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Seward, Amy M.

Publications and source records attributed to Seward, Amy M..

Market-based Policies for Non-Proliferation

Access to weapons-useable fissile material—highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium—is the primary technical barrier to nuclear weapons development. Nuclear non-proliferation policy is largely concerned with the secure distribution and use of these materials and the technologies that produce them. To the extent that both materials and technologies are traded in markets, the problem may be viewed as one of regulating markets to give an acceptable set of allocative outcomes. While a laissez-faire approach to these markets was rejected long ago, most current policy is based on prescribed or proscribed behavior rather than market incentives. “Market-based” non-proliferation policies would act through incentives in the nuclear materials and technology markets rather than by prescribing outcomes or behavior. Possible polices of this sort include subsidized enrichment services, credits to impute value to spent nuclear fuel, and new markets for special scarce nuclear materials. While market-based policies will not replace command-and-control policies entirely, they could lead to efficient regulation which suffices for most market participants, reserving special, more discriminatory instruments for the few hard cases.

nulcear fuel markets, nonproliferation, SWU↗

Supply Security in Future Nuclear Fuel Markets

Previous PNNL work has shown the existing nuclear fuel markets to provide a high degree of supply security, including the ability to respond to supply disruptions that occur for technical and non-technical reasons. It is in the context of new reactor designs – that is, reactors likely to be licensed and market ready over the next several decades – that fuel supply security is most relevant. Whereas the fuel design and fabrication technology for existing reactors are well known, the construction of a new set of reactors could stress the ability of the existing market to provide adequate supply redundancy. This study shows this is unlikely to occur for at least thirty years, as most reactors likely to be built in the next three decades will be evolutions of current designs, with similar fuel designs to existing reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Supply Security in Future Nuclear Fuel Markets

Previous PNNL work has shown the existing nuclear fuel markets to provide a high degree of supply security, including the ability to respond to supply disruptions that occur for technical and non-technical reasons. It is in the context of new reactor designs – that is, reactors likely to be licensed and market ready over the next several decades – that fuel supply security is most relevant. Whereas the fuel design and fabrication technology for existing reactors are well known, the construction of a new set of reactors could stress the ability of the existing market to provide adequate supply redundancy. This study shows this is unlikely to occur for at least thirty years, as most reactors likely to be built in the next three decades will be evolutions of current designs, with similar fuel designs to existing reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Summary of FY13 Industry Interviews

The spread of weapons of mass destruction relies on the illicit procurement of dual-use items, and industry plays a critical role in preventing these transfers. Export control systems regulate industry’s sales, but there are additional steps that industry and government can take to stop proliferators. Collectively, these additional steps are known as industry self-regulation. The industry self-regulation project at PNNL has identified several approaches to going “beyond compliance” in recent years, including corporate sustainability, competitive advantages for nonproliferation, and a third party. In FY12 the project team moved from a research phase to an implementation phase, and prepared to seek feedback from industry on these topics. This effort included research to identify American manufacturers of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Part 2 Annex commodities. To gain initial responses from industry about whether these ideas could be reasonably implemented, in FY13 the project team conducted a series of outreach interviews. Outreach was initially focused on firms in the carbon fiber, filament winding, and maraging steel sectors. The project team chose these sectors based on the number of firms that produce these items and their proliferation relevance. As the year progressed, the team widened its outreach to manufacturers of a variety of NSG-controlled commodities. In total, the project team contacted 57 firms and conducted 13 interviews. The interviewed firms manufactured or distributed at least 11 controlled commodities. All interviews were conducted on a not for-public-attribution basis, and all information in this summary, unless otherwise cited, can be assumed to be derived from the interviews.

Nonproliferation↗

Evaluation of a Business Case for Safeguards by Design in Nuclear Power Reactors

Safeguards by Design (SbD) is a well-known paradigm for consideration and incorporation of safeguards approaches and associated design features early in the nuclear facility development process. This paradigm has been developed as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and has been accepted as beneficial in many discussions and papers on NGSI or specific technologies under development within NGSI. The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to examine the business case justification of SbD for nuclear power reactors. Ultimately, the implementation of SbD will rely on the designers of nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is important to assess the incentives which will lead designers to adopt SbD as a standard practice for nuclear facility design. This report details the extent to which designers will have compelling economic incentives to adopt SbD.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Redundancy of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Market: Are Fabrication Services Assured?

For several years, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been assessing the reliability of nuclear fuel supply in support of the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration. Three international low enriched uranium reserves, which are intended back up the existing and well-functioning nuclear fuel market, are currently moving toward implementation. These backup reserves are intended to provide countries credible assurance that of the uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel to operate their nuclear power reactors in the event that their primary fuel supply is disrupted, whether for political or other reasons. The efficacy of these backup reserves, however, may be constrained without redundant fabrication services. This report presents the findings of a recent PNNL study that simulated outages of varying durations at specific nuclear fuel fabrication plants. The modeling specifically enabled prediction and visualization of the reactors affected and the degree of fuel delivery delay. The results thus provide insight on the extent of vulnerability to nuclear fuel supply disruption at the level of individual fabrication plants, reactors, and countries. The simulation studies demonstrate that, when a reasonable set of qualification criteria are applied, existing fabrication plants are technically qualified to provide backup fabrication services to the majority of the world's power reactors. The report concludes with an assessment of the redundancy of fuel supply in the nuclear fuel market, and a description of potential extra-market mechanisms to enhance the security of fuel supply in cases where it may be warranted. This report is an assessment of the ability of the existing market to respond to supply disruptions that occur for technical reasons. A forthcoming report will address political disruption scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Progress Addressing Safeguards Capability Development Needs through Educational Outreach and Knowledge Management

This paper describes the NGSI Human Capital Development Program's domestic and international activities, and offers specific case studies to exemplify the outcomes and progress achieved in this area over the past several years. The paper highlights the importance of a sustained effort to address the human dimension of safeguards and nonproliferation and to address critical work force issues in the U.S. and abroad.

international safeguards, human capital developmen↗