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Simon Wilson

Publications and source records attributed to Simon Wilson.

Future CH4 Budgets as Modelled By A Fully Coupled Earth System Model Using Prescribed GHG Concentrations vs. Interactive CH4 Sources and Sinks

We have used the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) Earth system model GISS-E2.1 to study the future budgets and trends of global and regional CH4 under different emission scenarios. GISS-E2.1 is one of the few ESMs that can be driven by anthropogenic CH4 emissions, as well as interactive natural sources such as wetlands, and can simulate the tropospheric CH4 chemistry. In frame of the recent short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs) assessment by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), we used the GISS-E2.1 model with prescribed long-lived greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations. In the present study, we have supplemented these simulations using the interactive CH4 sources and sinks in order to quantify the model performance and the sensitivity to CH4 sources and sinks. We have used the Current Legislation (CLE) and the Maximum Feasible Reduction (MFR) emission scenarios from the Eclipse V6b emission database to simulate the future chemical composition and climate impacts from 2015 to 2050. We have also simulated 1995-2014 in order to evaluate the model performance following the AMAP-SLCF protocol. The prescribed GHG version underestimates the Global Atmospheric Watch (GAW) surface CH4 observations during the period between 1995 and 2023 by 1% [-8.4%-2.0%], with a correlation (r) of 0.71 [-0.41 0.99]. The largest underestimations are over the continental emission regions such as North America, Europe, and Asia, while biases are smallest over oceans. On the other hand, the simulation with interactive sources and sinks underestimates the GAW observations more than the prescribed simulation, by 18.5% [-25% -10.4%], with a lower r of 0.36 [-0.82 0.93]. Opposite to the prescribed simulation, the biases are largest over oceans and smaller over the continents, however they are still larger over land than the prescribed simulation. The interactive simulation, with large sources virtually over land and strong sink over oceans, has a land/ocean ratio larger than 1 while the prescribed simulation has this ratio equal to 1 as it distributes the global prescribed CH4 concentration equally in longitude over a given latitude. This clearly shows that the interactive sources and sinks should be represented in models in order to realistically simulate the chemical composition and the oxidative capacity of the atmosphere. As expected, the MFR scenario simulates lower global surface CH4 concentrations and burdens compared to the CLE scenario, however in both cases, global surface CH4 and burden continue to increase through 2050 compared to present day. In the CLE scenario, increases are largest over the equatorial belt, in particular over India and East China, while the MFR scenario shows increases over the whole Southern Hemisphere, however much smaller compared to CLE. Finally, the interactive simulation shows that the chemical CH4 sink increases in the CLE scenario, while it slightly decreases in the MFR, leading to a larger CH4 lifetime in the MFR scenario compared to in the CLE scenario.

CH4↗

Reviews and syntheses: Arctic fire regimes and emissions in the 21st century

In recent years, the pan-Arctic region has experienced increasingly extreme fire seasons. Fires in the northern high latitudes are driven by current and future climate change, lightning, fuel conditions, and human activity. In this context, conceptualizing and parameterizing current and future Arctic fire regimes will be important for fire and land management as well as understanding current and predicting future fire emissions. The objectives of this review were driven by policy questions identified by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) Working Group and posed to its Expert Group on Short-Lived Climate Forcers. This review synthesizes current understanding of the changing Arctic and boreal fire regimes, particularly as fire activity and its response to future climate change in the pan-Arctic have consequences for Arctic Council states aiming to mitigate and adapt to climate change in the north. The conclusions from our synthesis are the following. (1) Current and future Arctic fires, and the adjacent boreal region, are driven by natural (i.e. lightning) and human-caused ignition sources, including fires caused by timber and energy extraction, prescribed burning for landscape management, and tourism activities. Little is published in the scientific literature about cultural burning by Indigenous populations across the pan-Arctic, and questions remain on the source of ignitions above 70_ N in Arctic Russia. (2) Climate change is expected to make Arctic fires more likely by increasing the likelihood of extreme fire weather, increased lightning activity, and drier vegetative and ground fuel conditions. (3) To some extent, shifting agricultural land use and forest transitions from forest–steppe to steppe, tundra to taiga, and coniferous to deciduous in a warmer climate may increase and decrease open biomass burning, depending on land use in addition to climate-driven biome shifts. However, at the country and landscape scales, these relationships are not well established. (4) Current black carbon and PM2:5 emissions from wildfires above 50 and 65_ N are larger than emissions from heanthropogenic sectors of residential combustion, transportation, and flaring. Wildfire emissions have increased from 2010 to 2020, particularly above 60_ N, with 56% of black carbon emissions above 65_ N in 2020 attributed to open biomass burning – indicating how extreme the 2020 wildfire season was and how severe future Arctic wildfire seasons can potentially be. (5) What works in the boreal zones to prevent and fight wildfires may not work in the Arctic. Fire management will need to adapt to a changing climate, economic development, the Indigenous and local communities, and fragile northern ecosystems, including permafrost and peatlands. (6) Factors contributing to the uncertainty of predicting and quantifying future Arctic fire regimes include underestimation of Arctic fires by satellite systems, lack of agreement between Earth observations and official statistics, and still needed refinements of location, conditions, and previous fire return intervals on peat and permafrost landscapes. This review highlights that much research is needed in order to understand the local and regional impacts of the changing Arctic fire regime on emissions and the global climate, ecosystems, and pan-Arctic communities.

Arctic↗

Anthropogenic Pathways for Modeling and Managing Future Arctic Fires

Wildland fires, including extreme fire events and seasons, are becoming more common in the boreal and Arctic regions due to climate change. Current climate modeling approaches do not include country- or region-specific socioeconomic pathways that specifically address the drivers of and potential mitigation techniques for wildland fires. Forest management, energy extraction, and tourism, together with firefighting capacity and readiness as well as fuels treatment, can have a significant impact on future wildland fire risks and impacts. To assess the impacts of anthropogenic factors and to align with previous work done on shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs), climate pathways for future wildfires up to 2050 were created for the states that compose the original Arctic Council countries: Canada, the United States, the Kingdom of Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, and Finland as well as the Russian Federation (with whom the other seven countries withdrew participation from in May 2022 due to the invasion and ongoing war in Ukraine). High and low fire activity and risk pathways for all states comprising the Arctic were made, with expert ‘best guess’ pathways for each state created separately to represent the middle of road. The low activity and low fire risk pathways, named “We Got This”, assume active fire suppression via citizenry participation and official land management, efficient and extensive fuel treatments, and consistent and active wildland firefighting for each new ignition. The high activity and high fire risk pathways, named “Let It Burn”, assume nearly the opposite, due to lack of government and community response and no action on climate change drivers that increase wildland fire risk. The ‘best guess’ pathway, named “The Fire Will Come”, indicates that some countries are currently on the pathway for less fire compared to other Arctic and Boreal states but not a ‘no-fire’ future. For example, in the Nordic countries, human ignition sources from tourism, timber and energy extraction, summer cottages, and expanding wildland-urban intermix due to exurban growth may increase. In North America, these same risks will apply but also may see an expansion of agriculture that increases the likelihood of open burning in croplands. Drier fuel condition and extreme heat events due to climate change create favorable conditions for extreme wildfires from any ignition source. Throughout the Arctic and boreal lightning is expected to increase, increasing the risk of tundra fires in addition to forest fires in hard-to-reach locations that are more difficult to coordinate and execute wildland firefighting. To move the future Arctic fire SSPs forward, several short-term and long-term actions must be completed. Certain data needs are required, like a harmonized pan-Arctic and pan-boreal fuels geospatial product, while also a need to refine and socialize current definitions of fire seasons and fire management – including developing an open-source system to track and share innovation, mitigation, and adaptation strategies across Arctic states.

Arctic↗