Engineering topics

Schwahn, Scott O.

Publications and source records attributed to Schwahn, Scott O..

4 records

DOE OSTI2023

Second Target Station Project: LANSCE WNR Target 2 (Blue Room) Experiment 2022

The Second Target Station (STS) at SNS will address emerging scientific challenges by providing a source of intense, cold neutrons to instruments optimized for this source, using rotating, tungsten target blocks. The STS target will receive 1.3 GeV proton beam pulses from the SNS accelerator at a repetition rate of 15 Hz. The facility life is planned for 40 years, and each target assembly life is expected to be approximately 10 years. An accurate strain prediction is then critical for fatigue life assessment of STS target blocks because they will be subject to approximately 108 beam pulses per lifetime. As an R&D activity, the LANSCE WNR Target 2 (blue room) facility was used to test the strain response of prototypical target blocks to the thermal shock of a proton pulse. The blue room was well suited for a pulsed proton beam impact test of subscale STS target blocks; the 800 MeV proton energy is approximately 60% of the 1.3 GeV proton energy expected from the SNS accelerator to the STS. Both the LANSCE Proton Storage Ring (PSR) and SNS are short-pulse proton beam sources with nominal pulse widths of 250 ns and 661 ns, respectively, so the energy deposition in the target occurs in < 1 microsecond pulse duration.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Experience with Inner Reflector Plug exchange in SNS

The Inner Reflector Plug (IRP) is a central component of the Spallation Neutron Source target monolith, which houses the mercury target and four liter-sized neutron moderator units. It is exposed to high-level radiation fields during routine operation and builds up significant activity. The IRP needs to be replaced due to moderator neutron poison and decoupler burn-out, which is used for shaping neutron pulses. The first IRP exchange took place in March 2018. The old IRP was extracted from the target monolith, providing space for the new one. It was split into three segments, each of which was handled separately. The lowest section of the IRP is the largest segment in size and in activity and is temporarily stored on-site for cool down before conduction post irradiation examination. In support of planning the replacement activities, a wide range of activation and transport analyses were performed. This included calculating isotope inventories and the radiation fields for each segment as it is extracted in storage casks, and the radiation field from the empty IRP pit in the target monolith. While the replacement was taking place, measurements were performed and later on compared to the calculations. During these studies, it was discovered that a significant contributor to the radiation field from the lower IRP segment is from photo-neutrons. Photo-nuclear physics was added to the analyses and calculated results compared well with measured dose rates.

Popova, Irina I.↗

DOE OSTI2020

Coefficients for Estimating Prenatal Dose in Pregnant Workers from Acute Intakes

Inhalation and ingestion dose coefficients for the embryo and fetus from intakes of radionuclides by the mother are provided in the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 88 for intake of each of 74 radionuclides. To address the many other possible radionuclides to which workers may be exposed, effective dose coefficients were developed for the embryo/fetus for all additional radionuclides addressed in ICRP Publication 107 with half-life of 10 min or more. The general approach was to use the estimated dose to the mother’s uterus during pregnancy as a scalable proxy for the dose to the embryo/fetus. The set of scaling factors used in the study was derived from analyses of the relationships of the dose to the mother’s uterus and the effective dose to the embryo/fetus for the ~400 cases (considering two intake modes and multiple forms of many of the radionuclides) addressed in Publication 88.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2020

Compromise of Personal Protective Clothing from Liquid Exposure

Following critiques of multiple personal contamination events from entries into the Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Spallation Neutron Source transfer bay, it was considered that the most likely causes for contamination were personal protective clothing doffing errors or that moisture (sweat) allowed contamination to wick through the protective clothing. To pursue this issue, radiological protection staff looked more closely, however, at the specific area of the clothing where contamination was highest; under enhanced lighting and photochromic manipulation, there appeared to have been some type of moisture in the area. Recognizing the possibility that moisture may have allowed for migration of contamination through the clothing, further experiments were undertaken to determine under which conditions this transport might have occurred. The objective for this work was to identify the susceptibility of different types of personal protective clothing to various liquids encountered in the workplace.Method: Several tests were performed to determine if perspiration had enabled migration of contamination, and to identify what other liquids might have affected contamination transport. Two layers of personal protective clothing were subjected to static conditions and dynamic conditions, to include active rubbing of the materials while wet. Food dye added to each of the liquids tested enabled visual indications of liquid breakthrough. Additional tests were conducted to see if solid contamination could be transported through the materials along with the liquids. As a result, it was found that all but one type of non-rubberized personal protective clothing in use at Oak Ridge National Laboratory were permanently compromised to some extent by the solvents used for decontamination. It was determined that most common cleaning agents immediately and permanently destroyed the hydrophobic nature of several of the splash-resistant protective clothing materials, allowing for radioactive contamination to penetrate through the material to the worker. Work around wet surfaces or performing wet decontamination will only be performed in protective clothing known to prevent transport of the wetting agent.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗