commodities are sold and resold. As such, the secondary market for listed commodities pose proliferation risks and export control challenges that may not be well understood by the U.S. Government.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Development and Examination of a Proliferation Trade Risk Metric

A Proliferation Trade Risk metric has been calculated for each country represented in a publicly-available trade dataset. This metric, comprising both direct and indirect proliferation trade risk components, represents the risk that each country’s proliferation-relevant exports will go to a designated set of proliferation threat countries. This metric can serve to prioritize nonproliferation export control capacity building engagement. Further, within such engagement, the decomposition of the proliferation trade risk metric can identify specific industrial sectors and trade relationships of greatest importance for outreach and enforcement measures. Finally, these supply-side perspectives can be complemented by threat-based profiles identifying the most important suppliers to each threat country.

export control, trade analysis↗

Exploring the Application of Shared Ledger Technology to Safeguards and other National Security Topics

In 2016, the Office of International Nuclear Safeguards at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the Department of Energy (DOE) commissioned the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to explore the potential implications of the digital currency bitcoin and its underlying technologies on the safeguards system. The authors found that one category of technologies referred to as Shared Ledger Technology (SLT) offers a spectrum of benefits to the safeguards system. While further research is needed to validate assumptions and findings in the paper, preliminary analysis suggests that both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Member States can use SLT to promote efficient, effective, accurate, and timely reporting, and increase transparency in the safeguards system without sacrificing confidentiality of safeguards data. This increased transparency and involvement of Member States in certain safeguards transactions could lead to increased trust and cooperation among States and the public, which generates a number of benefits. This paper describes these benefits and the analytical framework for assessing SLT applications for specific safeguards problems. The paper will also describe other national security areas where SLT could provide benefits.

arms control↗

Exploratory study on potential safeguards applications for shared ledger technology

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for providing credible assurance that countries are meeting their obligations not to divert or misuse nuclear materials and facilities for non-peaceful purposes. To this end, the IAEA integrates information about States’ nuclear material inventories and transactions with other types of data to draw its safeguards conclusions. As the amount and variety of data and information has increased, the IAEA’s data acquisition, management, and analysis processes have greatly benefited from advancements in computer science, data management, and cybersecurity during the last 20 years. Despite these advancements, inconsistent use of advanced computer technologies as well as political concerns among certain IAEA Member States centered on trust, transparency, and IAEA authorities limit the overall effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. As a result, there is an ongoing need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards while improving Member State cooperation and trust in the safeguards system. These chronic safeguards needs could be met with some emerging technologies, specifically those associated with the digital currency bitcoin.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

International Safeguards and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Established in 1965, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) strong technical ties and shared heritage with the nearby U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Site were central to the early development of expertise in nuclear fuel cycle signatures, separations chemistry, plutonium chemistry, environmental monitoring, modeling and analysis of reactor systems, and nuclear material safeguards and security. From these Hanford origins, PNNL has grown into a multi-program science and engineering enterprise that utilizes this diversity to strengthen the international safeguards regime. Today, PNNL supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its mission to provide assurances to the international community that nations do not use nuclear materials and equipment outside of peaceful uses. PNNL also serves in the IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) by providing analysis of environmental samples gathered around the world. PNNL is involved in safeguards research and development activities in support of many U.S. Government programs such as the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Research and Development, NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, and the U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards. In addition to these programs, PNNL invests internal resources including safeguards-specific training opportunities for staff, and laboratory-directed research and development funding to further ideas that may grow into new capabilities. This paper and accompanying presentation highlight some of PNNL’s contributions in technology development, implementation concepts and approaches, policy, capacity building, and human capital development, in the field of international safeguards.

Olsen, Khris B.↗

The Global Diffusion of Societal Verification Tools: A Quantitative Assessment of the Public’s Ability to Engage Nonproliferation Treaty Monitoring

The spread of nuclear and dual-use technologies and the need for more robust, effective and efficient nonproliferation and arms control treaties has led to an increasing need for innovative verification approaches and technologies. This need, paired with advancements in online computing, mobile devices, commercially available satellite imagery and the evolution of online social networks, has led to a resurgence of the concept of societal verification for arms control and nonproliferation treaties. In the event a country accepts its citizens’ assistance in supporting transparency, confidence-building and societal verification, the host government will need a population that is willing and able to participate. While scholarly interest in societal verification continues to grow, social scientific research on the topic is lacking. The aim of this paper is to begin the process of understanding public societal verification capabilities, extend the availability of quantitative research on societal verification and set in motion complementary research to increase the breadth and depth of knowledge on this topic. This paper presents a potential framework and outlines a research roadmap for the development of such a societal verification capability index.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Development of a SPARK Training Dataset

In its first five years, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) sponsored more than 400 undergraduate, graduate, and post-doctoral students in internships and research positions (Wyse 2012). In the past seven years, the NGSI program has, and continues to produce a large body of scientific, technical, and policy work in targeted core safeguards capabilities and human capital development activities. Not only does the NGSI program carry out activities across multiple disciplines, but also across all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA locations in the United States. However, products are not readily shared among disciplines and across locations, nor are they archived in a comprehensive library. Rather, knowledge of NGSI-produced literature is localized to the researchers, clients, and internal laboratory/facility publication systems such as the Electronic Records and Information Capture Architecture (ERICA) at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). There is also no incorporated way of analyzing existing NGSI literature to determine whether the larger NGSI program is achieving its core safeguards capabilities and activities. A complete library of NGSI literature could prove beneficial to a cohesive, sustainable, and more economical NGSI program. The Safeguards Platform for Automated Retrieval of Knowledge (SPARK) has been developed to be a knowledge storage, retrieval, and analysis capability to capture safeguards knowledge to exist beyond the lifespan of NGSI. During the development process, it was necessary to build a SPARK training dataset (a corpus of documents) for initial entry into the system and for demonstration purposes. We manipulated these data to gain new information about the breadth of NGSI publications, and they evaluated the science-policy interface at PNNL as a practical demonstration of SPARK’s intended analysis capability. The analysis demonstration sought to answer the question, “Who leads research and development at PNNL, scientists or policy researchers?” The analysis was inconclusive as to whether policy researchers or scientists are primary drivers for research at PNNL. However, the dataset development and analysis activity did demonstrate the utility and usability of the SPARK dataset. After the initiation of the NGSI program there is a clear increase in the number of publications of safeguards products. Employing the natural language analysis tool IN SPIRE™ showed the presence of vocation- and topic-specific vernacular within NGSI sub-topics. The methodology developed to define the scope of the dataset was useful in describing safeguards applications, but may be applicable for research on other topics beyond safeguards. The analysis emphasized the need for an expanded dataset to fully understand the scope of safeguards publications and research both nationally and internationally. As the SPARK dataset grows to include publications outside PNNL, topics crosscutting disciplines and DOE/NNSA locations should become more apparent. NGSI was established in 2008 to cultivate the next generation of safeguards professionals and support the development of core safeguards capabilities (NNSA 2012). Now a robust system to preserve and share institutional memory such as SPARK is needed to inspire and equip the next generation of safeguards experts, technologies, and policies.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗