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Smith, Brian E.

Publications and source records attributed to Smith, Brian E..

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

In the commercial aviation domain, large volumes of data are collected and analyzed on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that contribute to routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of non- representative safety data. Analysis of aviation accident data suggests that human error is implicated in up to 80% of accidents, which has been used to justify future visions for aviation in which the roles of human operators are greatly diminished or eliminated in the interest of creating a safer aviation system. However, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant and largely unrecognized risk when making policy decisions about human roles and responsibilities. Opportunities exist to leverage the vast amount of data that has already been collected, or could be easily obtained, to increase our understanding of human contributions to “things going right” in commercial aviation. The principal focus of this assessment was to identify current gaps and explore methods for identifying human “success” data generated by the aviation system, from personnel and within the supporting infrastructure.

Holbrook, Jon B.↗

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of nonrepresentative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made possible by human operators. With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant risk — a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel, a system is resilient if it can sustain required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed methods for capturing and analyzing new data.

Null, Cynthia H.↗

Current Safety Nets Within the U.S. National Airspace System

There are over 70,000 flights managed per day in the National Airspace System, with approximately 7,000 aircraft in the air over the United States at any given time. Operators of each of these flights would prefer to fly a user-defined “4D” trajectory (4DT), which includes arrival and departure times; preferred gates and runways at the airport; efficient, wind-optimal routes for departure, cruise and arrival phase of flight; and fuel efficient altitude profiles. To demonstrate the magnitude of this achievement a single flight from Los Angeles to Baltimore, accesses over 35 shared or “constrained” resources that are managed by roughly 30 air traffic controllers (at towers, approach control and en route sectors); along with traffic managers at 12 facilities, using over 22 different, independent automation system (including TBFM, ERAM, STARS, ASDE-X, FSM, TSD, GPWS, TCAS, etc.). In addition, dispatchers, ramp controllers and others utilize even more systems to manage each flight’s access to operator-managed resources. Flying an ideal 4DT requires successful coordination of all flight constraints among all flights, facilities, operators, pilots and controllers. Additionally, when conditions in the NAS change, the trajectories of one or more aircraft may need to be revised to avoid loss of flight efficiency, predictability, separation or system throughput. The Aviation Safety Network has released the 2016 airliner accident statistics showing a very low total of 19 fatal airliner accidents, resulting in 325 fatalities1. Despite several high profile accidents, the year 2016 turned out to be a very safe year for commercial aviation, Aviation Safety Network data show. Over the year 2016 the Aviation Safety Network recorded a total of 19 fatal airliner accidents [1], resulting in 325 fatalities. This makes 2016 the second safest year ever, both by number of fatal accidents as well as in terms of fatalities. In 2015 ASN recorded 16 accidents while in 2013 a total of 265 lives were lost. How can we keep it that way and not upset the apple cart by premature insertion of innovative technologies, functions, and procedures? In aviation, safety nets function as the last system defense against incidents and accidents. Current ground-based and airborne safety nets are well established and development to make them more efficient and reliable continues. Additionally, future air traffic control safety nets may emerge from new operational concepts.

Smith, Brian E.↗

Aviation Safety Concerns for the Future

The Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) is a multidisciplinary international group of aviation professionals that was established to identify possible future aviation safety hazards. The principle was adopted that future hazards are undesirable consequences of changes, and a primary activity of FAST became identification and prioritization of possible future changes affecting aviation. Since 2004, FAST has been maintaining a catalogue of "Areas of Change" (AoC) that could potentially influence aviation safety. The horizon for such changes is between 5 to 20 years. In this context, changes must be understood as broadly as possible. An AoC is a description of the change, not an identification of the hazards that result from the change. An ex-post analysis of the AoCs identified in 2004 demonstrates that changes catalogued many years previous were directly implicated in the majority of fatal aviation accidents over the past ten years. This paper presents an overview of the current content of the AoC catalogue and a subsequent discussion of aviation safety concerns related to these possible changes. Interactions among these future changes may weaken critical functions that must be maintained to ensure safe operations. Safety assessments that do not appreciate or reflect the consequences of significant interaction complexity will not be fully informative and can lead to inappropriate trade-offs and increases in other risks. The FAST strongly encourages a system-wide approach to safety risk assessment across the global aviation system, not just within the domain for which future technologies or operational concepts are being considered. The FAST advocates the use of the "Areas of Change" concept, considering that several possible future phenomena may interact with a technology or operational concept under study producing unanticipated hazards.

emerging risks↗

Transformational Phenomena as Predictors of Aircraft Accidents: What Goes Around Comes Around

Flight crew confusion, excessive stressworkload, and ineffective Crew Resource Management among other issues arising from dependence on automated systems on the flight deck have been identified as major causal factors in multiple fatal accidents, significant incidents and near misses. Many Loss of Control events have been traced to display of erroneous flight data and auto-flight system mode status to the crew. Safety was compromised by not having sufficiently obvious and unambiguous information available in order to permit quick diagnosis of aircraft status and then appropriate action to regain control of the aircraft energy state or trajectory. Continually evolving training and operational requirements related to aircraft automation have also presented critical challenges to commercial aviation. During times of high demand and low supply of experienced pilots (which is today the case in South-East Asia, for instance), basic training in manual flight may be minimal and as low as a few hundred flight hours on light aircraft before beginning training on advanced, highly automated aircraft. Predominant use of automation may cause aircrew trained in this way to have trouble performing traditionally simple operations such as manually switching to other runways or overriding the autopilot in tight situations. Inadequate crew training andor experience coupled with attempted manual flight in highly automated airplanes may more easily lead to loss of aircraft control in unusual situations such as high-altitude stallsupsets, traffic avoidance or maneuvering. Loss of basic piloting skills through increasing dependence on automation may exacerbate this problem. Finally, design changes by nature take a long time and are very costly. Incorporating novel automated functionality into new aircraft designs is technically feasible and desirable. However, it may take many years for these changes to have a significant impact on tomorrows fleet, given the time it takes to develop a new aircraft and for these aircraft to become a significant fraction of the fleet. This paper will review and summarize the findings and recommendations from a 2004 study of the topic, Increasing reliance on flight deck automation conducted by the Future Aviation Safety Team at the behest of the Joint Safety Strategy Initiative (JSSI) within the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) organization that existed at the time. Although this study was conducted more than ten years ago, its findings and recommendations are as relevant now as then and into the future.

safety↗

Prospective Safety Analysis and the Complex Aviation System

Fatal accident rates in commercial passenger aviation are at historic lows yet have plateaued and are not showing evidence of further safety advances. Modern aircraft accidents reflect both historic causal factors and new unexpected "Black Swan" events. The ever-increasing complexity of the aviation system, along with its associated technology and organizational relationships, provides fertile ground for fresh problems. It is important to take a proactive approach to aviation safety by working to identify novel causation mechanisms for future aviation accidents before they happen. Progress has been made in using of historic data to identify the telltale signals preceding aviation accidents and incidents, using the large repositories of discrete and continuous data on aircraft and air traffic control performance and information reported by front-line personnel. Nevertheless, the aviation community is increasingly embracing predictive approaches to aviation safety. The "prospective workshop" early assessment tool described in this paper represents an approach toward this prospective mindset-one that attempts to identify the future vectors of aviation and asks the question: "What haven't we considered in our current safety assessments?" New causation mechanisms threatening aviation safety will arise in the future because new (or revised) systems and procedures will have to be used under future contextual conditions that have not been properly anticipated. Many simulation models exist for demonstrating the safety cases of new operational concepts and technologies. However the results from such models can only be as valid as the accuracy and completeness of assumptions made about the future context in which the new operational concepts and/or technologies will be immersed. Of course that future has not happened yet. What is needed is a reasonably high-confidence description of the future operational context, capturing critical contextual characteristics that modulate both the likelihood of occurrence of hazards, and the likelihood that those hazards will lead to negative safety events. Heuristics extracted from scenarios, questionnaires, and observed trends from scanning the aviation horizon may be helpful in capturing those future changes in a way conducive to safety assessment. What is also needed is a checklist of potential sources of emerging risk that arise from organizational features that are frequently overlooked. The ultimate goal is to develop a pragmatic, workable method for using descriptions of the future aviation context, to generate valid predictions of safety risks.

prospection↗

Summary of HEAT 1 Aeroacoustics Installation Effects

A critical part of the NASA High-Speed Research (HSR) program is the demonstration of satisfactory suppression of the jet noise present at low airspeeds. One scheme for reducing jet exhaust noise generated by a future High-Speed Civil Transport (HSCT) is the use of a mixer/ ejector system which would entrain large quantities of ambient air into the exhaust flow from the powerplant in order to cool and slow the jet exhaust before it leaves the tailpipe. Of the variety of factors which can affect the noise suppression characteristics of the mixer/ejector system, the influence of the wing flow field and high-lift devices is not well understood. The effectiveness of the noise suppression device must be evaluated in the presence of the wing/high-lift system before definitive assessments can be made concerning HSCT noise. Of nearly equal importance is the evaluation of the performance of the high-lift system(s) in the presence of realistic propulsion units which feature high ambient flow entrainment rates and jet thrust coefficients. These noise suppressors must provide the required acoustic attenuation while not overly degrading the thrust efficiency of the propulsion system or the lift enhancement of the high-lift devices on the wing. The overall objective of the NASA High-lift Engine Aeroacoustics Technology program is to demonstrate satisfactory interaction between the jet noise suppressor and the high-lift system at airspeeds and angles of attack consistent with takeoff, climb, approach, and landing. In support of this program, an isolated aeroacoustic test of a 13.5%-scale, candidate mixer/ejector nozzle was performed in the Ames' Research Center 40- by 80-Foot Wind Tunnel. The purpose of the test was to measure the baseline aeroacoustic performance characteristics of this nozzle in isolation from the aerodynamic flowfield induced by an HSCT airframe. The test documented the acoustic signature of the nozzles with treated and hardwall ejector surfaces and with changes in the ratio of ejector-duct-to-jet-area over a wide range range of nozzle pressure ratios and freestream Mach numbers. The test also measured the thrust performance, ambient-flow aspiration ratio, and internal and external static pressures on the nozzles. The isolated aeroacoustic performance data has been compared with results obtained with this nozzle installed on a 13.5% Boeing Reference H HSCT configuration, semi-span model. The semi-span, aeroacoustics integration test documented the first-order effects of the airframe flowfield on the acoustic performance of the nozzle and the effect of the nozzle secondary inlet flows on the aerodynamic performance of the wing high-lift systems. This investigation is critical to understanding the mutual installation effects of mixer/ejector nozzles and wing high-lift systems.

Smith, Brian E.↗

High-Lift Engine Aeroacoustics Technology (HEAT) Test Program Overview

The NASA High-Speed Research program developed the High-Lift Engine Aeroacoustics Technology (HEAT) program to demonstrate satisfactory interaction between the jet noise suppressor and high-lift system of a High-Speed Civil Transport (HSCT) configuration at takeoff, climb, approach and landing conditions. One scheme for reducing jet exhaust noise generated by an HSCT is the use of a mixer-ejector system which would entrain large quantities of ambient air into the nozzle exhaust flow through secondary inlets in order to cool and slow the jet exhaust before it exits the nozzle. The effectiveness of such a noise suppression device must be evaluated in the presence of an HSCT wing high-lift system before definitive assessments can be made concerning its acoustic performance. In addition, these noise suppressors must provide the required acoustic attenuation while not degrading the thrust efficiency of the propulsion system or the aerodynamic performance of the high-lift devices on the wing. Therefore, the main objective of the HEAT program is to demonstrate these technologies and understand their interactions on a large-scale HSCT model. The HEAT program is a collaborative effort between NASA-Ames, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, Douglas Aircraft Corp., Lockheed-Georgia, General Electric and NASA - Lewis. The suppressor nozzles used in the tests were Generation 1 2-D mixer-ejector nozzles made by General Electric. The model used was a 13.5%-scale semi-span model of a Boeing Reference H configuration.

Zuniga, Fanny A.↗

Secondary Wing System for Use on an Aircraft

A secondary wing system for use on an aircraft augments the lift, stability, and control of the aircraft at subsonic speeds. The secondary wing system includes a mechanism that allows the canard to be retracted within the contour of the aircraft fuselage from an operational position to a stowed position. The top surface of the canard is exposed to air flow in the stowed position, and is contoured to integrate aerodynamically and smoothly within the contour of the fuselage when the canard is retracted for high speed flight. The bottom portion of the canard is substantially flat for rotation into a storage recess within the fuselage. The single canard rotates about a vertical axis at its spanwise midpoint. The canard can be positioned between a range of sweep angles during flight and a stowed position in which its span is substantially parallel to the aircraft fuselage. The canard can be deployed and retracted during flight. The deployment mechanism includes a circular mounting ring and drive mechanism that connects the canard with the fuselage and permits it to rotate and to change incidence. The deployment mechanism further includes retractable fairings which serve to streamline the wing when it is retracted into the top of the fuselage.

Smith, Brian E.↗

Hover performance validation of an ejector configured STOVL fighter aircraft

The hover thrust performance of a full-scale model of an ejector-lift/vectored thrust Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) fighter configuration was measured at the Outdoor Aerodynamic Research Facility of the National Full-Scale Aerodynamics Complex located at NASA Ames Research Center. The static thrust of the lifting ejector and ventral nozzle was calibrated at an out-of-ground-effect height. The test permitted comparison with static thrust calibrations obtained in the 80- by 120-Foot Wind Tunnel. The average static thrust augmentation ratio of the ejector system was 1.55 compared with the design goal of 1.63. The outdoor test showed that the addition of short extensions to the diffuser on the fuselage sidewall decreased suckdown and increased ejector performance. As expected, an increase in the ventral nozzle thrust deflection angle from nearly horizontal to the vertical-lift hover position caused a significant decrease in thrust. Flow visualization using smoke revealed greater secondary airflow into the left ejector and the penetration of hot ventral gases along the ground beneath and between the cool plumes from the ejector system.

Naumowicz, Tim↗

Aerodynamic performance of a full-scale lifting ejector system in a STOVL fighter aircraft

The aerodynamic characteristics of an advanced lifting ejector system incorporated into a full-scale, powered, fighter aircraft model were measured at statically and at transition airspeeds in the 40- by 80- and 80- by 120-Foot Wind Tunnels at NASA-Ames. The ejector system was installed in an ejector-lift/vectored thrust STOVL (Short Take-Off Vertical Landing) fighter aircraft configuration. Ejector thrust augmentation ratios approaching 1.6 were demonstrated during static testing. Changes in the internal aerodynamics and exit flow conditions of the ejector ducts are presented for a variety of wind-off and forward-flight test conditions. Wind-on test results indicate a small decrease in ejector performance and increase in exit flow nonuniformity with forward speed. Simulated ejector start-up at high speed, nose-up attitudes caused only small effects on overall vehicle forces and moments despite the fact that the ejector inlet flow was found to induce large regions of negative pressure on the upper surface of the wing apex adjacent to the inlets.

Smith, Brian E.↗

Propulsion-induced aerodynamics of an ejector-configured STOVL fighter aircraft

Propulsion-induced aerodynamic effects are computed by using data obtained from tests of a full-scale model of the E-7A configuration that were run in the NASA Ames 40 x 80 and 80 x 120-foot tunnels. These effects are shown both in aerodynamic coefficients and nondimensionalized by thrust versus equivalent velocity. The test results show that the full-scale ventral nozzle-induced effects are smaller than scale model data, while the ejector-induced effects demonstrate fair agreement. The effect of tunnel test section size is primarily observed at low and static speed, high thrust conditions, as seen in comparisons of data from both tunnels. The 80 x 120-foot tunnel test gave better static thrust calibrations and permitted a greater range of test freestream velocities and angles-of-attack, extending the database provided by the full-scale model.

Poppen, William A.↗

Comparison of model- and full-scale wind-tunnel performance

Experimental results from the Integrated Systems Test of the upgraded National Full-Scale Aerodynamics Complex 40- by 80-ft wind tunnel located at NASA Ames Research Center, which took place in 1987, are compared with results obtained with a 1/50 scale model of the wind tunnel. Test-section flow characteristics, air-exchange performance, total pressure distributions, and wall-static pressure distributions obtained with the model- and full-scale facilities are compared. The 1/50-scale model data were used to predict qualitative performance trends of the full-scale facility during investigation of design changes. Despite large differences in scale and Reynolds number between the two tunnels, quantitative agreement between certain model and full-scale performance characteristics was quite good.

Smith, Brian E.↗

Large-scale wind tunnel studies of a jet-engined powered ejector-lift STOVL aircraft

A full-scale model of a supersonic STOVL single engine flighter aircraft employing an ejector to augment lift in hover and in low-speed flight was tested in the 40- by 80-ft and 80- by 120-ft test sections of the National Full-Scale Aerodynamics Complex located at the NASA Ames Research Center. The measured ejector augmentation ratio in hover met the design requirement of 1.6 and continued to provide the lift necessary in forward flight for good transition qualities. The up-and-away aerodynamics (ejector system stowed) were found to be conventional for this class of vehicle. The pitch control provided by the full-span blown flaps is sufficient to control the large pitching moments generated by ventral exhaust nozzle vectoring and propulsion induced aerodynamic effects such as the turning of the flow entrained into the ejectors.

Dudley, Michael R.↗

Application of a panel method to wake-vortex/wing interaction and comparison with experimental data

The ability of the Vortex Separation AEROdynamics (VSAERO) program to calculate aerodynamic loads on wings due to interaction with free vortices was studied. The loads were calculated for various positions of a downstream following wing relative to an upstream vortex-generating wing. Calculated vortex-induced span loads, rolling-moment coefficients, and lift coefficients on the following wing were compared with experimental results of McMillan et al. and El-Ramly et al. Comparisons of calculated and experimental vortex tangential velocities were also made.

Smith, Brian E.↗

Aerodynamic characteristics of the modified 40- by 80-foot wind tunnel as measured in a 1/50th-scale model

The aerodynamic characteristics of the 40- by 80-Foot Wind Tunnel at Ames Research Center were measured by using a 1/50th-scale facility. The model was configured to closely simulate the features of the full-scale facility when it became operational in 1986. The items measured include the aerodynamic effects due to changes in the total-pressure-loss characteristics of the intake and exhaust openings of the air-exchange system, total-pressure distributions in the flow field at locations around the wind tunnel circuit, the locations of the maximum total-pressure contours, and the aerodynamic changes caused by the installation of the acoustic barrier in the southwest corner of the wind tunnel. The model tests reveal the changes in the aerodynamic performance of the 1986 version of the 40- by 80-Foot Wind Tunnel compared with the performance of the 1982 configuration.

Smith, Brian E.↗