Search NASA⌕ Search

Engineering topics

Scherer, Carolynn

Publications and source records attributed to Scherer, Carolynn.

Used fuel extended storage security and safeguards by design roadmap

In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is safely and securely stored in spent fuel pools and dry storage casks. The available capacity in spent fuel pools across the nuclear fleet has nearly reached a steady state value. The excess SNF continues to be loaded in dry storage casks. Fuel is expected to remain in dry storage for periods beyond the initial dry cask certification period of 20 years. Recent licensing renewals have approved an additional 40 years. This report identifies the current requirements and evaluation techniques associated with the safeguards and security of SNF dry cask storage. A set of knowledge gaps is identified in the current approaches. Finally, this roadmap identifies known knowledge gaps and provides a research path to deliver the tools and models needed to close the gaps and allow the optimization of the security and safeguards approaches for an interim spent fuel facility over the lifetime of the storage site.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Developing standard performance testing procedures for MC&A components at a site

The condition of a nuclear material control and accountability system (MC&A) and its individual components, as with any system combining technical elements, documentation and the human factor, may be characterized through an aggregate of values for the various parameters that determine the system's ability to perform. The MC&A system's status may be functioning effectively, marginally or not functioning based on a summary of the values of the individual parameters. This work included a review of the following elements and subsystems or components for a material control and accountability system: (1) MC&A Elements: Information subsystem, Measurement subsystem, NM access subsystem, including a tamper-indicating device (TID) program, and Automated information-gathering subsystem; and (2) Detecting NM Loses Elements: Inventory differences, Shipper/receiver differences, Confirmatory measurements and differences with accounting data, and TID or seal violations. In order to detect the absence or loss of nuclear material there must be appropriate interactions among the elements and their respective subsystems (from the list above). Additionally this work includes a review of the status of regulatory requirements for the MC&A system components and potential criteria that support the evaluation of the performance of the listed components. The listed components had performance testing algorithms and procedures developed that took into consideration the regulatory criteria. The developed MC&A performance-testing procedures were the basis for a pilot Guide for MC&A Performance Testing at the MBAs of SSC RF IPPE.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗