Joint attack detection and secure state estimation of cyber-physical systems
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Engineering topics
Publications and source records attributed to Sinopoli, Bruno.
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We study the robustness of flow networks against cascading failures under a partial load redistribution model. In particular, we consider a flow network of N lines with initial loads L 1 ,...,L N and free spaces (i.e., redundant space) S 1 ,...,S N that are independent and identically distributed with joint distribution P LS (x,y) = P[L ≤ x, S ≤ y]. The capacity C i is the maximum load allowed on line i and is given by C i = L i + S i . Furthermore, when a line fails due to overloading, it is removed from the system and (1 – ε) fraction of the load it was carrying is redistributed equally among all remaining lines in the system. The rest (i.e., ε fraction) of the load is assumed to be lost or absorbed, e.g., due to advanced circuitry disconnecting overloaded power lines or an interconnected network or material absorbing a fraction of the flow from overloaded lines. We analyze the robustness of this flow network against random attacks that remove a p fraction of the lines. Our contributions include (i) deriving the final fraction of alive lines n ∞ (p,ε) for all p,εϵ(0,1) and confirming the results via extensive simulations; (ii) showing that partial redistribution might lead to (depending on the parameter 0 < ε ≤ 1) the order of transition at the critical attack size p* changing from first to second-order; and (iii) proving analytically that flow networks achieve maximum robustness [quantified by the area ∫$^{1}_{0}$ n ∞ (p,ε)dp] when all lines have the same free space regardless of their initial load. The optimality of equal free-space allocation is also confirmed on real-world data from the UK National Power Grid.