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Smith, Morag K

Publications and source records attributed to Smith, Morag K.

Field Trial of LANL On-Line Advanced Enrichment Monitor for UF6 GCEP

The outline of this presentation is: (1) Technology basis of on-line enrichment monitoring; (2) Timescale of trial; (3) Description of installed equipment; (4) Photographs; (5) Results; (6) Possible further development; and (7) Conclusions. Summary of the good things about the Advanced Enrichment Monitor (AEM) performance is: (1) High accuracy - normally better than 1% relative, (2) Active system as accurate as passive system, (3) Fast and accurate detection of enrichment changes, (4) Physics is well understood, (5) Elegant method for capturing pressure signal, and (6) Data capture is automatic, low cost and fast. A couple of negative things are: (1) Some jumps in measured passive enrichment - of around +2% relative (due to clock errors?); and (2) Data handling and evaluation is off-line, expensive and very slow. Conclusions are: (1) LANL AEM is being tested on E23 plant at Capenhurst; (2) The trial is going very well; (3) AEM could detect production of HEU at potentially much lower cost than existing CEMO; (4) AEM can measure {sup 235}U assay accurately; (5) Active system using X-Ray source would avoid need for pressure measurement; (6) Substantial work lies ahead to go from current prototype to a production instrument.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Improving accuracy and reliability of 186-keV measurements for unattended enrichment monitoring

Improving the quality of safeguards measurements at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs), whilst reducing the inspection effort, is an important objective given the number of existing and new plants that need to be safeguarded. A useful tool in many safeguards approaches is the on-line monitoring of enrichment in process pipes. One aspect of this measurement is a simple, reliable and precise passive measurement of the 186-keV line from {sup 235}U. (The other information required is the amount of gas in the pipe. This can be obtained by transmission measurements or pressure measurements). In this paper we describe our research efforts towards such a passive measurement system. The system includes redundant measurements of the 186-keV line from the gas and separately from the wall deposits. The design also includes measures to reduce the effect of the potentially important background. Such an approach would practically eliminate false alarms and can maintain the operation of the system even with a hardware malfunction in one of the channels. The work involves Monte Carlo modeling and the construction of a proof-of-principle prototype. We will carry out experimental tests with UF{sub 6} gas in pipes with and without deposits in order to demonstrate the deposit correction.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Defining the questions: a research agenda for nontraditional authentication in arms control

Many traditional authentication techniques have been based on hardware solutions. Thus authentication of measurement system hardware has been considered in terms of physical inspection and destructive analysis. Software authentication has implied hash function analysis or authentication tools such as Rose. Continuity of knowledge is maintained through TIDs and cameras. Although there is ongoing progress improving all of these authentication methods, there has been little discussion of the human factors involved in authentication. Issues of non-traditional authentication include sleight-of-hand substitutions, monitor perception vs. reality, and visual diversions. Since monitor confidence in a measurement system depends on the product of their confidences in each authentication element, it is important to investigate all authentication techniques, including the human factors. This paper will present an initial effort to identify the most important problems that traditional authentication approaches in safeguards have not addressed and are especially relevant to arms control verification. This will include a survey of the literature and direct engagement with nontraditional experts in areas like psychology and human factors. Based on the identification of problem areas, potential research areas will be identified and a possible research agenda will be developed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗