Supporting Astronaut Autonomous Operations in Future Deep Space Missions
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Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Shu-chieh Wu.
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On the International Space Station today, the crew has the near real-time support of a large group of system experts on the ground when dealing with problems on-board. For exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit, however, intermittent and delayed communication with ground will force small crews to take the lead in responding to vehicle anomalies. Enabling a flight crew of roughly four astronauts to perform the job that has traditionally been done by a ground crew of over 80 experts will require a fundamental rethinking of human-systems integration. Through observations of anomaly resolution processes, interviews with system experts and astronauts, and analyses of problem-solving models, we have identified the capabilities that are not currently available on-board but will be needed to enable safe exploration further away from Earth. These include increased data access, just-in-time training tools and technologies, and troubleshooting decision support. Important questions remain on how these technologies can be designed and implemented for increased crew autonomy. We present this critical challenge for deep space exploration to the human-computer interaction research community to reflect on the areas identified by our needs analysis and contemplate how they might be manifested as solutions.
The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to evaluate those risks and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are ranked by likelihood and consequence. Intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes are described using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The DAGs are also useful for identifying common factors and countermeasures across the top 30 risks as well as communicating how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes. One of the top risks tracked by the HSRB is The Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). This risk captures the possibility that due to decreasing real-time ground support during missions beyond LEO, crew will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety-critical procedural errors. The HSIA risk is ranked red (high) for Lunar surface and Mars missions due to the probability of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences. This paper describes the evidence that supports the HSIA risk ranking and presents the central narrative of the HSIA risk DAG-- i.e., anomaly detection, diagnosis, intervention, and task performance. Characterizations of the current state of practice for each of the DAG’s central nodes and the future tools needed for successful anomaly response are provided.
Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.
BACKGROUND At NASA, verification testing is the formal process of ensuring that a product conforms to requirements set by a project or program. Some verification methods, such as Demonstrations and Test, require either the end product or a mockup of the product with sufficient fidelity to stand-in for the product during the test. Traditionally, these mockups have been physical (e.g., foam-core and wood) but there is growing interest in exploring new methods for testing with these mockups. These methods include virtual reality (VR), mixed reality, and augmented reality which are collectively referred to as eXtended Reality (XR) technologies. VR has already been adopted and used by many in the aerospace industry as a tool for use in early design phases (e.g., developmental testing) and may have the most potential for use in verification tests. Benefits of using VR mockups offer cost effectiveness, ease of iteration, simulation of hazardous conditions (e.g., an egress through a hatch with smoke obscuring vision), and the ability to simulate microgravity conditions, which are challenging to do with physical mockups. However, the validity of test results obtained from VR mockup demonstrations or testing, compared to the current gold standard of physical mockups, remains uncertain. It is unlikely that there is one clean answer as there are many different types of verification outcomes and each XR technology must be evaluated on its own merits. This is not an issue during developmental testing as the design is still in flux and the total success of the design is not dependent upon the results of a developmental test. Verification tests, however, only happen once, assuming no change to the design, and the results are used to certify the product. Therefore, establishing the validity of XR mockup-based verification outcomes is essential before considering them for any use in verification tests. OBJECTIVE AND METHOD To address this concern, the Human Research Program has funded a project to explore and qualify how XR technologies might be used in verification demonstration and testing at NASA. Currently, we are conducting a review of the literature on the utilization of XR mockups for design activities, prototyping, and user testing. We are employing the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis method to identify the pros, cons, and barriers to adoption of XR technologies for verification testing at NASA. Additionally, we are developing a framework to guide the deployment of XR mockups for verification tests. Building upon available evidence from the literature and subject-matter expert feedback, our goal for the framework is to provide guidelines for which forms of XR mockups are suitable for a given verification test, when only physical mockups should be employed and to highlight areas for which more evidence is needed. To further refine our framework and to contribute to the body of evidence, we are planning a lab-based experiment comparing a VR mockup to a physical twin for a set of select verification outcomes. ANTICIPATED RESULTS In this presentation, we will present the work we conducted to evaluate XR technologies for use in verification tests at NASA. We will summarize and report our findings from the SWOT analysis and our lab-based study, and we will present the current state of the XR Technologies for Verification Testing framework. We will conclude by summarizing remaining work and future directions for the project. Technologies for Verification Testing framework. We will conclude by summarizing remaining work and future directions for the project.
NASA’s current mission-operations paradigm originated with Project Mercury and endured with minimum evolution through the Apollo Program, Space Shuttle Program, and ISS missions. At its foundation is a near-complete real-time dependence on a ground team to manage the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew. Utilizing many engineers and operators with broad and deep expertise; large, distributed datasets including extensive telemetry; and expansive analytical and computing power, this ground team has served as the safety net for crewed spaceflight missions over the past 60 years. This approach must change to address challenges associated with missions beyond low Earth orbit (BLEO), including infrequent resupply, reduced ability to evacuate, and delayed communications that prohibit real-time operational support. We anticipate that a necessary part of this change will be increased independence for the crew, as roles and responsibilities traditionally performed by ground teams move on board the vehicle. While many risks are associated with Earth-independent operations, one particular concern is ensuring that the crew will have adequate onboard support to perform urgent problem solving when communication with the ground is delayed or intermittent. A key resource that enables the ground team to respond to anomalies quickly and effectively is the extraordinary expertise and experience it possesses. It is comprised of 80+ experts on at any given time, with a combined 600+ years of system-specific experience across 22 unique console disciplines. A small crew will face the unprecedented challenge of independently responding to anomalies that have historically been handled by a team 20 times their size. Another important resource upon which the ground heavily relies to support procedure execution and anomaly response is data. The amount of telemetry data that each flight controller monitors is extensive. In addition, as the ground team works to further assess impacts, trouble shoot, identify workarounds, and oversee procedure execution, it accesses and synthesizes engineering and procedure information, as well as system build, test, and configuration documentation. It is not feasible nor useful to put all these data onboard as crews become more Earth independent. Each member of a small Mars mission small crew will have multiple roles beyond monitoring telemetry and data gathering, and multiple roles within anomaly resolution processes, thereby limiting their capacity for copious amounts of information. Moreover, while access is necessary, it alone is insufficient. Information will need to be compiled, refined, and represented appropriately to support the crew’s reduced attention and expertise. This work seeks to understand the content and representation of information needed to support time-constrained problem solving and decision making by the crew without real-time ground support. To build this understanding, we first surveyed the literature, focusing on how expert problem solvers construct and manipulate their mental models. Next, we interviewed expert problem solvers in spaceflight and analogous domains and surveyed industry solutions for data presentation. Finally, we analyzed current spaceflight operations by investigating flight controller anomaly resolution processes during ISS training simulations and real operational events. These methods led to creating a problem-solving framework that details common themes and features of attending to, assessing, analyzing, and acting on problems in complex, time-constrained domains. Using this framework and the results of our analysis, we identified conceptual data representations needed for crew-led problem-solving. Preliminary onboard user interface concepts to meet identified needs will be presented.