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Schanfein, Mark

Publications and source records attributed to Schanfein, Mark.

Challenges and Technology-Driven Opportunities for Safeguarding Microreactors

Nuclear microreactors (MRs) represent a new class of reactors characterized by their compactness, portability, and low power output. These features enable MRs to supply electricity and process heat to remote areas like military bases; inaccessible locations; small grids, such as on islands; or disaster impacted areas. Compared to traditional light water reactors, MRs have a unique set of attributes that need to be considered for the implementation of safeguard strategies. Current safeguard methodologies are reactor technology specific and are employed on large, stationary reactors where there is easy access by safeguards inspectors and where safeguard equipment can be easily installed and retrofitted. While there are numerous benefits to MRs, their compact size, portability, scalability, and operational lifetime create challenges to the traditional safeguard approaches, thus needing novel safeguard strategies. Here, this paper addresses the unique challenges posed by MRs to the international nuclear safeguards regime, including limited human resources, and explores how technology advancements can help mitigate these challenges. Specifically, it examines novel technologies that could contribute to establishing a comprehensive safeguards framework for MRs. These safeguards-enabling technologies encompass safeguards by design, remote sensing and monitoring technologies, applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms, utilization of digital twins, and system of systems assessments. While each of these safeguards-enabling technologies offers partial solutions to the challenges posed by MRs for the international safeguards regime, none of them alone can entirely address these challenges. Consequently, a combination of the safeguards-enabling technologies outlined in this paper is recommended to establish a robust safeguards regime for MRs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

IAEA Facility-Level Safeguards and Implementation and Advanced Verification Technologies

IAEA Facility-Level Safeguards and Implementation - This presentation is intended to introduce the audience to the application of international safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency at nuclear facilities around the world. It covers the State Level Approach, random statistical sampling processes, material balance area structure, non-destructive assay techniques, and inspection areas. Addition of advanced verification technologies for the IAEA

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Battery Technologies for Unattended Monitoring Systems: Recommendations for current and future systems

A review of battery technologies was undertaken to identify those that could be used as part of the Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) for an Unattended Monitoring System (UMS). The costs associated with servicing and replacing batteries is a significant contribution to overall IAEA expenses. The current suite of batteries in use must be replaced every 2 years; this adds effort, shipping and disposal costs. An extension of the battery lifetime by a factor of at least three would reduce costs and allow for expanded UMS deployment. The results of this study clearly show that this is possible for some batteries.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Passive Noise Analysis Studies on Tampering Indication

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is part of a multi-laboratory research project tasked with investigating methods for detection of tampering on unattended/remotely monitored systems (UMS) in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) installations. Ensuring that the detector signals received at the IAEA cabinet are authentic is central to the independence of IAEA’s safeguards conclusions. INL is investigating a passive noise analysis technique in the frequency domain to detect tampering. Prior work performed by INL showed a proof-of-principle method in which changes in ambient conditions could be observed in the frequency spectrum. In this paper several new findings, as well as further investigation into prior findings used for tamper indication, will be presented. Information from various parts of the spectrum and the whole spectrum can be used to determine temperature changes, modifications made to a pre-amplifier/amplifier or the replacement, changes to the neutron detector, replacement of the transmission cable, tapping into the cable and teeing off the signal from the cable. Future work will investigate the viability of these indicators to detect tampering for normal operation, noisy environments and real world applications.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Lessons Learned from U.S. Industry Engagement on Safeguards by Design

Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration, through its Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), has supported development of the safeguards by design (SBD) concept. In more recent years, NGSI has made efforts to move the concept of SBD from paper to standard industry practice through engagement with commercial nuclear industry. These partnerships between NGSI and domestic facility designers have represented a unique opportunity to assess and explore the safeguards implementation challenges that emerging reactor designs have the potential to pose. Thus far, partners have included NuScale Power, Babcock & Wilcox mPower, Westinghouse, and TerraPower. This paper reviews engagements with partners to-date, with an emphasis on approaches to engaging commercial industry on SBD and identifying lessons learned from these engagements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗