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Scott Hull

Publications and source records attributed to Scott Hull.

Passivation of Spacecraft Pressure Vessels: Some Comments on Requirements, Principles, and Practices

Many space-faring organizations have requirements to limit the growth of orbital debris by passivating spacecraft that remain in orbit after mission end. These requirements state that a stored energy devices are to be fully depleted at the end of a spacecraft’s useful life. Spacecraft designs not able to comply with those requirements use a so-called “soft passivation” option. This report presents the results of two studies aimed at better understanding spacecraft pressure vessel passivation state-of-the-art. They summarize current practices and principles of pressure vessel passivation and present an approach that can be used to show that spacecraft propulsion system passivation has been achieved.

Spacecraft Passivation↗

An Efficient and Effective Light Gas Gun Design for Millimeter-Scale Hypervelocity Testing

This paper serves to document a design for a light gas gun that was used for 3 decades at NASA’s Langley Research Center. By adapting readily-available equipment and supplies, this apparatus was capable of accelerating projectiles at up to 9 kilometers per second. The lack of a projectile-carrying sabot sacrifices some adaptability in projectile size, but results in a design that can be cleaned and cycled with far less labor input. Overall limitation on the projectile impact energies attainable effectively limit the applications to assessing the relatively thin shields employed for robotic spacecraft (as opposed to manned missions). The original gun has been decommissioned, but it is believed that this design has application for robotic spacecraft shield testing in the modern world, allowing cost-effective generation of larger sample sizes than with conventional sabot-based light gas guns.

Hypervelocity↗

Spacecraft Passivation - An Overview of Requirements, Principles, and Practices as Applied to Spacecraft Pressure Vessels

Explosions, collisions, and other catastrophic breakups of launch vehicle orbital stages and satellites continue to be major contributors to the generation of orbital debris. Both launch vehicles and payload satellites typically have several types of stored energy sources on board, any of which might result in energetic breakups and the creation of debris after their mission has ended. These energy sources include propulsion systems, pressure vessels, reaction wheels, control moment gyros, heat pipes, and power systems. NASA, ESA, JAXA and other space-faring organizations have requirements in place to limit the growth of the orbital debris population by passivating space vehicles that remain in orbit after their missions have ended. In this paper, we review current spacecraft passivation philosophies and principles, as well as how those principles have been applied in practice. In particular, we focus on how NASA programs have addressed spacecraft passivation. We begin by considering and reviewing general passivation requirements, with specific emphasis on pressure vessel passivation. We then discuss passivation approaches used in several recent NASA missions as well as some practical considerations in spacecraft passivation, and conclude by providing some summary guidelines regarding what may be considered acceptable (reduced) pressure level targets (depending on the tank commodity and the type of propulsion system) that could allow the pressure vessel to be considered in a passivated state.

Scott Hull↗

NOAA-17 Break-up Engineering Investigation Board Final Report

The NOAA-17 break-up was found to be a single, localized debris event producing about100 trackable pieces; there is likely no catastrophic damage to the whole spacecraft. NOAA-17 debris is very much in family with NOAA-16 debris, and DMSP F11 and F13 are very much in family with each other and share similarities with NOAA-16 and 17; it is likely all four (“The Big Four”) share the same debris source. DMSP F13 break-up occurred simultaneous with a known battery overcharge and therefore battery rupture is most likely intermediate cause of the Big Four break-ups; this is a low confidence assessment since other debris sources cannot be definitively ruled out. No root cause was found as the NOAA-17 batteries were all confirmed to have been disconnected from the charge path as intended. Possible conditions for reconnection are all unlikely including short circuits and commanding from a “bad actor.” All related spacecraft pose a risk of similar break-ups for decades to come and are a threat to the critical 800-850 km polar orbit regime; even appropriately decommissioned spacecraft appear to be at risk. Recommendations include an update to the decommissioning procedure and consideration of further investigations and active debris removal, consistent with national policy.

Maggie Atkinson↗

Spacecraft Passivation – An Overview of Requirements, Principles, and Practices

Explosions, collisions, and other catastrophic breakups of launch vehicle orbital stages and satellites continue to be major contributors to the generation of orbital debris. Both launch vehicles and payload satellites typically have several types of stored energy sources on board, any of which might result in energetic breakups and the creation of debris after their mission has ended. These energy sources include propulsion systems, pressure vessels, reaction wheels, control moment gyros, heat pipes, and power systems. NASA, ESA, JAXA and other space-faring organizations have requirements in place to limit the growth of the orbital debris population by passivating space vehicles that remain in orbit after their missions have ended. In this paper, we review current spacecraft passivation philosophies and principles, as well as how those principles have been applied in practice. In particular, we focus on how NASA programs have addressed spacecraft passivation. We begin by considering and reviewing general passivation requirements, with specific emphasis on pressure vessel passivation. We discuss passivation approaches used in several recent NASA missions as well as some practical considerations in spacecraft passivation, and conclude by providing some summary guidelines regarding what may be considered acceptable (reduced) pressure level targets (depending on the tank commodity and the type of propulsion system) that could allow the pressure vessel to be considered in a passivated state.

Scott Hull↗

An Efficient and Effective Light Gas Gun Design for Millimeter-scale Hypervelocity Testing

This paper serves to document a design for a light gas gun that was used for 3 decades at NASA’s Langley Research Center. By adapting readily-available equipment and supplies, this apparatus was capable of accelerating projectiles at up to 9 kilometers per second. The lack of a projectile-carrying sabot sacrifices some adaptability in projectile size, but results in a design that can be cleaned and cycled with far less labor input. Overall limitation on the projectile impact energies attainable effectively limit the applications to assessing the relatively thin shields employed for robotic spacecraft (as opposed to manned missions). The original gun has been decommissioned, but it is believed that this design has application for robotic spacecraft shield testing in the modern world, allowing cost-effective generation of larger sample sizes than with conventional sabot-based light gas guns.

Hypervelocity↗

NOAA-17 Break-up Engineering Investigation

The NOAA-17 weather satellite operated in polar orbit near 800 km from 2002 until it was decommissioned in April 2013. The spacecraft broke up almost eight years later in March 2021 producing about 100 trackable objects. This follows the breakups of similar spacecraft NOAA-16, DMSP F11, and DMSP F13 which also produced between 80 and 500 trackable objects. An investigation was made into the cause of the breakup and recommend how to better operate or decommission spacecraft in the future. The NOAA-17 breakup was found to be a single, localized debris event; there is likely no catastrophic damage to the whole spacecraft. NOAA-17 debris is very much in family with NOAA-16 debris, and DMSP F11 and F13 are very much in family with each other and share similarities with NOAA-16 and 17; it is likely all four share the same breakup cause. DMSP F13 breakup occurred simultaneous with a known battery overcharge and therefore battery rupture is most likely intermediate cause of all four of the breakups. This is a low confidence assessment, however, since other debris sources cannot be definitively ruled out. No root cause was found as the NOAA-17 batteries were all confirmed to have been disconnected from the charge path as intended. Possible conditions for reconnection are all unlikely including short circuits and ground commanding. All 25 related spacecraft pose a risk of similar breakups for decades to come and are a threat to the critical 800-850 km polar orbit regime; even appropriately decommissioned spacecraft appear to be at risk. Recommendations include an update to the decommissioning procedure and consideration of further investigations and active debris removal, consistent with national policy.

Scott Hull↗

An Efficient and Effective Light Gas Gun Design for Millimeter-Scale Hypervelocity Testing

This paper serves to document a design for a light gas gun that was used for 3 decades at NASA’s Langley Research Center. By adapting readily-available equipment and supplies, this apparatus was capable of accelerating projectiles at up to 9 kilometers per second. The lack of a projectile-carrying sabot sacrifices some adaptability in projectile size, but results in a design that can be cleaned and cycled with far less labor input. Overall limitation on the projectile impact energies attainable effectively limit the applications to assessing the relatively thin shields employed for robotic spacecraft (less useful for those used for manned missions). The original gun has been decommissioned, but it is believed that this design has application for robotic spacecraft shield testing in the modern world, allowing cost-effective generation of larger sample sizes than with conventional sabot-based light gas guns.

Scott Hull↗

An Efficient and Effective Light Gas Gun Design for Millimeter-scale Hypervelocity Testing

This paper serves to document a design for a light gas gun that was used for 3 decades at NASA’s Langley Research Center. By adapting readily-available equipment and supplies, this apparatus was capable of accelerating projectiles at up to 9 kilometers per second (when new). The lack of a projectile-carrying sabot sacrifices some adaptability in projectile size, but results in a design that can be cleaned and cycled with far less labor input. Overall limitation on the projectile impact energies attainable effectively limit the applications to assessing the relatively thin shields employed for robotic spacecraft (less useful for those used for manned missions). The original gun has been decommissioned, but it is believed that this design has application for robotic spacecraft shield testing in the modern world, allowing cost-effective generation of larger sample sizes than with conventional sabot-based light gas guns.

Scott Hull↗